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Fiedler's Contingency Model: An Inferential Analysis of 
Leadership"]! (19 80) 
Directed by: Dr. Roland H. Nelson Jr. Pp. 307. 
The purpose of this study was to show that the cnarac-
ters in leadership positions (formal and informal) portrayed 
in Billy Budd and The Caine Mutiny performed predictably with 
respect to the parameters of the Fiedler Contingency Model 
of leadership effectiveness. Qualitative inferences con­
cerning character motivations and actions were derived by 
using the Contingency Model as a baseline for analysis of 
various leadership behaviors. The two novels selected for 
this study provided realistic microcosms of bureaucratic 
organizations in situations which revealed botn task-
motivated and relationship-motivated leadership types. 
Since these leadership types comprise a variety of 
characteristics encountered in leaders throughout many kinds 
of organizations, this study has nearly universal applica­
tion. Additionally, the situational variables reflected 
the degree of "favorableness" most conducive to the leader­
ship types portrayed. Analyzing the interaction of tnese 
situational variables and characters has projected some 
degree of predictability for effectiveness of leadership 
types described in Fiedler's theory. Some conclusions were 
that leaders are more effective in some situations (jobs, 
circumstances, organizations) than others and that a leader's 
effectiveness can be enhanced more easily by changing his 
situation than by attempts to change him as an individual. 
Ideally, an exceptional leader must possess the judgment to 
recognize (or even create) the variables of fluid situations 
and have the personal flexibility to employ either a task-
motivated or a relationship-motivated leadership style. 
In attempting to illustrate predictable leadership 
effectiveness through inferential character analysis, 
complex psychological and philosophical dimensions had to 
be considered. Too often, leadersnip has been assessed 
only in terms of quantifiable productivity in our results-
oriented society. Of course this is the "proof of the 
pudding" approach to evaluate leaders but it is too simplis­
tic to be comprehensive. 
To achieve a more comprehensive evaluation of leader­
ship types, inferences have been drawn to show predictable 
leader effectiveness not only through the actions of 
characters but also in psychological and philosophical terms 
which influenced those actions. Hopefully, the result has 
been to produce a more multi-dimensional insight into the 
complexity of leader behavior. 
To accomplish the purpose of this study, a literary 
approach was used to involve readers vicariously in 
realistic situations of leadership. Only those portions of 
each novel which portrayed salient qualities of leadership 
(motivations, words, actions) in the characters were sum­
marized. These qualities were carefully selected for 
inclusion as a part of leader profiles which would later 
become points of analysis. Documented comments of scholarly 
critics have substantiated the realism of the leader profiles 
presented throughout this dissertation. The style is 
relatively free of complex terms and professional jargon 
(nautical terms excepted) in order to enhance readability 
for professionals in virtually any field. It is hoped that 
people in all kinds of organizations can derive some benefit 
by recognizing situations or styles of leadership portrayed 
here which might aid thein in becoming more effective leaders 
or at least in understanding leadership behavior within 
their respective organizations. 
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Theories of leadership are as diverse and numerous as 
the writers who attempt to define or quantify such an 
elusive concept of human behavior. The variables and their 
combinations seem infinite and complex, thereby rendering 
exact conclusions virtually meaningless except, perhaps, in 
extremely controlled or very specific environments. While 
quantitative research is important in leadership studies, much 
of the research in this area is of a qualitative and 
inferential nature which suggests generalizations about 
the interaction between leadership theory and leadership 
practices. A good compromise of these two approaches 
appears to be embodied in the case study method which 
analyzes a specific microcosmic slice of organizational 
life and suggests macrocosmic generalities which can be 
applied to variable situations in a manner deemed appro­
priate by whomever the reader might be. 
Much has been written about leadership within 
bureaucracies and military leadership in particular. In 
the military context, the Navy has often been considered 
exceptionally steeped in tradition, protocol, and strict 
adherence to duty in the accomplishment of its mission. 
Even though some changes nave occurred in iiavy regulations 
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during the last two decades, the remnants of what con­
stitutes traditional naval leadership, based on centuries-
old precedent, continue to pervade naval commands. 
Recent studies (Klemp, Munger, & Spencer, 1977) 
have been conducted by the Navy in order to ascertain 
specific competencies of superior naval officers in an 
effort to bridge the gap between what theory says leadership 
should be and what officers actually do. 
Within this context, the dissertation which follows 
will evaluate Fiedler's Contingency Model of leadership 
effectiveness through a comprehensive study of Herman Mel­
ville's Billy Budd (1891) and Herman Wouk's The Caine Mutiny 
(1951). It is hypothesized that the main characters in 
leadership positions (both formal and informal) of the 
novels The Caine Mutiny and Billy Budd performed predictably 
with respect to Fiedler's Contingency Model of leadership 
effectiveness. 
Fiedler's Model is based on the assumption that no 
single personality trait pattern or style of leadership 
behavior assures effective performance in all leadership 
situations. Fiedler believes that "the performance of a 
group is contingent upon both the motivational system of 
the leader and the degree to which the leader has control 
and influence in a particular situation, the 'situation 
favorableness'" (Fiedler & Chemers, 197^, p. 73). Briefly, 
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a leader attempts to satisfy his own goals as well as those 
of the organization or group. 
Since the subjects of this study are literary charac­
ters, this writer can only vicariously analyze their 
respective behaviors. Ostensibly, statistical data cannot 
be gathered from fictional persons so there will be no 
"hard evidence" to support the aforementioned hypothesis. 
However, the novels selected basically reflect "real-life" 
contingency situations appropriate for inferential correla­
tion with Fiedler's Contingency Model. Statistical data will 
consist of tables and graphs of Fiedler's Contingency Model, 
as well as any other relevant quantitative data. 
After a brief introductory overview of pertinent 
leadership theories and a presentation of the Fiedler 
Contingency Model, the basic structure of this study 
will utilise the literary approach in showing: a 
relationship between inferences derived from literary 
criticism of the novels mentioned and Fiedler's Contingency 
Model of leadership. 
CHAPTER I 
LEADERSHIP: AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW 
A study of a concept as broad and complex as leadership 
behavior and effectiveness is a challenge. The 
more one researches the current and past theories commensu­
rate with supplemental tables and charts, the more one 
realizes the futility of arriving at a single "model" which 
would encompass all the independent and dependent variables 
of interaction among a structured group of people. The 
world is, indeed, primarily gray. 
Ralph Stogdill (197*0 aptly observed that there are 
probably as many different definitions of leadership as 
there are persons who have attempted to define the concept. 
His survey of leadership theory seems to point toward a 
general consensus definition of leadership as a "social 
influence process." Similarly, Kast and Rosenzweig (197*0 
state that "leadership is (1) a process and (2) a status 
grouping. Directors, executives, administrators, managers, 
bosses, and chiefs would typically be included in the cate­
gory called leadership" (p. 3*J1). However, both men contend 
that there is a distinction between a manager and a leader 
stated as follows: 
Leadership is a part of management, but not all of it. 
A manager is required to plan and organize, for 
example, but all we ask of the leader is that he get 
others to follow .... Leadership is the ability 
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to persuade others to seek defined objectives enthusi­
astically. It is the human factor which binds a group 
together and motivates it toward goals. Management 
activities such as planning, organizing, and decision­
making, are dormant cocoons until the leader triggers 
the power of motivation in people and guides them 
toward goals. (p. 3^1) 
In a broader sense, it is obvious from the foregoing 
quotation that one must study leadership in the context of 
management, organization, and systems. 
However, despite the fact that many writers have attempted 
to "codify" the concept of leadership into a systematic 
behavior or a list of character traits, leadership remains an 
elusive intangible art which cannot be measured only in 
terms of productivity charts and goal achievement. So, 
what is a successful leader? 
Erik Erikson has suggested that the successful and 
creative leader tries to solve for all what he cannot 
solve for himself alone. If this definition is accepted, 
the study of leadership becomes an analysis of the 
relation between an individual whose motivations are 
never transparent and a group whose reasons for respond­
ing to him are invariably complex, rooted as they are in 
historical circumstance. (Graubard, 1968, p. v) 
Ideally, Shmidt and Tannenbaum (1976) perceive the success­
ful leader as follows: 
The successful leader is one who accurately understands 
himself, the individuals and group he is dealing with, 
and the compr^y and broader social environment in which 
he operates. ... If direction is in order, he is able 
to direct; if considerable participative freedom is 
called for, he is able to provide such freedom. . . * 
Thus, the successful manager of men can be- primarily 
characterized neither as a strong leader nor as a 
permissive one. . . . Being both insightful and 
flexible, he is less likely to see the problem of 
leadership as a dilemma. (p. 126) 
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Tannenbaum portrays leadership behavior on a linear continuum 
betv/een "boss-centered leadership" and "subordinate-centered 
leadership (Shmidt & Tannenbaum, 1976, Figure 1, p. 117).* 
A second figure reflects a convolinear interaction of 
"manager and non-manager behavior" not only in the organiza­
tion but also within the broader societal environment 
(Shmidt & Tannenbaum, 1976, Figure 2, p. 129).* 
Seeing graphic portrayals of leadership often leads 
one to conclude that there is a "system" to effective 
leadership but these figures only suggest in tangible form 
the intangible art of motivating others to action. Peter 
Vaill defined art as "the attempt to wrest more coherence 
and meaning out of more reality than we ordinarily try to 
deal with" (IicCall, 1977, p. 16). Thus, management through 
leadership becomes a kind of performing art which orchestrates 
a complex series of events, processes, and systems. This 
idea poses a crucial, yet unresolved question of whether a 
manager can, as a creative leader, effectively control his 
environment or is a leadership style constrained by the 
parameters dictated by the leader's environment? 
In partial answer to this question, Morgan W. McCall 
believes that "environment determines (a) what leaders do and 
(b) which leadership roles are most critical to the organi­
zation. Whether leadership matters is a function of envi­
ronment" (McCall, 1978, p. 6). McCall qualifies his 
*Attached at end of chapter. 
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assertion by perceiving the leader's environment as a func­
tion of organizational design with leaders as designers. 
"Structural intervention in task, reward, feedback, and power 
distributions can serve as 'substitutes' for leadership 
and leaders can be viewed as designers" (McCall, 1978, in 
Abstract). Hence the design properties of an organizational 
environment have a great deal to do with providing the 
proper conditions for the emergence of effective leadership 
as indicated below: 
Making design decisions about leadership involves an 
intensive look at environmental constraints. Such 
decisions also require conscious deliberation over 
what leadership should mean to the organization. It is 
theoretically possible to design a structure in which 
leadership will matter very little. This is what the 
bureaucratic model is all about. It is also possible 
to design structures which place considerably more 
importance on individual leaders. As leaders matter 
more, the success or failure of the organization relies 
more heavily on individual skills and abilities. 
(McCall, 1978, p. 7) 
The most important implication of design decisions is the 
power conferred on leaders to act as designers of their 
units. As a result, the leader is held accountable relative 
to his impact on the subordinate group. 
Most recent theorists of effective leadership contend 
that two situational variables crucially interact within 
an organizational environment and have an influential bearing 
on leadership style. 
The first includes structural features of the organiza­
tion such as power structure, task structure, and 
patterns of interpersonal relationships. . . . The 
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second type refers to personality variables used to 
describe persons who interact within the organiza­
tional structures. (O'Brien, 1971, p. 1^9) 
These situational variables will be explored later in the 
context of Fiedler's Contingency Model (Chapter II). But 
first, it is important to note several schools of thought 
which might have had a bearing on the basic research of 
Fiedler's Contingency Model of leadership effectiveness 
which was developed between 1951 and 1963 based on the 
findings of over 800 experimental groups (Fiedler & Chemers, 
197*0. The overview which follows is by no means all-
inclusive but should acquaint the reader with major trends 
of leadership theory beginning with the era of the industrial 
revolution, progressing through the mid-twentieth century, 
and ending with some current leadership thought. 
The Era of Scientific Management 
In 1886, Henry H. Towne, founder of Yale and Towne Lock 
Company, sent out an appeal for writings in management 
theory and practice through the American Society of Mechani­
cal Engineers (ASME). Many articles were published in 
the group's magazine, Transactions, and were primarily 
functional in terms of leadership and management. 
In 1895 Frederick W. Taylor published an article in 
Transactions entitled "Piece Work System" which proposed 
that performance standards should be based on a "scientific" 
determination of how long a job should take. The era of 
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"scientific management" was launched in 1911 with the 
publication of Taylor's The Principles of Scientific 
Management which advocated the idea of separating "planning 
from doing" and the beginning of functional staff organiza­
tion. 
According to Haimann and Scott (197*1)» Taylor was 
followed by writers like Henry Gantt who published studies 
concerning production control. Many firms still use the 
famous Gantt Chart in managing production schedules. Frank 
and Lillian Gilbreth are noted for their "time and motion" 
studies to determine the most efficient means of production. 
Overseas, a French mining engineer by the name of Henry 
Fayol published his General and Industrial Management in 
1916 which was later translated into English in 19^9- He 
advocated the scientific management school of thought and 
is credited with dividing management activities into six 
groups: technical, commercial, financial, security, account­
ing, and managerial. Fayol further subdivided the managerial 
element into planning, organizing, command, coordination, 
and control. This emphasis on management was the basic 
departure of Fayol from Taylor since the perspective of 
Taylor's work was from the bottom or "shop level." 
The theorists of the scientific management movement 
held the basic premise that man is a rational animal and 
works solely for economic gain. Another dimension was 
added by the human relations movement beginning in 1927 
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with the famous Hawthorne Studies designed by Elton Mayo 
and conducted by F. J. Roethlisberger and William J. 
Dickson. The project began as a series of experiments in 
industrial psychology based on the assumption that a direct 
relationship existed between workers' productivity and the 
physical condition of the work environment. As a result 
of the Hawthorne Studies, the behavioral sciences were 
introduced to management and leadership (Haimann & Scott, 
1974). 
In addition to new management principles, the 1930s 
produced theories of the modern business organization and 
established management as a recognized discipline. James 
D. Mooney and Alan C. Reiley systematized principles of 
formal organi2',at ions. "They considered unity of action the 
principle underlying all organizational efforts and from it 
they derived three subordinate principles: (1) the scalar 
principle, based on delegation that created the chain 
of command coupled with unity of command; (2) the functional 
principle, based on specialization of work; (3) line and 
staff, which introduced the idea of support and advisory 
activities for the main functions of an organization" 
(Haimann & Scott, 197^, p. 27). In 1938, Chester I 
Barnard, vice-president of the New Jersey Bell. Telephone 
Company, published The Functions of the Executive which 
influenced leadership and managerial thinking long after 
World War II. 
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Barnard suggested that management's responsibility was 
to create a cooperative system capable of satisfying 
the personal objectives of employees while meeting 
the impersonal objectives of the business. He said 
that a business could exist by satisfying one or the 
other objective but a cooperative system would meet 
both. (Haimann & Scott, 1974, p. 28) 
Today's leadership, managerial and organizational thinking 
seem to embody the basic tenets of Barnard and the human 
relations movement in general. Concern for the individual, 
the environment, and the societal obligations of business 
are obvious ramifications of increasing emphasis on the 
human element within productive economies throughout the 
world. However, it must be noted here that Barnard and 
other advocates of the human relations movement in the 
Western World were greatly influenced by a German sociolo­
gist by the name of Max Weber. 
Weber and the Bureaucratic-Charismatic Leader 
The important personality variable of "charisma" in 
evaluating leadership effectiveness within a bureaucratic 
organization was greatly emphasized in Max Weber's The 
Theory of Social and Economic Organization published in 
Germany in 1922. Weber proposed t'hat leadership was 
derived not only from law and tradition but also charisma. 
Unquestionably, many Western social scientists have 
been influenced by the Weberian idea of the leader who 
enjoys his authority not through enacted position or 
traditional dignity, but owing to gifts of grace 
(charisma) "by virtue of which he is set apart from 
other men and treated as endowed with supernatural, 
superhuman, or at least specifically, exceptional 
powers or qualities." (Tucker, 1968, p. 721) 
To fully understand Weber's theory of charismatic 
leadership, one must look beyond organizational constraints 
and focus on social movements. The concepts of charismatic 
leadership and social movement are practically inseparable. 
There are basically four phases of a social movement in­
spired by the charismatic leader illustrated as follows: 
(1) The initial phase is the formation of a charismatic 
following, a group of persons who cluster around the 
charismatic personality and accept his authority. . . . 
(2) As a charismatic following grows, attracting new 
members in larger and larger numbers, it achieves the 
status of a movement. ... (3) Once in power, the 
movement becomes a movement-regime with enormous 
resources of influence. . . . (*0 Finally, a charismatic 
movement, particularly one that comes to power in a 
nation, may become international in scope, radiating 
across national boundaries and enlisting new followers 
everywhere. (Tucker, 1968, p. 739) 
The best time for such a leader to emerge is when social 
distress arises from discontent with economic, political, 
or religious conditions. Often, the atrocities inflicted 
by charismatic leaders emphasize that this type of leader is 
not always "good" and his followers are not necessarily 
rational. "Weber uses 'charisma' in a value-neutral manner: 
To be a charismatic leader is not necessarily to be an 
admirable individual" (Tucker, 1968, p. 735)- The charismatic 
following is motivated primarily by love, passionate 
devotion, and enthusiasm. 
It might be tempting to say that for Weber, the leader 
is, in a sense, a deus ex machina, a nan who brings 
about what social forces and the institutions in which 
13 
they are crystallized are unable to accomplish, namely 
to co-ordinate the various conflicting interests and 
unify the groups which represent them. (Lachmann, 
1971, p. 129) 
Weber's concept of the charismatic leader is not 
totally absorbed in projecting the leader in a god-like 
role within a sweeping social movement with world-wide 
impact. Weber strongly emphasized the positive elements 
of the organizational bureaucratic model upon the premise 
that man would act rationally within a basically rationally 
designed, structured environment. Hence, a bureaucratic-
charismatic organizational model would emerge as indicated 
below: 
The rotation of leadership types referred to were 
believed by Weber to take place against a background of 
increasing rationalization in society. The process 
may be conceived as a (bureaucratic-charismatic) cycle 
fluctuating around a rising curve (social rationaliza­
tion). . . . Charismatic leadership based on the 
acceptance of a leader because of his presumed, unusual 
personality traits, was held to disrupt the process of 
rationalization. (Gouldner, 1965, p. 60) 
Weber also stressed the need for adaptability and a good 
sense of timing in the charismatic leader in addition to 
the very important factor of who designs the organization. 
With designed institutions, it matters a good deal who 
designs them. . . . Those who are good at conciliating 
conflicting group interests and devising compromises 
which minimize social friction are not necessarily 
qualified as designers of institutions. Successful 
manipulation of interests are unlikely to. excel in the 
quality of craftsmanship. Those whose minds are too 
absorbed the problems of the day are unlikely to be 
good prophets. (Lachman, 1971, p. 138) 
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It should be obvious by now that most current theories 
retain earlier models while adding situational contingencies. 
The last thirty years (1950s-1980s) of leadership theory 
have been a blend of scientific, behavioral, and Weberian 
schools of thought modified by the more recent trends of 
humanism. 
Recent Humanistic Leadership Theory 
Reminiscent of Barnard's views of the '30s is the 
"Motivation-Hygiene Theory" proposed by Frederick Herzberg 
in 1959. Two hundred engineers in the Pittsburgh area were 
interviewed and asked to relate events experienced in their 
work that had resulted in a marked improvement of their 
job satisfaction or a reduction in job satisfaction. "Five 
factors stand out as strong determiners of job satisfaction: 
achievement, recognition, work itself, responsibility, and 
advancement; the last three being of greater importance for 
lasting change of attitudes" (Herzberg, 1966, p. 72). 
In contrast, "the major dissatisfiers were company policy 
and administration, supervision, salary, interpersonal 
relations and working conditions" (Herzberg, 1966, p. 74). 
Hence, the satisfiers seem to describe man's relationship 
to what he does and the dissatisfiers relate more to the 
environment in which a person works. Herzberg refers to 
these factors as "motivators" and "hygiene factors" 
respectively. In a very real sense, Herzberg designed his 
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study to test man's two types of needs: his need to avoid 
pain and his need to grow psychologically. 
These animal and human instincts in man were further 
explored by Abraham Maslow and have a direct bearing on 
both leader and follower behavior since attitudes motivate 
actions which are contingent upon unmet needs. Maslow 
(1970) postulated that man has five basic needs which are 
depicted in a pyramid arrangement of hierarchy. At the 
base of the pyramid are man's physiological needs which 
must be fulfilled prior to ascending to the next level, 
safety. As each need is satisfied, man can progress to the 
next higher level. After safety is love, then esteem, and 
finally self-actualization. Self-actualization, the highest 
level of need, is the most difficult to define. It can be 
said that this is the need to become one's full potential. 
It is evident from Maslow's need hierarchy that most 
leaders would have a strong tendency to achieve (or attempt 
to achieve) the last two levels at the apex of the pyramid. 
"The satisfaction of needs measures the fulfillment provided 
against the expectations one brings to it. Autonomy and 
self-actualization are two needs which managers pointed out 
as tops in priority. Security is no longer a primary 
problem" (Haire, Ghiselli, and Porter, 1966, p. 17^0. 
Another important leadership ingredient is the manner 
in which a leader perceives his followers. Douglas 
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MacGregor (i960) theorized that an organizational climate 
was based on assumptions of Theory X or Theory Y. A leader/ 
manager who fits into the Theory X group prefers an organiza­
tional climate of close control, centralized authority, 
autocratic leadership, and minimum participation in 
decision-making. He believes the average worker is lazy and 
needs to be forced or threatened to perform well. In 
contrast, a Theory Y manager believes in general supervi­
sion, more decentralization of authority, less reliance on 
control, and a democratic style of leadership. He assumes 
that work is natural for man and that people are self-
motivated and committed to individual as well as group 
goals. 
Jack R.'Gibb (1971) seems to combine both assumptions 
of Theory X and Y in his assertion that "people must be led. 
. . . It is the responsibility of the leader to marshall 
the forces of the organization, to stimulate effort, to 
capture the imagination, to inspire people, to coordinate 
efforts, and to serve as a model of sustained effort" 
(p. 165). He agrees with MacGregor completely with regard 
to a Theory X or "defensive" leader. "The key to defensive 
leadership is a state of low trust. . . . The defensive 
leader can counteract his feelings of inferiority by 
assuming that his subordinates are less than they actually 
are; and he can service his hostile feelings by keeping the 
subordinate in demeaning, dependent, and inferior roles in 
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relation to himself and to leadership as a class" (Gibb, 
1971j p. 169). In contrast, leaders with a high degree of 
self-acceptance tend to have a high level of trust for their 
followers (Theory Y). 
In conformance with Gibb and MacGregor, John Paul Jones 
(1962) believed that "strength of a leader will come not 
from his position in a management hierarchy, but from 
confidence in himself and in the people associated with 
him" (p. 5*0. Thus, the defensive leader is one who relies 
heavily on positional authority and demonstrates his 
insecurity by condemning subordinates' growth through 
excessive centralization. 
Somewhat less obvious, and so more dangerous, is the 
result that may follow too zealous an attempt to 
control completely in terms of "leadership" rather than 
to use leadership as an important component of manage­
ment. . . . The exercise of leadership when it is not 
called for is implicitly an expression of contempt 
for one's subordinates and a designation of them as 
truly inferior rather than merely subordinate. 
(Gibb, 1971, P. 137) 
Mason Haire concurs with Gibb's views as a proponent of 
decentralization. "A decentralized responsibility and 
shared objective tend to root authority in the process and 
in the person rather than in the position, and in the 
relationship among the working group" (Haire, 1971, p. 8). 
With regard to the leader-follower relationship, Chris 
Argyris (1972) advocates a sociological and psychological 
approach to explain change (or lack of it) in organizations. 
"The system will exist as long as the individuals in it 
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behave according to its requirements. In other words, 
systems require that individuals behave according to certain 
prescribed rules. When they do, sociologists apparently 
conclude that the system tends to be autonomous from the 
individuals" (p. 118). Consequently, since roles are part 
of the system and do not always embody humanitarian ideas, 
many people psychologically withdraw from work even though 
observable activity continues. Personal growth is stifled. 
In effect, "Chris Argyris saw a conflict between the indivi­
dual who seeks activity and independence through psychologi­
cal development and the bureaucratic, formalized organiza­
tion which keeps the individual in an infantile state of 
passive dependence" (Haimann & Scott, 197^» p. 3^5). 
In view of Argyris' assertion, it is obvious that both 
leader and follower must have the opportunity to achieve in 
their respective quests for self-actualization. David 
McClelland (1961) conducted studies in patterns of achieve­
ment motivation, "n(motivation)." His work led McClelland 
to conclude that levels of aspiration were dependent 
variables of achievement motivation which could be learned. 
Upon this premise, McClelland believed in the possibility of 
teaching young people and lower levels of management to 
raise their motivation. 
A sense of achievement, however, must be evaluated in 
terms of what price one is willing to pay in order to aspire 
to various levels. Essentially, is a leader willing to 
achieve at the cost of production or people? Blake and 
Mouton (1964) developed a "managerial grid" on which concern 
for people represents one axis and concern for production 
represents the other axis. A leader may be high or low on 
both axes, or he may be high on one and low on the other. 
The individual who rates high on both develops followers 
committed to accomplishment of v/ork which leads to a rela­
tionship of trust and mutual respect. 
If an individual is to fulfill his need to achieve 
in order to enhance a positive self-esteem, there must exist 
a positive correlation between one's aspirations and their 
subsequent attainment. In 1959» Ralph Stogdill developed 
an "expectancy-reinforcement" theory of role attainment which 
stated that "as group members interact and engage in mutual 
task performance, they reinforce the expectation that each 
will continue to act and interact in accord with his pre­
vious performance. Thus, the individual's role is defined 
by mutually confirmed expectations relative to the performances 
and interactions he will be permitted to contribute to the 
group" (Stogdill, 197^, p. 20). 
Stogdill's "expectancy-reinforcement" theory ideally 
reflects a very favorable organizational climate. There 
are other types of organized environments which Rensis 
Likert (1967) categorized into four systems as follows: 
System 1, Exploitive; System 2, Benevolent authoritative; 
System 3, Consultative; and System 4, Participative Group 
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Each system contains six key elements: leadership, motivation, 
communication, decision, goals, and control. All of these 
dimensions are depicted on a scale by which Likert maintains 
that the organizational climate can be judged. It is 
interesting to note that while managers advocate the 
democratic end of the scale, they tend to practice a 
combination of systems 2 and 3 (Likert, 1967). 
A survey of leadership would not be complete without 
addressing the concept of decision making which ultimately 
manifests itself in overt leadership behavior. Cyert and 
March (1963) postulated four major relational concepts 
in the theory of business decision making: "quasi resolution 
of conflict, uncertainty avoidance, problematic search, and 
organizational search" (p. 116). Later, Herbert Simon 
(1977) theorized that 
decision-making comprises four principal phases: 
finding occasions for making a decision, finding pos­
sible courses of action, choosing among courses of 
action, and evaluating past choices. These activities 
are called intelligence, design, choice, and review 
respectively. (p. MO) 
Simon further asserts that there is no reason to believe, 
however, that a person with a high level of individual 
decision-making will have a correspondingly high degree of 
skill in designing decision making systems. "The skills 
of designing and maintaining the modern decision-making 
systems we call organizations are less intuitive skills. 
Hence, they are even more susceptible to training than the 
skills of personal decision-making" (Simon, 1977, p. ^5). 
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In a final analysis of making organizational decisions, 
Simon makes a distinction between "programmed and unpro-
grammed" decisions. 
Making programmed decisions depends on relatively 
simple psychological processes that are somewhat 
understood, at least at the practical level. These 
include habit, memory, simple manipulations of things 
and symbols. Making non-programmed decisions depends 
on psychological processes that until recently have 
not been understood at all. (Simon, 1977, p. 52) 
In addition to the decision-making process, the 
concepts of power and authority, differences between formal 
and informal organizations, emergent and conferred leaders, 
are also variables which would need further elaboration in 
a comprehensive study of leadership behavior. But possibly 
the initial step in any leadership analysis should be to 
determine why an individual decides (or does not decide) 
to become a leader. One explanation is as follows: 
First, there must be a promise of a large personal 
reward for the leader if and when the task is 
accomplished, although the reward need not be material. 
Second, the leader must feel that he can in fact succeed 
in accomplishing the task if he tries. Third, the 
leader must feel that the group supports and accepts 
him. Finally, the individual must believe that he has 
the required abilities or skills to get the job done. 
(Fiedler & Chemers, 197^, p. 1*0 
The humanistic movement in leadership and management 
theory continues to gather momentum in current thinking 
as exemplified in the book simply entitled Leadership by 
James MacGregor Burns (1978). His basic philosophy is that 
"leaders, in responding to their own motives, appeal to the 
motive bases of potential followers. As followers respond, 
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a symbiotic relationship develops that binds leader and 
follower together into a social and political collectivity. 
Cadres form; hierarchies evolve; structure hardens" (p. 452). 
Burns rejects power manipulation as a basis for leadership 
and sees the greatest test of leadership as essentially 
"intended social change." He does not promote the dialecti­
cal views of "great man" (elitist) and populist (anti-elitist) 
theories but is a strong proponent of a consensus of motivat­
ing forces between leaders and followers through a kind 
of mutual transcendence and transactional endeavors. 
This brief introductory overview of leadership theory 
pertinent to the development of Fiedler's Contingency Model 
has shown that a great deal of influence can be wielded by 
a charismatic leader or an effective and efficient manager. 
However, there are numerous situational variables which 
have to be considered in leadership analysis. 
Leadership is highly variable or "contingent" upon 
a large variety of important variables such as nature 
of task, size of the group, length of time the group 
has existed, type of personnel within the group and 
their relationship with each other, and amount of pres­
sure the group is under. It does not seem likely that 
we'll be able to devise a way to select the best leader 
for a particular situation. Even if we could, that 
situation would probably change in a short time and thus 
would require a somewhat different type of leader. 
(Perrow, 1976, p. 14) 
It is this type of observation which is the very foundation 
for the Contingency Model of Fred E. Fiedler. 
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Figure 2. Continuum of Manager-Nonmanager Behavior 
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CHAPTER II 
THE FIEDLER CONTINGENCY MODEL OF LEADERSHIP 
One of the most valid and predictive theories of 
leadership is the one proposed by Fred E. Fiedler called 
the Contingency Model which evaluates conditions for leader­
ship effectiveness within a situational context (Fiedler 
& Chemers, 197*0. This model is based on the assumption 
that no single personality trait pattern or style of 
leadership behavior assures effective performance in all 
leadership situations. Fiedler believes that 
the performance of a group is contingent upon both 
the motivational system of the leader and the degree 
to which the leader has control and influence in a 
particular situation, the "situation favorableness." 
(Fiedler & Chemers, 197^, p. 73) 
In short, a leader attempts to satisfy his own goals as 
well as those of the organization or group. 
The key variable in the contingency theory is the 
Least Preferred Co-worker(LPC) score. An individual leader 
is asked to rate the personality traits of people with whom 
he works least well on a scale from one (least favorable) to 
eight (most favorable). These 16 characteristics are 
depicted in Table 1 (Fiedler & Chemers, 197^, p. 75).* 
*A11 figures and tables are attached at the end of 
this chapter in the order referred to in context for easy 
reference. 
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A very negative description of one's co-worker is 
indicative of a low LPC leader often referred to as a 
task-motivated leader. Conversely, a very high or moderately 
positive description of co-worker would indicate a high 
LPC leader known as a relationship-motivated (considerate) 
leader. Briefly, a low LPC leader does not consider 
favorable interpersonal relationships with co-workers as 
crucial to performance effectiveness but a high LPC leader 
believes that a positive co-worker relationship is essential 
even if an assigned task or mission has to become secondary 
in importance to human considerations. 
The Contingency Model (Fiedler & Chemers, 197^, p. 80, 
Figure 3) is a graphic representation of the relative pre­
dictive effectiveness of both high and low LPC leaders con­
tingent upon diverse combinations of situational variables. 
These combinations are represented by eight "cells" called 
octants. The three variables under consideration in each 
octant are: (a) leader-member relations, (b) task struc­
ture, and (c) leader position power. The most favorable 
situation (Octant I) is on the far left of the graph and 
is characterized by "good" leader-member relations, 
"structured" task, and "strong" leader position power. Con­
versely, the least favorable situation (Octant VIII) is 
on the extreme right of the horizontal axis and is charac­
terized by "poor" leader-member relations, "unstructured" 
task, and a "weak" leader position power. 
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The vertical axis indicates the degree to which the 
leader's LPC score and his group's performance are 
correlated in various sets of groups within a cell. A 
point in the graph above the midline shows a positive 
correlation between LPC and group performance, that is, 
it shows that the high LPC leaders performed better 
than did the low LPC leaders. A point below the 
midline shows that the low LPC leaders performed better 
than did the high LPC leaders, that the correlation was 
negative. The heavy line connects the median correla­
tion coefficient in each of the eight cells—in other 
words, the best prediction of the correlations. 
(Fiedler & Chemers, 197*1, p. 79) 
Briefly, then, the Contingency Model predicts that the 
task-motivated (low LPC) leaders are most effective in very 
favorable situations (octants I and III) or in quite 
unfavorable situations(octants VII and VIII). Relationship-
motivated (high LPC) leaders perform better in moderately 
favorable situations as indicated by octants IV, V, and VI 
How valid is the Contingency Model? Table 2 (Fiedler 
& Chemers, 197*1, p. 82) indicates the wide variety of 
studies conducted to test the theory using military 
organizations, research teams, hospital wards, engineering 
groups, and others. The results are graphically illustrated 
in Figure *1 (Fiedler & Chemers, 197*1, p. 8*1) and show that 
"the theory is highly predictive and that the relations 
obtained in the validation studies are almost identical to 
those obtained in the original studies" (Fiedler 8e Chemers, 
197**» P« 83). Octant II is an exception but it is believed 
that it is too difficult to build into a laboratory experi­
ment and it also reflects a situation in which the particu­
lar combination of variables is rare in reality. 
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The correlation between the medians of the original 
studies and the medians of the validation studies in 
field, laboratory and both types of studies are, 
respectively, 0.85, 0.64, and 0.80 (the first and 
third are statistically significant). . . . Moreover, 
37 of the correlations in [Table 2] were in the expected 
direction and only 11 were in the opposite direction. 
This is, again, a finding which is statistically highly 
significant. The joint probability of these findings, 
using Fisher's exact test, is less than 0.05. 
(Fiedler & Chemers, 1974, p. 85) 
Obviously Fiedler measures leadership effectiveness in 
terms of how well the leader's group performs assigned 
functions. This performance factor seems to be a function 
of environmental variables as well as the degree of strength 
of the leader-group relationship. "Other things being equal, 
it then seems reasonable to measure the leader's performance 
by his group's success, and this approach is amply justified 
by the consistent finding that the leader's motivational 
pattern predicts quite well how well his group performs" 
(Fiedler & Chemers, 1974, p. 8). In addition, the effective 
leader must satisfy the requirements of the organization while 
simultaneously meeting the needs of his subordinates. 
"Group membership is, in effect, a social contract. Group 
members surrender some of their autonomy and independence 
to the leader or authority in return for benefits which they 
could not acquire alone. A leader who does not recognize that 
his authority flows from the consent of subordinates is doomed 
to an unhappy if not short-lived leadership experience" 
(Fiedler & Chemers, 1974, p. 10). Even if a leader accepts 
this "social contract" theory, it is evident that Fiedler's 
ideal leader must be flexible and adaptable if he works 
within an atmosphere of environmental flux. "One of the 
more interesting questions posed by an acceptance of a con­
tingency model is whether a leader can behave flexibly 
enough to cope with varied situations, or whether it is neces­
sary to either replace the leader as the situation changes 
or to modify the situation to fit the leader's capabilities. 
. . . Pitting the man to the leadership job by selection 
and training has not been spectacularly successful. It is 
surely easier to change almost anything in the job situation 
than a man's personality and his leadership style" (Hill, 
1973, p. 64). It would seem that a leader would exercise 
his natural tendencies in the majority of problematic situa­
tions but occasionally would assume a "role" if the situation 
occasionally warrants. 
The body of related literature pursuant to the ramifi­
cations of Fiedler's Contingency Model is quite extensive 
and a formal review is not considered necessary for the 
purposes of this study. Research has shown that the Fiedler 
model is valid as a premise for this dissertation. Literary 
criticism with regard to Wouk's The Caine Mutiny is adequate 
though not as preponderant as that of Melville's-Billy Budd. 
Despite the fact that both of these novels are categorized 
as fiction, their respective settings, plots, and characteriza­
tions accurately reflect reality of the British Navy in 1797 
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and the U. S. Navy in 19^2 (The Caine Mutiny). Therefore, 
qualitative inferences will be made with regard to character 
motivations and actions using Fiedler's Contingency Model 
as a basis for analysis of leadership behaviors. 
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Tajble 1 
Think of the Person with Whom You Can Work Least Well. 
He May Be Someone You Work with Now, or He May Be Someone 
You Knew'in the Past. He Does Not Have to Be the Person 
You Like Least Well, But Should Be the Person with Whom 
You Had the Most Difficulty in Getting a Job Done. Describe 
This Person as He Appears to You.* 
Pleasant 
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Figure 3. How the style of effective leadership varies with the 
situation (Fiedler & Chemers, 197^, p. 80) 
Table 2 
Summary of Field and Laboratory Studies Testing the Contingency Model* 
Field Studies Octants 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Hunt (1967) -.67 -.80 .21 .30 
-.51 -.30 
Hill (1969) -.10 -.29 -.24 .62 




 • .67* -.51 
O'Brien and Fiedler 
(unpublished) -. 46 .47 -.45 -.14 
Tumes (1972) -.47 .62** 
Laboratory Experiments 
Belgian Navy (Fiedler, -.12 .37 -.16 .08 .16 .07 .26 -.37 
1966) -.77 .50 -.54 .13 .03 .14 -.27 .60 
Shima (1968) -.26 .71* 
Mitchell (1969) .24 .43 
.17 .38 
Fiedler Exec. .34 .51 




 • -.33 
Rice and Chemers (1973) .30 -.40 
Sashkin (1972) -.29 
Table 2 (continued) 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Median, all studies -.59 .17 -.29 .40 .22 -.13 .26 -.35 
Median, field studies -.51 -.21 -.29 .47 .21 -.24 .30 -.33 
Median, laboratory 







Medians in original 
studies -.52 -.58 -.33 .47 .42 .05 -.43 
Number of correlations In the expected direction: 381 
Number of correlations opposite to expected direction: 9 
p by binomial test: .01 
"^exclusive of octant VI, for which no prediction had been made. 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
sFiedler & Chemers, 1974, p. 82. 
Median, original studies Median, validation studies 
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Le ade r- me mb e r 
relations 
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position Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak 
power 
Figure A. Correlations between leader LPC scores and performances in various cells 




HERMAN MELVILLE AND BILLY BUDD: A LOOK 
AT THE MAN AND HIS NOVEL 
Before one engages in the analysis of any literary 
work, it is most helpful to be somewhat knowledgeable 
of its author, especially those factors which might have 
had an influential bearing on the work itself. Not only 
does this enlarge one's overall perspective and insight but 
it also lends credibility, even to a work of fiction, 
with respect to the authenticity of events and the veracity 
of the author's credentials based on his own life experiences. 
Though Billy Budd is classified as fiction, it is remarkably 
realistic in its probability of occurrence. As will be 
seen in the following biographical and critical comments, 
the novel is a classic on issues of universal ambiguity 
and remains inextricably reflective of the moral dilemmas 
which haunted its author, Herman Melville. 
Chronology of Melville's Life 
1819—Herman Melville born as the third of eight children 
to Allan and Maria Gansevoort Melville on August 1 at 
No. 6 Pearl Street, New York City. 
1830—Moved with family to Albany. Entered the Albany 
Academy. 
1832—Allan Melville died. 
1835-37—Clerked in Albany. Taught school near Pittsfield, 
Massachusetts. 
1838—Moved with family to Lansingburgh. Took a course 
in the Lansingburgh Academy. 
1839—Shipped in June as a sailor on the St. Lawrence for 
Liverpool; returned to New York in October. Taught 
school at Greenbush. 
1840—Visited uncle in Galena, Illinois. 
184.1-44—Shipped as sailor in January on the whaler Acushnet 
from Fairhaven (New Bedford); stopped at Rio de Janeiro 
in March; rounded the Cape in June; cruised through the 
Galapagos Islands in fall and winter. Arrived at the 
Marquesas Islands in June (1842); deserted with Toby 
Greene to the interior of Nukahiva in July; signed on 
the Australian whaler Lucy Ann in August; left ship 
at Tahiti, escaped to neighboring island of Eimeo; 
signed on the whaler Charles and Henry in November. 
Arrived at Hawaiian Islands in April (1843); went to 
Honolulu in May; signed in August on the frigate 
United States, which sailed to the Marquesas, Tahiti, 
Valparaiso, Callao, Lima, and Mazatlan. Arrived at 
Rio in August (1844) and at Boston in October. Rejoined 
family at Lansingburgh. 
1840—Typee published in London and New York. Qmoo completed. 
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1847—Qmoo published in London and New York. Married 
Elizabeth Shaw in Boston on August 4; moved to New 
York. 
1849—Mardi published in London and New York. Kedburn 
published in London and New York. Completed White-
Jacket . Visited London, Paris, Brussels, Cologne, 
and the Rhineland. Son, Malcolm, born. 
1850—Returned to New York, began book on whaling. White-
Jacket published in London and New York. Moved to 
"Arrowhead," near Pittsfield, Massachusetts; there met 
Hawthorne, who was his neighbor until November, 1851. 
1851—Moby Dick published in London (as The Whale) and in 
New York. Began Pierre. Second son, Stanwix, born. 
1852—Pierre published in London and New York. 
1853—Began to contribute stories and essays to Putnam's 
and Harper's monthlies. Daughter, Elizabeth, born. 
1854—Israel Potter serialized in Putnam's. 
1855—Israel Potter published in book form. Second daughter, 
Frances, born. 
1856—The Piazza Tales published in U.S. and England. 
Completed The Confidence Man. Sailed to England and 
the Mediterranean, visiting Malta, Syria, Salonica, 
Constantinople, Alexandria, Cairo. 
1857—The Confidence Man published in U.S. and England. 
Traveled through Palestine, Italy, Switzerland, 
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Germany, the Netherlands, and (again) England. 
Returned to America. 
1858-60—Lectured in South and Middle West. Worked on 
poems. Sailed to California and returned to New York 
(i860). 
1863—Moved family to 104 East 26th Street, New York City. 
1866—Volume of poems, Battle-pieces and Aspects of War, 
published. Appointed Inspector of Customs at the Port 
of Mew York. 
1867—Son Malcolm died of a self-inflicted pistol shot. 
1869—Surviving son, Stanwix, went to sea on the Yokohama, 
sailing for China. 
1870—Began work on Clarel. 
1876—Published Clarel with a subsidy from uncle, Peter 
Gansevoort. 
1886—Son Stanwix died in San Francisco. 
1888—Voyaged to Bermuda, returning by way of Florida. 
Printed John Marr and Other Sailors privately. Began 
Billy Budd. 
1891—Completed Billy Budd. Printed Timoleon privately. 
Died September 28. 
1924—Billy Budd published. (Stafford,1961, pp. ix-x) 
Melville and His Inside Narrative 
The foregoing biographical chronology readily reveals 
the intensity and diversity of Melville's sea experience 
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primarily in the time span between 1839 through 1844. The 
publications noted reflect an accuracy of historical 
setting and human character regarding the men and ships in 
the time before steam. Stylistically, Melville's frequent 
digressions of description, allegory, and symbolism are an 
effort to lend realism to character motivation within 
authentic environments. However, it is precisely due to 
these digressions that one feels vicariously drawn into 
Melville's vortex of realism and moral ambiguity. 
The chronology also indicates that Billy Budd was 
Melville's last artistic undertaking, completed only a few 
months prior to his death. The endeavor was almost a race 
against time. 
While writing Billy Budd, Melville was clearly con­
demned by Time itself to his imminent death, felt in his 
blood and in his bones. Against this encroaching 
catastrophe, Melville fought with the chief resource 
at his command, his pen, challenging the mortality 
of the flesh with the immortality of art. (Vincent, 
1971, p. 9) 
According to Wendell Glick (1953), the novel seems to be the 
"cogent fruition of a lifetime of observation and study of 
the eternal conflict between absolute morality and social 
expedience" (p. 103). This conflict is reiterated by 
Leon Howard (1971) in terms of the individual within society. 
For the problem that bothered Melville in Billy Budd 
was not the problem of knowledge that had worried him 
in his youth. It was the problem of man. Is he a 
social being, responsible to the welfare of the society 
to which he belongs? Or is he an independent moral 
individual, responsible to his private awareness of 
guilt and innocence? This was the dilemma Captain 
Vere faced when, in Melville's fiction, the preserva­
tion of discipline in the British fleet was absolutely 
requisite to the preservation of England's freedom. 
Melville's solution was to make him behave as a social 
being but pay a penalty by suffering the private agonies 
of his private conscience. (p. 9*0 
However, the course of action taken as a solution to any 
dilemma is always ambiguous and subject to inevitable 
debate. This is the essence of why William Braswell (1961) 
refers to Billy Budd as an inside narrative about the tragic 
conflict in Melville's spiritual life. 
The Indomitable, which may be regarded merely as a 
man-of-war, or, on another plane, as the World of 
Christendom, appears to me acceptable also as a micro­
cosm, the world of an individual—specifically, the 
world of Herman Melville—and the story of what happened 
aboard the Indomitable, the symbolical projection of a 
personal crisis and the resolution of it. (p. 91) 
Roger Shattuck (1971) agrees with Braswell regarding 
the symbolism of Billy Budd as a reflection of Melville's 
inner conflict as signified by three facets of human nature. 
Captain Vere standing for the pride of both reason and 
authority, Claggart who represents "depravity according 
to nature," and Billy, who embodies ingenuous goodness. 
None of the three is pure, and none is a whole man. The 
Indomitable puts to sea less as the ship of state or 
society than as the ship of a complex individual. 
(p. 82) 
Shattuck elaborates further by inferring that multiple man 
sacrifices part of himself to maintain order and that the 
sacrifice is often lethal. "In unmistakable allegory, 
Melville presents the possibility of man's inward division 
and the accompanying dangers of self-destruction" (p. 83). 
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This spiritual conflict within Melville is often 
interpreted as a testament of acceptance in its resolution. 
E. L. Grant Watson (1933) suggests that Billy Budd is the 
culmination of Melville's deeper wisdom evolving from the 
subjective symbolism of rebellion to the more objective 
symbols of acceptance. Similar to Shattuck's views just 
mentioned, Watson perceives the inner conflict of Melville 
portrayed in Billy Budd as divided into three symbolic 
principles. 
Melville called his story "an inside narrative," and 
though it deals with events stirring and exciting 
enough in themselves, it is yet more exciting because it 
deals with the relation of those principles which 
constitute life itself. A simple-mindedness unaffected 
by the shadow of doubt [Vere], a divine innocence and 
courage, which might suggest a Christ not yet conscious 
of his divinity [Billy Budd], and a malice which has 
lost itself in the unconscious depths of mania [Claggart] 
—the very mystery of iniquity—these opposites here 
meet, and find their destiny. (p. 322). 
Watson concludes that these opposites are mutually depen­
dent principles which comprise the very essence of man's 
realization of himself. However, this realization may 
be forever shrouded in mystery as Eugenio Montale (1942) 
observes. 
In Billy Budd the life which gives expression with equal 
violence to good and evil, right and wrong, tries, but 
without success, to solve its own mystery. It seems as 
if the truth is to be found in turn in the sacrificial 
purity of the victim, and in the austere rigor of 
Vere. (p. 419) 
In contrast to Watson's proposal of Billy Budd as a 
portrayal of Melville's "testament of acceptance," F. 
Barron Freeman (194 8) perceives the novel as symbolic of 
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Ilelville's "recognition of necessity." This is a kind of 
calm acceptance of the necessity of worldly imperfection 
wherein Billy Budd is a Christian hero practicing resigna­
tion and achieving heavenly reward. Freeman sees this as 
Melville's optimistic acceptance of fate itself. Phil 
Within's disagreement with Watson's theory is even stronger 
in his perception of the wisdom in Melville's later years. 
Melville was a fighter, he was stubborn, he never 
accepted the easy way out. Would it not be contradic­
tory for him, after a lifetime of resisting practical 
evil in the world at large and metaphysical evil in his 
novels, at the very end to discover that he had been 
wrong all along and that his duty had always been to lie 
down and accept evil as unavoidable? (1961, p. 89) 
Regardless of whether one perceives Billy Budd as 
a testament of acceptance, a recognition of necessity, or 
a last idealistic defiance of the inevitability of evil, 
the larger vision of Melville must be considered as transcend­
ing the microcosm of one man. This concept is projected 
by William Tindall (1971) in terms of a moral process: 
We may say that Billy Budd is a vision of man in society, 
a vision of man's moral quandary or his responsibility; 
but its meaning is more general than these, and that is 
why it haunts us. So haunted, I find the work not an 
essay on a moral issue but a form for embodying the 
feeling and idea of thinking about a moral issue, the 
experience of facing, of choosing, of being uneasy 
about one's choice, of trying to know. Not a conclusion 
like a sermon, Billy Budd is a vision of confronting 
what confronts us, of man thinking things out with all 
the attendant confusions and uncertainties. Disorder 
is a form for this and the apparently formless is a 
formal triumph. . . . The discursive parts represent 
our attempts at thinking, while the action, images, and 
allusions represent what we cannot think but must 
approximate. Arrangement of these discordant elements 
forms a picture of a process. (pp. 39-40) 
It is this process which must have never ceased in 
conclusive wisdom within Melville's mind, hence perpetuat­
ing ambiguity in written form. In another sense, the novel 
Billy Budd might have been the final liberation of Melville 
from himself—a transcendence of that which is perfect in 
imperfect man beyond the limitations of worldly existence. 
H. P. Vincent (1971) illustrates this process through an 
Emersonian idea. 
The poets, Emerson said, are the liberating gods, 
but the most important of their liberations is their 
own. This, Melville achieved in Billy Budd, and 
his compositional struggle is emblematic of his 
psychological and artistic triumph. (p. 10) 
The inception of this liberating triumph was generated in 
Melville's mind by actual historical events of which he 
was profoundly aware. 
Historical Sources of Billy Budd 
Melville's novel was dedicated to Jack Chase, captain 
of the maintop aboard the U. S. Frigate United States in 
1843. As noted in the foregoing chronology Melville shipped 
aboard the United States in August of 1843 and must have 
regarded Chase as a prototype for the character of Billy 
Budd. This can be inferred from the nature of the dedica­
tion itself when Melville wrote of his friend: "Wherever 
that great heart may now be/ here on Earth or harbored in 
Paradise" (Hayford & Sealts, 1962, p. 42). Forty years 
earlier than the writing of Billy Budd, Jack Chase appeared 
in Melville's White-Jacket as H. P. Vincent (1971) notes: 
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First, was John J. Chase, Melville's shipmate on board 
the frigate United States, transformed into the flam­
boyant Jack Chase of White-Jacket, and the man to whom 
forty years later, Melville dedicated his ultimate 
creation. Jack Chase is the prototype for Billy Budd, 
but with significant differences, especially in speech, 
since the rhetorical cascades of Jack Chase contrast 
strikingly with the stuttering of young Billy. (p. 6) 
Vincent also refers to another of Melville's characters in 
White-Jacket who might have been the initial prototype of 
Claggart in Billy Budd. 
Jack Chase is in the book as is a villain named Bland, 
a quickly drawn sketch from which Claggart would develop. 
Furthermore, moral and ethical problems strongly drawn 
in Billy Budd ricochet throughout the realistic trappings 
of White-Jacket to give even that comic-satire work a 
serious and dark side. (p. 6). 
according to Charles Anderson (ly40), another probable 
source of Billy Budd was an actual historical event commonly 
known as the Corners Incident. In November of 1842, the 
United States brig Somers was returning from a trans­
atlantic cruise under the command of Captain Alexander 
Slidell Mackenzie. Lieutenant Guert Gansevoort reported 
that a conspiracy to mutiny was being led by an eighteen-year-
old midshipman Philip Spencer, who was also the son of the 
Honorable John C. Spencer, Secretary of War under President 
Tyler. Spencer and two fellow seamen were put in irons 
and a drumhead court was formed for their trial. The ensuing 
investigation revealed only circumstancial evidence beyond 
that reported by Lieutenant Gansevoort. While the two seamen 
exclaimed their innocence, Spencer acknowledged all charges 
but testified that the whole affair was a joke as it would 
certainly appear today to the impartial observer. However, 
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Captain Mackenzie, who was paranoid in his fear of growing 
disaffection among his crew, instructed the court to find 
all three of the accused guilty. As a result, they were 
hanged from the yardarm. Anderson further relates Melville's 
obvious knowledge of the Somers incident as follows: 
Gunner W. H. Meyers of the Cyane recorded in his 
journal at Mazatlan, Mexico, March 13, 1943: "Read 
Bennet's Herald with an account of the murder of 
Midshipman Spence[r] and men belonging to the Brig of 
War Somers with an account of the insanity of the 
Captain." This news Melville certainly heard as soon 
as he stepped on board the frigate United States 
at Honolulu in August of that year, for such a story 
would form the staple of ship's gossip for many a month 
(p. 337) 
It is interesting also to note the reaction to 
Mackenzie's orders through the comments of two authors 
writing at the time of the Somers incident. C. R. Anderson 
refers to an article appearing in Cosmopolitan Magazine in 
1844 written by Gail Hamilton, describing Mackenzie as 
follows: 
He used "fake and insulting words to Spencer," 
he was "the father of lies," his character was "brutal 
and "sinister," and he was actuated throughout by an 
"infernally fertile imagination." (Anderson, 1940, 
P. 341) 
Based on Hamilton's description, it is probable that 
Mackenzie was the prototype of Claggart who passed for a 
respectable man but was in fact a dangerous madman. This 
view is further reiterated in an essay by James Fenimore 
Cooper in 1844, cited by Anderson. 
Young Spencer, averred Cooper "all admit, was a great 
favorite of the crew, even as Billy Budd was the idol 
of his shipmates. Yet the commander's attitude towards 
him was without foundation, one of "prejudice which met 
the young officer, almost as soon as he crossed the 
gangway of the brig to join her, and which followed him 
til he crossed it again with the fatal whip around nis 
neck" an attitude paralleled by the antipathy conceived 
against Billy Budd from the outset, not by his commander 
but by the master-at-arms Claggart. [Cooper notes:] 
upon the head of this officious lieutenant, in common 
with that of the commander, the blood of the executed 
rests." (Anderson, 19^0, p. 337) 
The lieutenant to whom Cooper refers is, of course, Guert 
Oansevoort who originally accused Spencer of instigating 
mutiny aboard the Somers. What is startling about Gansevoort 
historically is his family relationship to Melville. 
For the lieutenant whom Cooper calls "officious" ana 
whose character, merged with that of Commander Macken­
zie's would thus seem to be the original of the villain 
Claggart, was no less a person than Guert Gansevoort, 
Herman Melville's first cousin. (Anderson, 19^0, p. 337) 
It should be evident that Melville based his novel 
Billy Budd on people with whom he was acquainted as well as 
actual historical events. The haunting conflicts within the 
microcosm of Lielvilie's mind are projected as universal 
dilemmas in Melville's work. C. A. Reich (1971) refers to 
Billy Budd as an intensely modern novel which is concerned 
with the coming of a materialistic, rational, scientific 
society, growing more distant from the natural instincts of 
man. This then is indeed the embodiment of the character 
Billy Budd. Reich notes that 
Billy harks back to a more adventurous and youthful 
America which, with the frontier and the whaleship, was 
already passing in Melville's lifetime. Billy's type 
comes from "the time before steamships," the significant 
words with which the novel opens. (p. 66) 
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Finally, the historical events which occurred within the 
British Fleet in 1797 also influenced Melville's selection 
of his setting for Billy Budd. It was during this tine that 
England was engaged in the Napoleonic Wars against France 
and a tine when French revolutionary ideals were causing men 
in all countries to question the established order of things. 
Irnpressnent as well as inhumane treatment of seamen were 
causing rumblings in some crews aboard British ships. The 
Admiralty could ill afford to have dissension within ranks, 
especially during wartime. Nevertheless, unprecedented 
mutiny on British warships began to surface. 
The scene is laid in the momentous year of 1797 made 
memorable by the mutinies at Spithead and Nore in April 
and May, which had come near crippling, the British Fleet 
at the very outset of the Napoleonic Wars. Some of the 
much-needed reforms had been accomplished by the Great 
Mutiny, according to Melville, but among the abuses that 
remained was the traditionally sanctioned practice of 
impressment. With discontent still lurking and the 
officers apprehensive, H. M. S. Indomitable set sail to 
join the Mediterranean Fleet in the summer of 1797. 
(Anderson, 19^0, p. 331) 
Consequently, several minor mutinies broke out in the Mediter­
ranean Fleet in July and September which were promptly 
suppressed by officers so as not to have the Nore and Spithead 
calamities occ'ur on their vessels. Anderson points out that 
"one of the most serious of these, resulting in the execution 
of three ringleaders, had occurred in the squadron off Cadiz, 
the locale of Melville's story" (p. 33*0. 
Brief Synopsis of Billy Budd 
It is the summer of 1797 and England is at war with 
the revolutionists of France. Billy Budd, a foretopman, is 
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impressed from an English merchant vessel called the 
Hights-of-Man to the warship, H.M.S. Bellipotent* 
(Indomitable). commanded by Captain Edward Fairfax Vere. 
Billy's unassuming character and natural goodness together 
with his hard work and able seamanship endear him to the crew 
with the exception of Claggart, the master-at-arms. 
This growing hatred for Billy perversely consumes 
Claggart to the point of obsession. Billy Budd is everything 
Claggart can never become and must be destroyed. Claggart 
covertly attempts to ensnare Billy in a fabricated plot of 
mutiny while outwardly appearing to be friendly. The plot 
fails so Claggart must resort to direct confrontation. 
Aware that the order of the British Fleet has recently 
been threatened by mutinous attempts at Nore and Spithead, 
Claggart decides to directly implicate Billy in a supposed 
conspiracy aboard the Bellipotent. He waits for the most 
opportune time which would give his charge maximum impact 
upon Captain Vere. 
That time comes when the Bellipotent, independently 
scouting for the enemy, has just been eluded by a lighter and 
faster French warship. Captain vere is visibly agitated 
about this event when he is confronted by Claggart's accusa­
tion that Billy is secretly conspiring mutiny. Not willing 
*A11 quotations in reference to'Melville' s Billy Budd, 
Sailor, will be taken from the definitive text edited from 
the original manuscript by Harrison Hayford and Merton M. 
Sealts, Jr., University of Chicago Press, 1962. 
to believe Claggart, Vere proceeds to the privacy of his 
cabin along with Claggart and orders that Billy be brought 
to his quarters immediately. 
In the presence of Vere, Claggart repeats his charge 
to Billy's face which becomes suddenly pale with shock and 
exasperation. Since Billy stutters in times of emotional 
stress, he can offer no verbal defense. Instead, he 
reflexively refutes the lie with a fatal blow to Claggart's 
forehead. 
Not wanting to risk rebellion, Vere quickly appoints 
a drumhead court to try Billy, not on the alleged mutiny 
plot, but on the striking of a superior officer under the 
British Articles of War. Though not a member of the court, 
Vere virtually acts as prosecutor imploring the members to 
consider only the criminal act regardless of its moral 
circumstances. Billy is found guilty and is to be hanged 
the following morning at muster. Just prior to Captain 
Vere's giving the fateful signal to the executioner, Billy 
faces him and exclaims, "God bless Captain Vere!" and then 
he ascends, both fatally and symbolically. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BILLY BUDD'S SETTING EVALUATED WITHIN THE 
SITUATIONAL FAVORABLENESS DIMENSION OF 
FIEDLER'S CONTINGENCY MODEL 
Prior to a detailed leadership analysis of the main 
characters in Billy Budd, it is necessary to evaluate the 
setting of the novel within the situational favorableness 
dimension of Fiedler's Contingency Model. Even though 
Melville begins with primary emphasis on the physical and 
psychological characteristics of Billy Budd, the "Handsome 
Sailor," and his impressment from the Rights of Man, the 
chief setting for the story is aboard the H.M.S. Bellipotent» 
commanded by Captain Edward Fairfax Vere. It was the summer 
of 1797 and Vere's warship was en route to join the Mediter­
ranean fleet. 
In essence, Melville has conveniently isolated the 
Bellipotent so that no other authority higher than Captain 
Vere might assume responsibility for command decisions. 
This factor proves to have great bearing on Vere's feeling of 
urgency in weighing alternatives as will be seen in a 
later chapter on Vere. At this point, Melville only states 
that the independent detachment of the Bellipotent and its 
assigned mission of scouting for the enemy, was not 
unusual considering the sailing qualities of the vessel 
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and the Admiralty's total confidence in Captain Vere's 
judgment and seamanship. 
As one of that fleet the seventy-four participated in 
its movements, though at times on account of her superior 
sailing qualities, in the .absence of frigates, dispatched 
on separate duty as a scout and at times on less 
temporary service. (5^T)* 
Additionally, 
the character of her commander, it was thought, specially 
adapted him for any duty where under unforseen diffi­
culties a prompt initiative might have to be taken in 
some matter demanding knowledge and ability in addition 
to those qualities implied in good seamanship. (90B) 
Equally important as a contingent variable were the 
events which preceded those which affect the decisions 
aboard the Bellipotent. 
It was the summer of 1797. In the April of that year 
had occurred the commotion at opithead followed in 
May be a second and yet more serious outbreak in the 
fleet at the IJore. The latter is known, and without 
exaggeration in the epithet, as the "Great Mutiny." (5^4) 
Since the Fleet was the military foundation of the British 
Empire, such incidents were a tremendous blow to traditions 
of order and discipline. It was as if the "unbridled and 
unbounded revolt" in France was spreading and undermining 
institutionalized governments of Europe. "Reasonable 
discontent growing out of practical grievances in the fleet 
had been ignited into irrational combustion as by live 
cinders blown across the Channel from France in flames." (5^B) 
*T'ne definitive transcription of the manuscript 
edited by Harrison Iiayford and Merton M. Sealts, Jr., 1962, 
will be used in all textual references to Melville's novel. 
Page numbers will be followed by the letters (T) top, 
(M) middle, and (B) bottom indicating exact location in the 
text. 
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Understandably, ship captains were apprehensive about such 
demonstrations occurring aboard their vessels. "Yes, the 
outbreak at the Nore was put down. But not every grievance 
was redressed" (58B). 
Closely following a description of the events at 
Spithead and the Nore, Melville interjects a digression 
concerning the heroic qualities of Admiral Horatio Nelson 
and the glory of the British fleet at Trafalgar. Melville's 
intention is probably to present a model of an ideal leader 
using an actual historical event which coincides with the 
setting of Billy Budd. Nelson was transferred from the 
Captain to the Theseus, the latter ship having recently 
participated in the Great Mutiny. 
Danger was apprehended from the temper of the men; and 
it was thought that an officer like Nelson was the 
one, not indeed to terrorize the crew into base sub­
jection, but to win them, by force of his mere presence 
and heroic personality, back to an allegiance if not as 
enthusiastic as his own yet as true. (59K) 
Nelson appears to be a flexible combination of both 
the task-motivated and considerate leaders and could probably 
be effective in both favorable and unfavorable situations 
in the context of Fiedler's Model. Possibly, he is the 
prototype of the best qualities in both Billy and Captain 
Vere, combining the ideal and the pragmatic into one. 
Nelson adheres to regulation as will Vere and yet he will 
risk deviation from "measured forms" to achieve success in 
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battle which endears him to men throughout the fleet, a 
parallel to the admiration elicited from sailors for Billy 
Budd. It is as if the head and heart as well as reason and 
instinct are fused into the ideal of Nelson but these become 
the center of conflict in Melville's novel. Just as Nelson 
sacrifices himself at Trafalgar through "a sort of priestly 
motive," so will Billy be sacrificed, necessitated by a 
transcendent victory achieved by both the head and heart 
together. Thus, despite the previous mutinies at Spithead 
and the Nore, the true fiber of the British sailor was exhi­
bited at Trafalgar under Nelson's leadership. "To the muti­
neers, those battles and especially Trafalgar were a plenary 
absolution and a grand one" (56T). This in part contributed 
to the favorable situation aboard the Bellipotent under Vere 
despite the unfavorable precedent of mutinous.conduct in other 
fleet units. 
As will be pointed out in later chapters of character 
analysis, the situation aboard the Bellipotent was highly 
favorable and one in which a task-motivated leader would be 
highly effective according to Fiedler's Contingency Model. 
In evaluating the various "cells" within each octant of 
variables, the following inferences will be supported: 
(a) the leader-member relationship was quite "good" 
primarily due to the general respect for Captain Vere by both 
officers and crew, (b) the task or mission was highly 
"structured" since the Bellipotent was governed by Admirality 
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directives as well as the Articles of War, and (c) leader 
position power was very "strong" resulting from a combination 
of both (a) and (c). Collectively, these three variables 
reveal a very strong case for situational favorableness to 
be quite positive for leaders in Octant I of Fiedler's Model 
(see end of chapter II). Thus, aside from the unfavorable 
precedents of the Nore and Spithead, the setting aboard the 
seventy-four pounder Bellipotent appears to be favorable for 
task-motivated (Low LPC) leaders. 
Foreword to Chapters V, VI, and VII 
The character analysis which follows in Chapters V, 
VI, and VII will show that Billy Budd, Claggart and Captain 
Vere acted predictably as leadership types within the 
contingency variables of Octant I in relation to Fiedler's 
Contingency Model presented in Chapters I and IV. Each 
character will be analyzed with respect to what he thinks, 
says, and does as documented by evidence in Melville's text 
and the criticism of noted scholars. 
The reader should keep in mind the parameters of 
Fiedler's Contingency Model as he reads the analysis presented. 
The inferences drawn from the analysis will show that Billy 
is an ideal form of the informal, relationship-motivated 
leader. Claggart holds a formal position of authority and 
is portrayed as an example of Fiedler's task-motivated leader 
but in an aura of moral depravity. Captain Vere, the focal 
point of leadership in the novel, is revealed as a classic 
example of the task-motivated leader who suppresses the 
consideration characteristic of a relationship-motivated 
leader in Fiedler's Model. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE "HANDSOME SAILOR" 
Melville begins his novel with a descriptive 
reference to common sailors along Prince's Dock in Liver­
pool, England. He describes them as "bronzed mariners, 
man-of-war's men or merchant sailors in holiday attire, 
ashore on liberty" (43T). One seaman in particular who 
might have been in this company is referred to as the 
Handsome Sailor whose "moral nature was seldom out of 
keeping with the physical make . . . the comeliness and power, 
always attractive in masculine conjunction ..." (44B). 
Thus begins the initial description of the 
welkin-eyed Billy Budd—or Baby Budd, as more fami­
liarly, under circumstances hereafter to be given, he 
at last came to be called—aged twenty-one, a foretopman 
of the British fleet toward the close of the last 
decade of the eighteenth century. (44B) 
While homeward bound on the merchant vessel, 
Rights-of-Man,Billy was impressed for service aboard the 
seventy-four outward-bound H.M.S. Bellipotent. Captain 
Graveling of the Rights' is understandably upset as Lt. 
Ratcliffe selects Billy Budd. "Lieutenant, you are going 
to take my best man from me, the jewel of 'em (46B). 
Graveling exclaims that before Billy came, his forecastle 
was a "rat-pit of quarrels." He relates an incident in 
which a large sailor called Red Whiskers and prompted by 
envy provoked Billy too far by prodding him under the ribs 
with a knife. "Quick as lightning Billy let fly his arm. 
I dare say he never meant to do quite as much as he did, 
but anyhow he gave the burly fool a terrible drubbing" 
(47M). The Captain concluded by stating that Red Whiskers 
became Billy's friend to the point of loving admiration 
as did the rest of the crew which Graveling considered 
more like a happy family under Billy's influence. Rat-
cliffe's smug reply was simply, "Well, blessed are the 
peacemakers, especially the fighting peacemakers" (48T). 
As Billy was escorted from the merchant vessel, 
he made no protest and accepted his fate with almost a 
cheerful attitude much to Lt. Ratcliffe's satisfaction. 
It should be noted that Billy Budd has not, even under 
the severest provocation, any element of rebellion 
in him; he is too free a soul to need a quality which 
is a virtue only in slaves. His nature spontaneously 
accepts whatever may befall. (Watson, 1933, p. 322) 
This observation, in contrast with the aforementioned 
incident with the Red Whiskers, might indicate that there 
is an element of unpredictability in Billy's normally 
unassuming and accepting nature. The incident serves to 
foreshadow the eventual explosiveness in the confrontation 
with Claggart who will later be seen as Billy's opposite 
in character. 
As for now, Melville goes on to describe Billy as 
endowed with "the gaiety of high health, youth, and a 
free heart" naive in the ways of "sinister dexterity" 
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in dealing with "double meanings and insinuations" (49M). 
Symbolically, of course, Billy's physical features reflect 
the purity and strength of his inner character. 
He was young; and despite his all but fully developed 
frame, in aspect looked even younger than he really 
was, owing to a lingering adolescent expression in the 
as yet smooth face all but feminine in purity of 
natural complexion but where, thanks to his sea going, 
the lily was quite suppressed and the rose had some 
ado visibly to flush through the tan. (5OK) 
Though having no known lineage, it is as though Billy's 
"entire family was practically invested in himself" 
(50T). 
A further description denotes a definite nobility in 
Billy's uncertain past. He was of the finest Saxon 
strain with a 
reposeful good nature which the Greek sculptor in 
some instances gave to his heroic strong man, Hercules. 
. . . The ear, small and shapely, the arch of the foot, 
the curve in mouth and nostril . . . something sugges­
tive of a mother eminently favored by Love and the 
Graces; all this strangely indicated a lineage in 
direct contradiction to his lot. (51M) 
Melville adds: "Yes, Billy Budd was a foundling, a 
presumable by-blow, and evidently, no ignoble one. Noble 
descent was as evident in him as a blood horse" (52T). 
Though a descendant of nobility, Billy was not 
nobly bred, possessing the qualities of the totally 
natural man. Pie was illiterate but could sing like the 
"nightingale." In many respects, Billy was 
little more than a sort of upright Barbarian, much 
such perhaps as Adam presumably might have been ere 
the urbane serpent wriggled himself into his 
company. (52B) 
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Indeed, there appears to be no inward or outward blemish of 
Billy's total character, save one. 
As if Satan must have a hand in every human's life, 
Melville implies, Billy possessed the occasional liability 
of a vocal defect. 
Though in the hour of elemental uproar or peril he was 
everything that a sailor should bes yet under sudden 
provocation of strong heart feeling his voice, 
otherwise singularly musical, as if expressive of the 
harmony within, was apt to develop an organic hesi­
tancy, in fact more or less of a stutter or even 
worse. (53M) 
Hence, even though Billy is described in rather heroic 
terms, the 
avowal of such an imperfection in the Handsome Sailor 
should be evidence not alone that he is not presented 
as a conventional hero but also that the story in which 
he is the main figure is no romance. (53B) 
Joseph Schiffman would agree with the last assertion 
as he perceives Billy as unqualified to be a spokesman for 
Melville's complex views of life regardless of his raoral 
and physical attributes. Rather, Billy Budd will play a 
symbolic role to portray something greater than a single 
individual. 
Physically, he is well suited for the -role, but he is 
found wanting mentally. Unperceptive, in fear of 
authority, extremely naive, suffering the tragic 
fault of a stammer in moments of stress, Eilly Budd 
cannot qualify as a spokesman. (1 S>L>0, p. 132) 
However, Schiffman's analysis should not imply that 
Billy was not intelligent. Though not a bookish intel­
lectual, Billy possessed a good mind which was quite astute 
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in learning those things required to carry out his duties. 
His apparent ignorance of more worldly concerns is really 
a manifestation of his naivete and childlike innocence in 
dealing with double meanings and insinuations. This 
inability to perceive the subtlety of evil is a factor 
in Billy's eventual tragedy. Roland Duerksen (1968) 
relates that 
Billy, although limited in experience, has not with­
drawn from participation in life as he found it. Nor 
does he show an inability to think for himself and to 
cope with subterfuge when given the opportunity to 
analyze and understand it. (p. 59) 
Duerksen concludes 
that Melville means to characterize Billy as a 
maturing ideal rather than as an undesirable, childish 
idealist indicated by his explanation, "to an 
immature nature essentially honest and humane, fore­
warning intimations of subtler danger from one's kind 
come tardily if at all." (98T)(Duerksen, 1968, p. 58) 
Thus, as Billy boarded the Bellipotent, he was 
entering the harsher world of a man-of-war made more 
rigid by martial law and discipline. The setting apart 
from the crew was to be in conflict with Billy's innocent 
nature. In reference to Gail Hamilton's (1889) actual 
account of Philip Spencer's heroic fate "glorified 
already by the light shining upon him through the opening 
gates of death" (p. 13*0, C. R. Anderson notes that 
in this character sketch Melville could have found at 
least a suggestion for his hero Billy Budd, whose 
youth and good looks, high health, gay spirits, and 
free heart make of him the archetype of "innocent"— 
an unsophisticated child-man with the rectitude of an 
animal, incapable of willing malice or even, in his 
simplicity, of conceiving its existence. (19^0, p. 3^2) 
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billy's ltevj "world 
"Life in trie foretop well agreed with billy 
Budd" (68T). It would seem that Billy adjusted well to 
his new environment but this is only short-lived when early 
in the novel, Melville subjects Billy to a strong dose 
of inhumanity the day following his impressment. A young 
after-guardsman was being flogged for dereliction of duty 
having been absent from his post during a critical ship's 
maneuver. 
When Billy saw the culprit's naked back under the 
scourge, gridironed with red welts and worse, when he 
marked the dire expression in the liberated man's 
face as with his woolen shirt flung over him by the 
executioner he rushed forv/ard from the spot to bury 
himself in the crowd, Billy was horrified. (68M) 
The scene elicited the compassionate sensitivity of Billy's 
nature and instilled in him the resolve never to be remiss 
in his duties, even that which might merit verbal reproof. 
What then was his surprise and concern when ultimately 
he found himself getting into petty trouble occasionally 
about such matters as the stowage of his bag or 
something amiss in his hammock, matters under the 
police oversight of the ship's corporals of the lower 
decks, and which brought down on him a vague threat 
from one of them. (68B) 
This, of course, is a reference to Claggart, the Belli-
potent's master-at-arms. Described in more detail in a 
later chapter, it is sufficient to say now that Claggart 
developed a kind of envy toward Billy out of a depraved 
admiration of those qualities in the "Handsome Sailor" 
that he could never instill within himself. Through 
hypocrisy, deceit, and subtlety, Claggart wove his trap 
for Billy who did not perceive Claggart's sinister 
intent. "He trusts all men, accepts appearances for what 
they seem, and is even foolish enough to think that he can 
become friends with the man who hates him the most" 
(Seelye, 1977, p. 22). Yet, an uneasy feeling seemed to 
haunt Billy bordering on a paranoia that something was 
amiss which could not be made readily apparent. 
So heedful in all things as he was, how could this be? 
He could not understand it, and it more than vexed 
him. When he spoke to his young topmates about it 
they were either lightly incredulous or found somethin 
comical in his unconcealed anxiety. (69T) 
Thus, Billy sought advice from one of the older sailors, 
a loner nicknamed "Board-Ker-in-the-Smoke" since he had 
served as a member of boarding parties under Melson's 
command. 
Billv and the Dansker 
Though a relatively minor but impox-uant character, 
the Dansker was an old veteran of many years service. 
Wrinkled in appearance and very taciturn, he was a loner 
and seemed to keep to himself the stories behind the many 
scars he had received in sea battles. "His wizened face, 
time-tinted and weather-stained to the complexion of an 
antique parchment, was here and there peppered blue by the 
chance explosion of a gun cartridge in action" (69M). 
When the Dansker first saw Billy come aboard the 
Bellipotent, 
a certain grim internal merriment set all his ancient 
wrinkles into antic play. Was it that his eccentric 
unsentimental old sapience, primitive in its kind, 
saw or thought it saw something which in contrast 
with the warship's environment looked oddly incongruou 
in the Handsome Sailor? (70T) 
As John Seelye (1971) notes, "the Dansker, like Claggart, 
is of the party of darkness. Where the master-at-arms 
is a stalking cat, the Dansker is an owl, and both see 
things that even Captain Vere is blind to" (p. 23). 
Despite their differences in nature, "the Dansker 
in his ascetic way rather took to Billy" (70M) and 
Billy, undeterred thereby, revering him as a salt 
hero, would make advances, never passing the old 
Agamemnon man without a salutation marked by that 
respect which is seldom lost on the aged, however 
crabbed at times or whatever their station in life. 
(70M). 
In fact, it was the Dansker who affectionately substituted 
"Baby" for Billy, a name by which Billy was eventually 
called aboard ship. 
When Billy approached the Dansker and related his 
concern to him, the only reply was, "Baby Buad, 'Jemmy 
Legs' [meaning the master-at-arms] is down on you" (71M). 
Billy protested that Claggart baa always appeared to be 
friendly and therefore the Dansker's reply maue no 
sense. When pressed further to explain the mystery of his 
reply, 
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who had done the spilling, he inwardly became enraged but 
outwardly passed with "handsomely done my lad! And handsome 
is as handsome did it, too!" (72M). Billy, in his 
lack of worldly insight, exclaimed to the sailors in the 
mess, "There now, who says that Jemmy Legs is down on 
me!" (72B) 
A few days after the "soup" incident, Billy was 
approached by an afterguardsman who was acting as one of 
Claggart's pawns. It was a warm night and Billy was 
dozing topside so as to escape the sultry heat below. 
As the afterguardsman awakened Billy, he stated, "We are 
not the only impressed ones, Billy. There's a gang of us.— 
Couldn't you—help—at a pinch?" (82M). Since Billy did 
not immediately comprehend the man's intent, the after­
guardsman offered two gold guineas to assure Billy's part 
in a mutiny conspiracy. Seized by an inner emotion welling 
up within him in a controlled rage, Billy stammered in 
dismissing the culprit, "If you d-don't start, I'll 
t-t-toss you back over the r-rail!" (82B). Obviously, 
though not to Billy, Claggart was hoping to "frame" Budd 
in a supposed conspiracy by later finding the proof of the 
two guineas in Billy's sea bag. 
More bewildered than ever, Billy again went to the 
sage Dansker for enlightenment. Upon hearing Billy's 
account of the incident with the afterguardsman, the 
Dansker reiterated his previous conclusion of Claggart 
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being "down" on "Baby" Budd. As if possessing some 
knowledge of Claggart's sinister plan yet not divulging 
that knowledge to Billy, the Dansker exclaimed,"Ho, it was 
an afterguardsman, then. A cat's paw, a cat's paw!" (853). 
And with that, "the old Merlin gave a twisting wrench with 
his black teeth at his plug of tobacco, vouchsafing no 
reply to Billy's impetuous question" (85B). As a result, 
Billy remained confused, not conscious of having said or 
done anything to provoke the master-at-arms. "As it was, 
innocence was his blinder" (S6B). 
The Confrontation 
It seemed as if Billy's naive simplicity had 
ignorantly foiled the subtlety of Claggart's intellect. 
Yet, Claggart would wait for a more opportune time to 
ensnare his victim. The incident which precipitated 
Claggart's next move was the pursuit of a light but fast 
French frigate by the heavier Bellipotent. After the 
frigate's escape, Claggart approached Captain Vere who was 
somewhat agitated from his failure to capture the French 
vessel. Not wanting to believe Claggartfs accusation of" 
Billy partaking in conspiracy for mutiny, Vere ordered 
Claggart to his cabin and had word sent for Billy. 
As Billy entered the Captain's cabin, his only 
thought was, 
Yes, the Captain, I have always thought, looks 
kindly upon me. Wonder if he's going to make he his 
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coxwain. I should like that. And may be now he is 
going to ask the master-at-arms about me. (981) 
With this positive frame of mind, it is understandable that 
Billy was shocked when Claggart was asked to repeat his 
accusation to Billy's face. Mentally and physically 
transfixed, Billy was unable to defend himself, even with 
a stammer, despite Vere's calm prodding. Contrary to 
Captain Vere's intent to calm Billy, now understanding the 
nature of his impediment, the opposite was effected. The 
paralysis within Billy^ brought about by the shocking 
insult uttered in Claggart's accusation before Vere whom 
Billy admired, served to intensify the defendant's ina­
bility to speak. Billy's eventual reply was deadly. 
"The next instant, quick as the flame from a discharged 
cannon at night, his right arm shot out, and Claggart 
dropped to the deck" (99M). Ironically, while Billy is 
responsible for Claggart's violent fate, Claggart through 
his sacrifice triumphs in sealing Billy's as well. 
His inability to adapt to society is the inability of 
nature to be civilized. Billy is incapable of 
acquiring experience. And the failing that leads to 
his execution is his incapacity to use the civilized 
man's weapon of speech. In society, natural forces 
cannot fight out their battles. Billy cannot use his 
physical strength to strike back at Claggart. 
(Reich, 19Y1, p. 57) 
Billy and the Drumhead Court 
Captain Vere acted quickly to try Billy's case in 
as much secrecy as possible. Vere plays a major role in 
the courtroom scene which will be analyzed in greater 
detail later. As the court members assembled in Vere's 
cabin, Billy was brought in from a smaller stateroom to 
answer in response to Captain Vere's testimony: 
Captain Vere tells the truth. It is just as Captain 
Vere says, but it is not as the master-at-arms said. 
I have eaten the King's bread and I am true to the 
King. (106T) 
Billy added that he bore no "malice" against Claggart and 
would not have struck him had he possessed the ability to 
answer with his tongue. "But he foully lied to my face 
and in presence of my captain, and I had to say something, 
and I could only say it with a blow, God help me!" (106M). 
When pressed further by the court to divulge the 
names of any member of the ship's company who might be 
involved in a mutinous conspiracy, Billy answered in the 
negative despite the bribe by the afterguardsman. This was 
due to "an innate repugnance to playing a part at all 
approaching that of an informer against one's own shipmates 
the same erring sense of uninstructed honor which had stood 
in the way of his reporting the matter at the time" 
(106B). As a final question, the court asked Billy why 
Claggart would have lied if there was no malice between 
them. "At that question, unintentionally touching on a 
spiritual sphere wholly obscure to Billy's thoughts, he 
was nonplussed" (10 7M). 
Billy was removed from the cabin as the court 
deliberated its decision. Captain Vere intervened with a 
reminder that the conspiracy of mutiny was not to be 
considered; rather, the striking of a superior officer 
under the Articles of War, is the chief issue. In short, 
no regard should be given to the situational variables 
but only attention to the consequences of the act itself. 
"In brief, Billy Buda was formally convicted and sentenced 
to be hung at the yardarm in the early morning watch, it 
being now night" (llAB). 
The Christ Figure 
After Captain Vere communicated the findings of 
the court to the prisoner,Billy was put in irons on the 
starboard side of the Bellipotent's upper gun deck. 
Melville's description of Billy in contrast with his 
harsh surroundings is a masterful piece of juxtaposition. 
Surrounded by the black guns and other implements of war, 
Billy lay prone in his white jumper and trousers "in the 
obscure light of the bay like a patch of discolored snow 
in early April lingering at some upland cave's black mouth" 
(118B). In effect, he is already in his funeral shroud 
as a faint glimmer of lantern light above seems to create 
an angelic halo about his head. 
Finding Billy "lying between two guns, as nipped in 
the vice of fate" (119B), the ship's chaplain came to 
offer consolation. However, the chaplain withdrew 
momentarily "feeling that even he, the minister of Christ 
though receiving his stipend from Mars, had no consolation 
to proffer which could result in a peace transcending 
that which he beheld" (120T). Upon returning, the chaplain 
tried to relate some "godly" understanding of death to 
Billy, but it was to no avail. 
Not that like children Billy was incapable of conceiv­
ing what death really is. No, but he was wholly 
without irrational fear of it, a fear more prevalent 
in highly civilized communities than those so-called 
barbarous ones which in all respects stand nearer to 
unadulterate nature. (12011) 
0. L. Fite (1968) believes that Billy's attitude 
toward death could be based on Ilelville's interpretation 
of Schopenhauer's discourse on the denial of the will to 
live in The World as Will and Idea (1887)• "Billy's behavior 
following his unfortunate felling of Claggart does give 
some evidence that he accepted the death sentence with 
complete resignation and came to his death with astonishing 
cheerfulness" (Fite, p. 337). Long interested in the 
concept of ultimate nothingness, Melville must have been 
fascinated by Schopenhauer's treatment on the concept of 
Buddhism (possible derivation of Budd) as a means of view­
ing the opposite of the rational-scientific and conven­
tionally religious as equally absurd. 
Schopenhauer believed that every individual is a 
manifestation of the same entity and therefore lives in 
every other manifestation. It is as if one would live 
forever so death is not to be feared. Rather, death should 
be considered that process which destroys the illusion 
separating one's consciousness from that of others. In 
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this manner, one achieves immortality. 0. L. Pite sees 
Billy as the "beautiful soul" in Schopenhauer's philosophy 
reflecting the belief that the good man lives in a world 
of individuals whose well-being he regards as his own. 
"This man is close, at least, to the level of self-denial 
and has reached the understanding that his welfare and 
that of others is one and the same since all are a part 
of the same unity: the world spirit, nature, the in-itself 
of the will" (Fite, 1968, p. 3^0). However, it is doubtful 
that Billy consciously understood the significance of death 
in relation to Schopenhauer's concept. 
Having denied his will to live, he could see his death 
as an event of importance only as it served a purpose 
for the whole community. That Billy consciously 
understood this transcendental idea seems unlikely 
from Melville's description of him; however, his 
acceptance of Captain Vere's explanation of his guilt 
before the law and of his coming death as matters of 
course indicates at least unconscious recognition of 
these concepts. (Fite, 1968, p. 3^1) 
Thus Melville describes the chaplain's futile efforts to 
"impress the young barbarian" with thoughts of salvation 
and a savior "like a gift placed in the palm of an out-
reached hand upon which the fingers do not close" (121M). 
The Hanging 
As a white vapor formed on the horizon in the East, 
eight bells were struck signalling four o'clock in the 
morning. "Instantly the silver whistles were heard summon­
ing all hands to witness punishment. . . . flan or boy, 
none spake but in whispers, and few spake at all" (1221-1; 123T). 
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Billy, accompanied by the chaplain, was brought up on deck 
and stood beneath the mainyard facing aft. Captain Vere 
was facing forward from the poop deck with the marines 
in full gear on the quarterdeck below him. Billy's only 
words were "God bless Captain Vere!" (123H) which was 
repeated in a response from the crew. "And yet at that 
instant Billy alone must have been in their hearts, even 
as in their eyes" (12 3B). In the next moment, Vere gave 
the signal and 
it chanced that the vapory fleece hanging low in the 
East was shot through with a soft glory as of the 
fleece of the Lamb of God seen in a mystical vision, 
and simultaneously therewith, watched by the wedged 
mass of upturned faces, Billy ascended; and, ascending, 
took the full rose of the dawn. (124M) 
Ironically, E. L. G. Watson (1933) sees a melding 
of souls between Vere and Billy at the precise moment of 
the execution. 
Every image has its significant implication: the very 
roll of the heavily-cannoned ship so majestic in 
moderate weather—the musket in the ship-armourer's 
rack; and Billy's last words are the triumphant seal 
of his acceptance, and they are more than that, for 
in this supreme passage a communion between personality 
at its purest, most God-given form, and character, 
hard hammered from the imperfect material of life on 
the battleship Indomitable, is here suggested, and one 
feels that the souls of Captain Vere and Billy are 
at that moment strangely one. (pp. 326-327) 
In contrast to Watson's statement, Richard Chase (19^8) 
observes that, 
by portraying Billy Budd, not as Isaac or the fallen 
Adam, or Oedipus, but as the innocent hermaphrodite 
Christ who ascends serenely to the yardarm of the 
frigate, Melville made it impossible for us to see the 
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tragedy we ought to see in the betrayal of the young 
hero to the man of power and lav; by the man of 
retributive righteousness. (p. 1217) 
Aftermath 
In the closing chapters of the novel, Melville 
portrays the memory of Billy Buad as something which 
transcends the finality of physical death through spiritual 
martyrdom. 
Billy Budd, a "martyr to martial discipline," is 
completely innocent, a "young Adam before the Fall," 
who cannot even comprehend the thought of salvation 
or a Savior nor that of law or sin. In his sacrificial 
death he is transformed into a Christ figure. 
(Brumm, 1975, p. 405) 
F. Barron Freeman (19^8) observes that Billy's apparent 
helpless defeat ironically becomes reincarnated as a living 
symbol for all sailors. Joseph ^chiffman (1950) reiterates 
this assertion. "Thus Billy becomes—under Melville's 
ironic pen—something he never intended becoming: a symbol 
to all blue jackets of their hardship and camaraderie. He 
stammered in life, but spoke clearly in death" (p. 136). 
Melville writes of this transcendent martyrdom of sailor 
legend as follows: 
Everything is for a term venerated in navies. 
Any tangible object associated with some striking 
incident of the service is converted into a monument. 
The spar from which the foretoprnan was suspended was 
for some years kept trace of by the bluejackets. . . . 
To them a chip of it was as a piece of the Cross. 
(131") 
These sailors instinctively knew that Billy was 
the kind of man incapable of mutiny or murder despite an 
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official account of the incident aboard the Bellipotent 
which appeared in a navy chronicle of the tines, a portion 
of which read: 
John Claggart, the ship's master-at-arms, discovering 
that some sort of plot was incipient among an inferior 
section of the ship's company, and that the ringleader 
was one William Budd; he, Claggart, in the act of 
arraigning the man before the Captain, was vindictively 
stabbed to the heart by the suddenly drawn sheath 
knife of Budd. . . . The enormity of the crime and 
the extreme depravity of the criminal appear the greater 
in view of the character of the victim . . . The 
criminal paid the penalty of his crime. The prompti­
tude of the punishment has proved salutary. IJothing 
amiss is now apprehended aboard II.M.o. Bellipotent. 
(pp. 130-131) 
In conclusion, Wendell Glick (1953) observes that 
the hanging of Billy Budd might have been Melville's final 
comment on the irnpracticality of absolutes in a world of 
expediency. In essence, Billy became a personification of 
spiritual moral law which simply does not work when applied 
to complex social relationships governed by pragmatic 
regulation. Billy was too good for the world and properly 
belonged to another, higher plane where the moral prin­
ciples from which he acted were appropriate. "But in 
a society composed of man, not angels—in a society in 
which even Claggarts are to be found—an inferior standard, 
that of expediency, is the only workable one" (Glick, 
1953, p. HO) 
Billy Budd and Fiedler's Contingency 
Model: A Conclusion 
The foregoing evidence presented in this chapter 
reveals that Billy Budd was a very charismatic, informal 
leader. Plis charisma was not used to influence others 
toward some economic or political goal in the V/eberian 
sense, but his presence seemed to make those around him 
more aware of their intrinsic, natural inclinations toward 
humanism and universal brotherhood. As an informal 
leader, Billy influenced not by power or positional 
authority but through personal example. The aura of his 
presence aid not influence "measured forms" of legal law 
and military regulation exhibited by a contagious, innocent 
sincerity in concern for his fellow men. 
Therefore, one might infer that Billy is an example 
of the "considerate" leader in Fiedler's Model. Personal 
relationships are extremely important to Billy even to the 
detriment of task accomplishment or personal survival. He 
possesses great trust for others though this is often 
interpreted as innocence and naivete and might have been his 
tragic flaw. Thus, Billy acted predictably according to 
the character analysis presented in the context of the 
informal, considerate leader. His natural goodness 
endeared him to his mates as well as to his superiors in 
formal leadership positions. Had he been tainted with the 
intelligent deceit of Claggart, the dutiful pragmatism of 
Vere, or the wise cynicism of the Dansker, Billy would 
have acted more as the worldly organization man and survived. 
However, Billy did not survive because a "relationship-
motivated" leader could not be effective in the situation 
aboard the iron-disciplined Bellipotent whose primary task 
was to search out and destroy the enemy. Unlike the con­
tingency factors aboard the Rights-of-Man which reflected 
a combination of variables in Octants IV and V of Fiedler's 
Model, highly conducive to a "considerate" leader, the 
situational contingencies aboard the Bellipotent (Chapter 
IV) heavily reflect favorableness in Octant I where task-
motivated leaders are considered most effective. Almost 
from the beginning, when Billy was harshly commanded, to 
sit down in the whaleboat taking him from the Rights, his 
charismatic naturalness was in conflict with the unnatural-
ness of military law and regulation. Though effective 
as an informal leader in his job and in his relations with 
all save Claggart, Billy could not and did not survive in 




As Melville begins his description of Claggart, 
the Bellipotent's master-at-arms, he notes that the 
original function of such a position was "the instruction 
of the men in the use of arms, sword or cutlass" (64T). 
With the advances of gunnery which made hand-to-hand 
combat less frequent, the master-at-arms of a warship 
evolved into a position "of chief of police charged 
among other matters with the duty of preserving order on 
the populous lower gun decks" (64T). 
In describing the physical traits of Claggart, Melville 
portrays a man who will be the antithesis of Billy Budd. 
Since Melville noted in Billy's description that "moral 
nature v/as seldom out of keeping with the physical make" 
(44B) the tanned, handsome physique of Billy reflected an 
ideal inner nature. "The bonfire in his heart made 
luminous the rose-tan in his cheek" (77T). In contrast, 
Claggart's skin is of 
a pallor tinged with a faint shade of amber akin to 
the hue of time-tinted marbles of old. This complexion, 
singularly contrasting with the red or deeply bronzed 
visage of the sailors, and in part the result of his 
official seclusion from the sunlight, though it was not 
exactly displeasing, nevertheless seemed to hint of 
something defective or abnormal in the constitution 
and blood. (64B) 
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Claggart's other characteristics are not indicative 
of the heroic qualities of beauty, strength, and grace 
ascribed to Billy. 
Claggart was a man about five-and thirty, somewhat 
spare and tall, yet of no ill figure upon the whole. 
... It served Claggart in his office that his eye 
could cast a tutoring glance. His brow was of the 
sort phrenologically associated with more than average 
intellect . . . (64M) 
It would seem that Claggart, both physically and intellec­
tually, is out of keeping with his enlisted station aboard 
ship. 
His hand was too small and shapely to have been 
accustomed to hard toil ... . But his general 
aspect and manner were so suggestive of an education 
and career incongruous with his naval function that 
when not actively engaged in it he looked like a man 
of high quality, social and moral, who for reasons of 
his own was keeping incog. (64B) 
Thus, like Billy's past, little is known of Claggart's. 
However, this was not an uncommon phenomenon among 
the crews aboard the ships of the eighteenth century. 
In an attempt to maintain muster rolls at an acceptable 
level, the British navy could not always be highly selective 
of enlisted personnel. In fact, it was no secret "that 
the London police were at liberty to capture any able-bodied 
suspect, any questionable fellow at large, and summarily 
ship him to the dockyard or fleet" (65M). Even among 
sailors who had voluntarily enlisted, the motive was often 
less one of patriotism and more of a desire for adventurous 
escape under the security of the British navy. 
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Insolvent debtors of minor grade, together with the 
promiscuous lame ducks of morality, found in the navy 
a convenient and secure refuge, secure because, once 
enlisted aboard a King's ship, they were as much in 
sanctuary as the transgressor of the Middle Ages 
harboring himself under the shadow of the altar. 
(65B) 
It was rumored that Claggart was "a chevalier who 
had volunteered into the King's navy by way of compounding 
for some mysterious swindle whereof he had been arraigned 
at the King's Bench" (65T). This rumor, coupled with the 
fact that the man who filled the position of master-at-
arms on any man-of-war was unpopular with the crew, made 
Claggart the target of many derogatory comments among the 
sailors. Additionally, Claggart's rapid rise to a rela­
tively high enlisted rank, having entered nautical service 
so late in life, made him suspect among the men. In fact, 
Claggart quickly extricated himself from his initial 
assignments of drudgery through extraordinary efforts 
and his intellect. 
The superior capacity he immediately evinced, his 
constitutional sobriety, an ingratiating deference 
to superiors, together with a peculiar ferreting 
genius manifested on a singular occasion; all this, 
capped by a certain austere patriotism, abruptly 
advanced him to the position of master-at-arms. 
(67MO ) 
Furthermore, Claggart's positional authority was pervasive 
through a network of ship's corporals who were his immediate 
subordinates. 
His place put various converging wires of underground 
influence under the chief's control, capable when 
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astutely worked through his understrappers of operating 
to the mysterious discomfort, if nothing worse, of 
any of the sea -commonalty. (67B) 
The Nature of Claggart's Depravity 
Unlike Billy, who was incapable of dealing in double 
meanings and insinuations, Claggart was quite adept in 
matters of deceit and subtle hypocrisy. It was little 
wonder, then, that Billy's arrival aboard the Bellipotent 
aroused an inner hatred born of envy within Claggart. 
His very presence on board the ship aroused a spon­
taneous antipathy in Claggart, so that his sadistic 
nature could not rest until it played the serpent 
to this young Adam. As master-at-arms in charge of 
the ship's discipline, it v;as an easy matter for him to 
lay a trap for the guileless Billy and have him 
brought up for trial as the leader in a mutinous 
conspiracy. (Anderson, ly^O, p. 335) 
E. L. Grant Watson (1933) reiterates Anderson's analysis 
of Claggart's antipathy and envy toward Billy. "His very 
virtue makes him the target for the shaft of evil, and his 
quality of acceptance provokes to action its complementary 
opposite, the sense of frustration that can not bear the 
consciousness of itself, and so has to find escape in 
mania" (p. 322). It is obvious to Watson that the conflict 
between Billy's virtuous nature and Claggart's perverse 
and envious admiration is inevitable. "Thus, there 
develops the conflict between unconscious virtue (not even 
aware of its loss of Eden and unsuspecting of the presence 
of evil) and the bitter perversion of love which finds 
its only solace in destruction" (p. 323). 
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The inevitability of conflict between two such dissimi­
lar characters as Billy and Claggart is made more apparent 
by Melville's assertion that the limited space and con­
fining quarters of a warship force one to either accept 
the objectionable qualities of another or leap over the 
side. There is almost daily contact of each man with 
every other man aboard the vessel during the performance 
of duty. 
Now there can exist no irritating juxtaposition of 
dissimilar personalities comparable to that which is 
possible aboard a great warship fully manned and at 
sea. . . . Imagine how all this might eventually 
operate on some peculiar human creature the direct 
reverse of a saint! (7^M) 
In conjunction with the influence of the setting just 
mentioned and Claggart's initial, envious dislike for Billy, 
Melville digresses extensively in his novel in an attempt 
to assay the inner nature of Claggart's natural depravity, 
the essence of his destructive motivation. Melville 
asserts that one must go beyond Plato's definition of 
natural depravity as simply being "a depravity according 
to nature" (75B). In order to comprehend Claggart in 
relation to a normal nature is insufficient. "To pass 
from a normal nature to him one must cross 'the deadly 
space between.' And this is best done by indirection" (7^M). 
Therefore, Melville seeks to apply Plato's definition to 
the broader sphere of mankind rather than just the individual 
in order to explain Claggart's nature. 
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Civilization, especially if of the austerer sort, is 
auspicious to it. It folds itself in the mantle of 
respectability. It has certain virtues serving as 
silent auxiliaries .... In short, the depravity 
here meant partakes nothing of the sordid or sensual. 
It is serious, but free from acerbity. Though no 
flatterer of mankind, it never speaks ill of it. (75B) 
Within this vein, Richard Chase (19^8) notes, 
so highly "critiqued" is Claggart's depraved mind that, 
like the mind of mankind, it generates a compensatory 
vision of Innocence. And this vision is at the root 
of his ambivalent feeling toward Billy Budd, finding 
its expression to some extent in a homosexual attrac­
tion. Billy Budd's "harmlessness" fills Claggart with 
both longing and revulsion at the same time that 
Budd's physical beauty attracts him. (p. 1216) 
W. H. Auden (1971) would agree in that Claggart is like the 
devil. Evil cannot admit sexual desire since this would be 
an admission of loneliness which pride does not permit. 
"Either he must corrupt innocence through an underling or 
if that is not possible he must annihilate it, which he 
does" (p. 88). In addition, Auden sees the conflict between 
evil and innocence in terms of consciousness rather than 
strength. "In Billy Budd, the opposition is not strength/ 
weakness, but innocence/guilt-consciousness, i.e., Claggart 
wishes to annihilate the difference either by becoming inno­
cent himself or by acquiring an accomplice in guilt" (p. 87). 
So, Claggart's "civilized" natural depravity, dark intel­
lect, and perverse envy, become masked in the hypocrisy 
of outward respectability governed by his sense of prudence. 
In civilized society, the chief personal virtue becomes 
"prudence": the end most worth seeking for becomes 
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"that manufacturable thing known as respectability," 
so often allied with moral obliquities, 
and occasionally as in the case of Claggart, indis­
tinguishable from "natural depravity." (Glick, 195 3, P* 
107) 
This is what makes Claggart's depravity so insidious since 
it does not have the trappings of evil. As Glick further 
notes, "prudence, while being the mark of the socially 
adjusted man who rigidly adheres to the utilitarian prin­
ciple of expediency, may also be the last refuge of 
scoundrels" (1953» P» 107). 
The Monomania of Evil 
In another effort to dissect the mind of his depraved 
scoundrel, Melville probes further into the apparent 
thin line between respectable sanity ana vicious insanity. 
While effecting irrational atrocities, Melville notes, 
men like Claggart appear to be perfectly rational and cool 
in judgment. "These men are madmen, and of the most 
dangerous sort, for their lunacy is not continuous, but 
occasional, evoked by some special object" (76M). Melville 
goes on to say that this lunacy is always "secretive" 
to the point that the average mind cannot distinguish it 
from sanity. For this reason, "whatever its aims may be— 
and the aim is never declared—the method and the outward 
proceeding are always perfectly rational" (76M). AS 
Richard Chase (19^8) observes, 
in his campaign against Billy Budd, he employs all the 
devices of "confidence." Subtly obsequious, outwardly 
frank and friendly, he is a "fair-spoken man," 
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speaking in silvery accents with "uncommon prudence" 
.... (p. 1216 
Claggart's monomania of envy bent on the destruction 
of Billy Budd becomes compounded by a paranoia of aliena­
tion. 0. L. Fite (1968) observes, "the evil man, on the 
other hand, feels himself surrounded by strange and 
hostile individuals and his only hope is centered in his 
own good" (p. 3^1). Schopenhauer (1887) explains this 
phenomenon even further in terms of the insatiability of 
the depraved ago. 
If, now, a man is filled with an exceptionally intense 
pressure of will—if with burning eagerness he seeks 
to accumulate everything to slake the thirst of his 
egoism, and thus experiences, as he inevitably must, 
that all satisfaction is merely apparent, that the 
attained end never fulfills the promise of the desired 
object .... that if at last all wishes are exhausted, 
the pressure of will itself remains without any conscious 
motive, and makes itself known to him with fearful 
pain as a feeling of terrible desolation and emptiness; 
... he seeks indirectly the alleviation which 
directly is denied him—seeks to mitigate his own 
suffering by the sight of the suffering of others, 
which at the same time he recognizes as an expression 
of power. The suffering of others now becomes for him 
an end in itself, and is a spectacle in which he 
delights .... (I, 470) 
The great irony of Claggart's mania is that he, other than 
Captain Vere, is the only man aboard the Bellipotent 
who can fully appreciate Billy's moral nature. It serves 
to intensify his dark passion. 
One person excepted, the master-at-arms was perhaps 
the only man in the ship intellectually capable of 
adequately appreciating the moral phenomena presented in 
Billy Budd. And the insight but intensified his 
passion . . .—to be nothing more than innocent! (7&M) 
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Fatalistically, however, Claggart can not discard 
his natural depravity any more than Billy can alter his 
natural innocence. 
Now something such an one was Claggart, in whom was 
the mania of an evil nature, not engendered by vicious 
training or corrupting books, or licentious living, 
but born with him and innate, in short "a depravity 
according to nature." (76B) 
Claggart's envy can not long be suppressed even by the 
intellect. "But since its lodgment is in the heart not the 
brain, no degree of intellect supplies a guarantee against 
it" (77B). Therefore, Claggart can only admire those 
qualities in Billy which he perversely envies, eventually 
leading him to empty uncontrollable despair. 
With no power to annul the elemental evil in him, 
though readily enough he could hide it; apprehending 
the good but powerless to be it, a nature like Clag­
gart's surcharged with energy as such natures almost 
invariably are, what recourse is left to it but to 
recoil upon itself and, like the scorpion for which the 
Creator alone is responsible, act out to the end the 
part allotted it. (78B) 
The Distortion of Claggart's 
"Profound Passion" 
"Passion and passion in its profoundest, is not a 
thing demanding a palatial stage whereon to play its 
part" (78B). Melville notes that "down among the ground­
lings, among the beggars and rakers of garbage, profound 
passion is enacted" (78B). In fact, the circumstances 
which might provoke such action can be trivial in 
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relation to the secretive power unleashed. "In the present 
instance the stage is a scrubbed gun deck, ana one of 
the external provocations a man-of-war's man's spilled 
soup" (79T). 
Such a minor incident during rough seas was greatly 
distorted in Claggart's mind as perceived through his mania 
of envy for Billy. Thus, he took it "not for the mere 
accident it assuredly was, but for the sly escape of 
spontaneous feeling on Billy's part more or less answering 
to the antipathy on his own" (79T). The incident seemed 
to confirm, in Claggart's mind, the occasional reports 
given him by one of his most cunning corporals, "Squeak," 
a little man 
so nicknamed by the sailors on account of his squeaky 
voice and sharp visage ferreting about the dark 
corners of the lower decks after interlopers, satiri­
cally suggesting to them the idea of a rat in the 
cellar. (79M) 
"Squeak," sensing that his immediate superior strongly 
disliked Billy, 
made it his business, faithful understrapper that he 
was, to foment the ill blood by perverting to his 
chief certain innocent frolics of the good-natured 
foretopman, besides inventing for his mouth sundry 
contumelious epithets he claimed to have overheard 
him let fall. (79M) 
Claggart never doubted the veracity of such distorted 
reports. Thus, Claggart's passion was fueled to greater 
intensity to put into action his innate, subtle depravity 
on the object which had provoked it. 
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But Claggart's conscience being but the lawyer to his 
will, made ogres of trifles, probably arguing that 
the motive imputed to Billy in spilling the soup just 
when he did, together with the epithets alleged, these, 
if nothing more,made a strong case against him; nay, 
justified animosity into a sort of retributive 
righteousness. (80M) 
Thus, due to a combination of fate and depraved envy, Melville 
warns that Claggart's monomania, "like a subterranean fire, 
was eating its way deeper and deeper in him. Something 
decisive must come of it" (901). 
The Accusation 
As indicated earlier, Claggart chose to play his hand 
in the moments following the Bellipotent' s failure to 
capture a French frigate which it had pursued for several 
hours. Claggart emerged from his 
cavernous sphere, made his appearance cap in hand by 
the mainmast respectfully waiting the notice of 
Captain Vere, then solitary walking the weather side 
of the quarter-deck, doubtless somewhat chafed at the 
failure of the pursuit. (91T) 
Though not well acquainted with Claggart personally, 
Captain Vere seemed uneasy about the figure deferentially 
standing before him. For some unknown reason, it was as 
though Claggart evoked "a vaguely repellant taste" (91B). 
Finally, "with the air of a subordinate grieved at 
the necessity of being a messenger of ill tidings" (92T), 
Claggart conveyed his concern that there was a dangerous 
character aboard who was clandestinely mustering other 
sailors to some action which ought to be brought to a 
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commander's attention in view of recent troublesome events 
elsewhere in the fleet. So as not to allude directly to 
recent events at the Nore and Spithead, Claggart refrained 
from even using the word, mutiny, in his message to Vere. 
This only raised the ire of Captain Vere as he demanded 
that Claggart speak more directly and name the culprit 
in question. 
Vere was obviously dismayed when Claggart answered, 
"William Budd, a foretopman, your honor" (9^M). The 
master-at-arms was quick to add that Billy was, "but for 
all his youth and good looks, a deep one" (9^M). In an 
equally convincing manner, Claggart further stated: 
"You have but noted his fair cheek. A mantrap may be 
under the ruddy-tipped daisies" (9^B). This last statement 
was enough to make Captain Vere ruminate in a perplexing 
manner the information just conveyed. Yet, intrinsically, 
he must have felt that Claggartfs words were false and 
decided to "test" the accuser in the privacy of his cabin. 
At this point, R. H. Fogle (1971) observes that in view 
of the ambiguities of the situation, the skillful and 
subtle Claggart is strangely clumsy. "He overplays his 
hand; one would say that he is fey, struck by some uncon­
scious premonition of approaching death, or maddened by 
irrational hatred" (p. 196). 
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The Serpent's Death 
As Billy entered the Captain's cabin and stood before 
Vere and Claggart, he was in a very positive frame of mind. 
Captain Vere then commanded Claggart to repeat his 
accusation to Billy's face, "and stood prepared to scruti­
nize the mutually confronting visages" (98T). Claggart 
approached to within very close range of Billy and 
"mesmerically looking him in the eye, briefly recapitulated 
the accusation" (93M). 
As Billy stood emotionally paralyzed, Claggart edged 
closer to Billy as a serpent would to its victim, trans­
fixing him with his stare. "Meanwhile the accuser's eyes, 
removing not as yet from the blue dilated ones, underwent 
a phenomenal change, their wonted rich violet color 
blurring into a muddy purple" (98M). It was as though 
Claggart's eyes reflected the inner transformation of his 
soul from all that is human to something more alien that 
Melville likens to those "uncatalogued creatures of the 
deep" (98B). Thus, Claggart's stare had its intended 
devastating effect as the soul of evil confronts the soul 
of innocence and purity. "The first mesmeristic glance 
was one of serpent fascination; the last was as the 
paralyzing lurch of the torpedo fish"(98M). 
As Billy unleashed his terrible fury, the blow landed 
squarely upon Claggart's forehead "so that the body fell 
over lengthwise, like a heavy plank tilted from erectness. 
A gasp or two, and he lay motionless" (99M). As Vere and 
Billy raised Claggart's body in a futile attempt to 
revive him, "the spare form flexibly acquiesced, but 
i n e r t l y .  I t  w a s  l i k e  h a n d l i n g  a  d e a d  s n a k e "  ( 9 9 B ) .  
Captain Vere summoned the ship's surgeon and requested 
verification of what he feared to be true. As the surgeon 
knelt beside the body, "on Claggart's always pallid 
complexion, thick black blood was now oozing from nostril 
and ear. To the gazer's professional eye it was unmistakably 
no living man that he saw" (100B)« 
Claggart Within Fiedler's Contingency Model 
As the foregoing evidence has indicated, Claggart is 
the classic low LPC, task-motivated leader in Fiedler's 
Model. He performs efficiently in the contingent situation 
favorableness of Octant I outlined in Chapter IV. His 
monomania is suppressed by his subtlety and cunning deceit. 
The onerousness of the master-at-arms' position aboard ship 
does not deter Claggart from accomplishing his appointed 
duties despite the general negative feeling towards him 
from the crew. As noted earlier, the low LPC leader does 
not consider positive personal relationships among 
co-workers as necessary to the achievement of a task. 
It is little wonder that Claggart's character was in 
such strong opposition to Billy who was evaluated as a very 
high LPC, considerate, informal leader. The innate 
possibility of Claggart ever becoming similar to billy 
in character is so highly remote that it generates the 
envy within Claggart*s moral depravity, eventually 
consuming him. 
Organizationally, Claggart functions well within 
the harsh environment of the Bellipotent, highly disciplined 
by military regulation. Positional authority is well 
delineated and demands little personal motivation of others 
to comply with the achievement of prescribed tasks. 
Claggart's almost paranoiac mistrust of others suits him 
well in carrying out his "police" function through a 
network of compliant "understrappers." Thus, Claggart 
cannot tolerate the qualities in Billy which inspire the 
admiration of others. A character so free of deceit and 
lacking in the ability to deal in "double meanings and 
insinuations" must confound the driving, organizational 
opportunist. To perceive Billy as a man who is nothing more 
than innocent is too much for Claggart to bear and in his 




Captain the Honorable Edward Fairfax Vere, to give 
him his full title, was a bachelor of forty or 
thereabouts, a sailor of distinction even in a time 
prolific of renowned seamen. (60T) 
Thus begins Melville's introduction of Vere who is to be 
centered between the extremes of both Claggart and Billy 
Budd. He is the man of decision caught in the middle of 
a moral dilemma for which there is no clear-cut resolu­
tion. According to R. H. Fogle (i960), Melville's initial 
description of Captain Vere portrays him as a man of 
balanced opposites, a kind of "golden" mean. 
Melville uses a dialectic method of balanced opposi­
tions to describe him: he is of noble birth, but his 
advancement has not been altogether owing to his 
family connections; a stern disciplinarian, he is also 
mindful of the welfare of his men; he is "intrepid 
to the verge of temerity, though never injudiciously 
so"; a thorough seaman and naval officer, he never 
uses nautical terms in ordinary conversation, and is 
notably unobtrusive as commander of his ship. In 
politics, he is an enlightened conservative .... 
Though practical enough when occasion demands it, he 
"would at times betray a certain dreaminess of mood." 
He is exceptionally bookish, and he reads deeply, 
in "confirmation of his own more reserved thoughts," 
and to establish settled principles by study of the 
past. . . . Thus, he has not quite the tact of a man 
of the world; he is too honest and direct to pay 
careful heed to immediate circumstances. (p. 193) 
The "dreaminess of mood" to which Fogle alludes 
seemed to reflect a rather pensive habit of Vere's while 
at sea. "Standing alone on the weather side of the 
quarter-deck, one hand holding by the rigging, he would 
absently gaze off at the blank sea" (6lT). If interrupted 
Vere would initially "show more or less irascibility; but 
instantly he would control it" (6lT). Thus, he was 
popularly known throughout the fleet as "Starry Vere," 
a name originally given him by a kinsman, Lord Denton, 
upon Vere's return from a West Indian cruise. It seems 
that just prior to Vere's return, Lord Denton had read a 
copy of Andrew Marvel1's poem entitled "Appleton House" 
in which the following lines are written: 
This 'tis to have been from the first 
In a domestic heaven nursed, 
Under the discipline severe 
Of Fairfax and the starry Vere. (6lM) 
According to Alice Chandler (1967)» the name Vere 
"was the family name of the Earls of Oxford, and both 
Edward and Fairfax are names associated with that line" 
(p. 86). Chandler also notes that in addition to Melville 
use of Marvell's poem as a source, he must have also been 
aware of the Vere family tree. 
As the Dictionary of National Biography points out, 
Vere was a "household word" in the nineteenth century. 
It was made so in part by a long-standing tradition 
that used it as a symbol of birth and honor and in 
part by Macaulay's famous panegyric to the "old earls 
of Oxford" as "the longest and most illustrious line 
of nobles that England has ever seen." (p. 86) 
However, in spite of such praise, Chandler notes that 
the name Vere came to have a pejorative connotation 
in nineteenth-century fiction where it was often 
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used to suggest a vapid, if not actually villainous 
aristocracy. (p. 86) 
As an example, Chandler states that one of Tennyson's 
poems, "Lady Clara Vere de Vere," relates the "story of a 
high born dame who spurns and thus moves to suicide her 
lowly lover" (p. 88), which might imply that Vere's noble 
office might be a factor in the death of Billy. Finally, 
the name Vere could have had its derivation from Latin, 
viewed ambiguously as Phil Withim (1961) notes: "Would 
it not be contradictory, . . . for Melville to use for the 
Captain's name a word which at first glance suggests 
Veritas 'truth,' but on second glance can as easily suggest 
veritus 'fear,' or on third glance, vir 'man'?" (p. 88). 
John C. Sherwood (1964) sees evidence of Melville's 
interest in the biography of Lord Collingwood as a link 
to the characteristics of Captain Vere. Based on a 
work published in London by William Davies called A Fine 
Old English Gentleman Exemplified in the Life and Character 
of Lord Collingwood (1875), Sherwood notes that Cuthbert 
Baron Collingwood (born in 1750) entered the British navy 
as a boy and quickly rose to the rank of captain through 
his exploits in the American revolution. Then, because of 
distinguished service in the Napoleonic wars, "he was 
vice-admiral and second in command at Trafalgar and 
succeeded Nelson as commander in the Mediterranean station" 
(p. 476). Collingwood died in 1810, despite repeated 
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requests to return home due to decaying illness. The 
government had considered him irreplaceable. The charac­
teristics so notable in Collingwood are listed by Sherwood 
as evident in Captain Vere as follows: superior seaman­
ship, courage, submission to duty and authority, humanity, 
strictness, conservatism, love of serious and factual 
reading, and lack of sociability. Lastly, in addition to 
Chandler's and Sherwood's observation of historical 
sources for Vere, C. R. Anderson (19^0) sees a direct 
parallel between Vere's fictional ascendency to rank with 
that of an actual naval officer of the eighteenth century. 
"The accuracy with which these facts fit the naval 
career of Sir William George Fairfax seems to be something 
more than mere coincidence" (p. 332). 
Notwithstanding the foregoing historical sources 
exemplifying Captain Vere as a leader of able seamanship 
and competence as a commander of men, Melville portrays 
Vere as an exceptional Captain because, "unlike no few of 
England's renowned sailors, long and arduous service with 
signal devotion to it had not resulted in absorbing and 
salting the entire man" (62T). Captain Vere was a man who 
loved books and had a propensity for everything intellec­
tual. The books with which he replenished his library on 
each voyage revealed a bias "to which every serious mind of 
superior order occupying any active post of authority in 
the world naturally inclines" (62M). The books dealt with 
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actual men In history, biography, and those ideas which 
were founded on the realities of pragmatic philosophers. 
In view of unsettled times, these books seemed to reinforce 
and confirm Vere's conservative beliefs in institutionalized 
convictions of the status quo. "His settled convictions 
were as a dike against those invading waters of novel 
opinion social, political, and otherwise" (62B). He was 
opposed to the ideals of revolutionary France, not simply 
because they were a threat to his privileged class but 
"because they seemed to him insusceptible of embodiment 
in lasting institutions" and "at war with the peace of the 
world and the true welfare of mankind" (63T). C. B. 
Ives (1962) notes that 
so pedantic was his interest in historical fact and 
so stubborn his lack of interest in human nature 
that even with those of his fellow officers whose 
inclinations were thoroughly alien to his, he freely 
alluded to his bookish research. (p. 37) 
It is as if Vere "turned away from literary art or 
imagination or feeling to the dryness of recorded fact" 
(Ives, 1962, p. 37). 
A Situation of Tragedy 
The preceding analysis of Captain Vere's character 
reveals a nature analogous to Claggart's with respect to 
prudence and portrays a captain who possesses the requisite 
quality of every successful military man—a sense of duty. 
"Personal prudence, even when dictated by quite other than 
selfish considerations, surely is no special virtue in a 
98 
military man; while an excessive love of glory, impassion­
ing a less burning impulse, the honest sense of duty, is 
the first" (58T). This trait is very strong in Vere's 
character and heavily influences crucial decisions 
later in the story. 
The situation which develops, forcing Vere to certain 
courses of action, can only be judged by the reader based 
on the contingencies outlined in Chapter VI of this paper, 
the nature of the characters involved, and the sequence of 
events which follow. In judging Vere's actions, Melville 
aptly warns against cool logic in the assessment process. 
"It is another thing personally and under fire to have to 
direct the fighting while involved in the obscuring smoke 
of it" (114m). In the evaluation of emergency actions, 
especially those involving moral and practical consider-
tions, Melville warns that "the might-have-been is but 
boggy ground to build on" (57B). In effect, there can be 
little correlation of thought between "the smug card 
players in the cabin" and "the responsibilities of the 
sleepless man on the bridge" (H4M). 
As the novel begins, R. ft. Willett (1967) indicates 
that "the temporal context of the story is the era of the 
Napoleonic Wars and of the Nore mutiny, and it is against 
this background that Vere's conduct has to be judged. In 
essence, Willitt sees the historical situation as responsible 
for Vere's eventual obsession with mutiny which exposes his 
human frailty amidst great prudence and intellect. Coupled 
with the fact that Vere is isolated from higher command 
due to the detachment of the Bellipotent on scouting duty, 
R. H. Fogle (I960) states that "the circumstances conspire 
to produce tragedy" (p. 196). Willett agrees in stating 
that "these circumstances, in conjunction with Claggart's 
machinations, Vere's temperament, and Billy's simplicity, 
produce the catastrophe" (1967, p. 370). 
The impending, tragic catastrophe is not readily 
apparent at first because, as Melville notes, "in their 
general bearing and conduct the commissioned officers of a 
warship naturally take their tone from the commander, that 
is if he have that ascendancy of character that ought to 
be his" (60T). This is obviously a credit to Captain 
Vere's competence as a leader aboard the Bellipotent since 
"very little in the manner of the men and nothing obvious 
in the demeanor of the officers would have suggested to an 
ordinary observer that the Great Mutiny was a recent 
event" (59B). However, this situation was to deteriorate 
quickly, precipitated by the failure of the Bellipotent 
to capture a smaller French frigate and Captain Vere's 
agitated disappointment followed by Claggart's deferential 
approach in his accusation of Billy Budd to mutiny. "The 
climax begins in a supercharged atmosphere" (Browne, 
1963, P. 332). 
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As Vere paced the quarterdeck absorbed in reflection 
of the frigate's escape, he noticed Claggart patiently 
waiting to speak and suddenly "a peculiar expression came 
over him" as "encountering a person who . . . first 
provokes a vaguely repellant taste" (91B). This feeling 
in Verewas compounded as Claggart couched his accusation 
of Billy in subtle implication. Becoming increasingly 
provoked, Vere vehemently demanded that Claggart be more 
direct. 
Normally Vere controls this [irascibility] instantly, 
but the fact remains that Claggart's accusation against 
Billy Budd and his frequent references to mutiny are 
delivered at a time when Vere is emotionally agitated. 
(Willett, 1967, P. 370) 
Ray Browne (1963) observes that the situation becomes 
increasingly tense. "Vere gets more taut, more nervous, 
less reliable. Claggart, on the contrary, remains always 
cold and calculation" (p. 332). As Claggart continues 
to weave his tale in a tone of retributive righteousness, 
he finally names Budd ironically referring to him as a 
"mantrap" under "the ruddy-tipped daisies" (9^M). It is 
understandable, then, that "in his present unquiet position, 
this is an argument the Captain cannot ignore. Claggart 
has merely to enunciate his charge and his case is won" 
(Chase, 19^8, p. 1216). However, Vere retorts,'" Do you 
come to me, Master-at-Arms, with so foggy a tale? . . . 
there is a yardarm-end for the false witness"' (95B). 
Captain Vere was obviously distrustful of Claggart's words 
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as R. H. Fogle (I960) notes: "Convinced of Claggart's 
falseness, Vere arranges a private confrontation, but with 
the object of testing the accuser than of trying the accused" 
(p. 197). 
The Tragic Test 
Having sent for Billy and ordering Claggart to follow, 
Captain Vere retired to his cabin in order to conduct his 
private test in as undemonstrative a manner as possible. 
With all three men now privately gathered in the Captain's 
quarters, Vere ordered,"'Now, Master-at-Arms, tell this 
man to his face what you told of him to me'" (98T). 
Hoping to expose the accuser, Vere "stood prepared to 
scrutinize the mutually confronting visages" (9&T). 
After the accusation was sadistically repeated, Billy 
stood tranfixed in emotional shock. Vere exclaimed, 
"'Speak! Defend yourself!'" (98B) which only caused 
"a strange dumb gesturing and gurgling in Billy . . . 
intensifying it into a convulsed tongue-tie" (9tfB). 
Now realizing the nature of Billy's vocal impediment 
through a mental recollection of a similar defect in an 
old schoolmate, Vere put his hand on Billy to calm him. 
"'There is no hurry, my boy. Take your time, take your 
time."' These words ironically "prompted yet more violent 
efforts at utterance . . . bringing to his face an 
expression which was as a crucifixion to behold" (99i-0. 
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In the next instant, Billy's arm shot out as he fatally 
struck Claggart on the forehead. "'Fated boy,' breathed 
Captain Vere in tone so low as to be almost a whisper, 
'what have you done!> But here, help me'" (99B). It was 
as if Captain Vere already knew that 
the case no longer turned on the charge of mutiny, 
admittedly false. But striking and killing a 
superior, regardless of how pure the intention or 
how justified the act, was proscribed in the 
Articles of War as a capital offense." (Anderson, 
1940, p. 3^5) 
Furthermore, after the surgeon confirmed Claggart; 's 
death, Vere exclaimed,"'Struck dead by an angel of God! 
Yet the angel must hang!'" (101T) as if he had already 
made up his mind concerning Billy's fate. 
Sanity or.Insanity 
As the Captain orders Claggart's body removed to 
an adjoining compartment, the surgeon is somewhat perplexed 
by the excited manner of his normally prudent Captain. 
The surgeon is further disturbed by Vere's disposition 
of the body in a compartment of his cabin, as implying 
an unaccountable desire for secrecy . . . the possi­
bility that he is wrong, or even that he is evil, 
is steadily before us. (Fogle, I960, p. 198) 
Ray Browne (1963) observes that "after Claggart is killed, 
Vere's mind and nerve crack" (p. 332). Browne adds that 
Vere tries to continue in the role of strict military 
disciplinarian but becomes more excited resulting in 
erratic actions. He would agree with Fogle in the respect 
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that "Vere has become, In fact, capable of great evil, 
of much destructiveness" (p. 332). 
Briefly recollecting himself, Vere orders the surgeon, 
"Go now. I presently shall call a drumhead court. 
Tell the lieutenants what has happened, and tell Mr. 
Mordant" (meaning the captain of marines), "and charge 
them to keep the matter to themselves." (101M) 
C. B. Ives (1962) notes that 
When Vere told the surgeon of his determination to call 
a drumhead court-martial immediately, the surgeon 
thought Vere was "suddenly affected in his mind." 
He recalled Vere's"excited exclamations so at variance 
with his normal manner." (p. 35) 
Ives concludes, "The 'sense of the urgency of the case1 
that 'overruled in Captain Vere every other consideration1 
did not possess his officers" (p. 35). R. H. Fogle (i960) 
in defense of Vere's urgency, suggests that "no time can 
be permitted for doubt or speculation by those who might 
mutiny; in his secrecy, Vere is defending an indispensable 
order" (p. 198). 
In agreement with Fogle's defense of Vere's urgency 
of action, 'William Brasswell (1961) states that the chief 
reason for immediate action on Billy's case was "that an 
encounter with the enemy might take place at any time, 
and any weakness of discipline might result in defection 
that would mean defeat" (p. 101). Brasswell adds further 
that even though Vere would rather have confined Billy so 
as to submit his case later to the Admiral, "he feels it 
incumbent on him as an officer responsible for the efficiency 
of a fighting unit, to act on the case immediately" (p. 99). 
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Tragically, in Vere's intuitive comprehension of two such 
disparate characters as Claggart and Billy, Fogle concludes 
that Captain Vere belongs to a "different order of nature 
from common humanity, and he is of tragedy the ideal 
spectator as well as the agent" ( p. 198). 
As the surgeon communicated to the other officers and 
captain of marines what the Captain ordered, these men 
shared the surgeon's surprise, thinking that such a matter 
should be referred to higher authority. If one is to 
judge Vere's decision as coming from a man "unhinged," 
Melville warns that the incident was too close to earlier 
insurrections in occurrence and that the times demanded 
"from every English sea commander two qualities not 
readily interfusable—prudence and rigor" (103T). In 
view of the circumstances and the uniqueness of the case, 
to assume that Vere is acting abnormally might be erroneous. 
Who in the rainbow can draw the line where the violet 
tint ends and the orange tint begins? Distinctly we 
see the difference of the colors, but where exactly 
does the one first blendingly enter into the other? 
So with sanity and insanity. (102M) 
Even if the surgeon is medically correct in his tacit 
assessment of Vere's mental condition, there is little 
that can be done without more obvious proof. This is, 
indeed, a trying time for subordinates. "To argue his 
order to him would be insolence. To resist him would be 
mutiny" (102T). Thus, a drumhead court, composed of the 
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first lieutenant, the captain of the marines, and the 
sailing master, was summarily convened. 
The Drumhead Court 
"The court was held in the same cabin where the 
unfortunate affair had taken place" (105T) It should be 
noted that Captain Vere did not absent himself from its 
proceedings notwithstanding his required testimony. 
Rather than allow his appointed subordinates to carry out 
their duty objectively, Captain Vere remained after his 
testimony to ensure that the trial proceeded according to 
considerations which he posec during its course. Vere's 
intervention as virtual prosecutor is regarded as highly 
unusual and might be due to the unique circumstances of 
the case as well as his strong sense of duty to inter­
ject martial opinion. R. W. Willett (1967) notes that 
Vere's arguments, motivated by a fear of mutiny, "are not 
even a priori reasoning, but are rationalizations of a 
hasty decision: 'Yet the angel must hang!'" (p. 370). 
R. A. Duerksen (1968) adds that though Vere's court is 
highly unusual, it is not illegal and is in keeping with 
Vere's sense of commission. "Captain Vere may then be 
viewed as the ultimate in military decorum, a devoted and 
honored servant of his system—a system which cannot take 
into account the abstract idea of virtue" (p. 53). Melville 
also reminds us that "a true military officer is one in 
particular like a true monk. Not with more of self-abnegation 
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will the latter keep his vows of monastic obedience than 
the former his vows of allegiance to martial duty" (10^T). 
Thus, even as Billy responded to the Captain's opening 
testimony, Vere influenced the court in the presence of 
the defendant. At first, he seems sympathetic to Billy's 
obvious allegiance to the King and loyalty to him as 
Captain of the Bellipotent. "I believe you, my man" 
(106M). But near the end of the court's interrogation of 
Billy, Captain Vere stated that "irrespective of the 
provocation of the blow, a martial court must needs in 
the present case confine its attention to the blow's 
consequence" (107B). At this remark, Billy looked wist­
fully at his Captain and the court sensed that Vere's 
statement reflected "a prejudgment on the speaker's part" 
(108T). Vere pressed his point that this is not a matter 
for "psychologic theologians" to discuss and reiterated: 
"The prisoner's deed—with that alone we have to do" 
(108M). Following this last statement, Billy indicated 
that he had nothing more to say and was taken from the 
cabin. 
The Arguments of Law 
As the sentry exited with Billy, the members of the 
court "exchanged looks of troubled indecision, yet feeling 
that decide they must and without long delay" (109T). 
As the men earnestly consulted in very low tones, Captain 
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Vere paced in silence back and forth across the cabin. 
Presently, Vere came to stand before the three members of 
the court and scanned their faces with resolute impa­
tience. It was obvious that "His Majesty's Navy mustered 
no more efficient officer of their grade than Starry 
Vere" (109B). Having detected a "troubled hesitancy" 
among the court members, Captain Vere firmly reminded them 
once again: "But for us here, acting not as casuists or 
moralists, it is a case practical, and under martial law 
practically to be dealt with" (HOT). Here, R. A. Duerk-
sen (1968) perceives a moral ambiguity in Vere which is 
difficult to comprehend. "He has the responsibility to 
pass judgment on Billy; yet he finds that the basic 
responsibility is not really his, but the Navy's or War's" 
(p. 55). Vere feels obligated to martial duty which is in 
obvious conflict with moral principles of compassion. 
"But mindful of paramount obligations, I strive against 
scruples that may tend to enervate decision" (110T). 
Duerksen ironically concludes that "Melville must have been 
bothered about the validity of Vere's mechanistic basis 
for choosing as his good that which he could so clearly 
depict as essentially evil" (p. 56). This is the very 
essence of the conflict between legal law and natural law. 
Captain Vere attempts to resolve this conflict for 
the court as he reminds them of their true allegiance. 
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"But do these buttons that we wear attest that our allegian 
is to Hature? No, to the King" (110M). This allegiance, 
Vere reasons, necessarily abrogates man's natural freedom. 
"We fight at command. If our judgments approve the war, 
that is but coincidence. So in other particulars" (HOB). 
Vere's logical conclusion is that there be strict adherence 
to law in the court's decision. "Our vowed responsibility 
is in this: that however pitilessly that law may operate 
in any instance, we nevertheless adhere to it and adminis­
ter it" (HIT). Thus, William Brasswell (1961) notes 
that 
when Vere tells the court that in administering 
the laws of His Majesty's Navy they are restricted 
to considering the act alone. . . the laws in effect 
in His Majesty's Wavy are symbolically the uni­
versal laws of mankind no matter what his opinion, 
(p. 102) 
C. R. Anderson (19^0) reiterates Brasswell's observa­
tion as he comments on the obvious intent of Vere's 
words: 
In deciding the fate of the young foretopman, the 
drumhead court was instructed by Captain Vere that 
the exigencies of naval discipline must take 
precedence over all humanitarian considerations. 
(p. 335) 
Wendell Glick (195 3) offers yet another interpreta­
tion of Vere's words at this point. 
The ultimate allegiance of the individual, in 
other words, is not to an absolute moral code, 
interpreted by his conscience and enlivened by 
his sympathies, but to the utilitarian principle 
of social expedience. (p. 104) 
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R. II. Fogle (i960), who would agree with both Anderson and 
Glick, indicated as follows: 
. . . But Vere is equally clear on the distinction 
between a natural and a man-of-war world. The killing 
of Claggart is divine justice, but on the Indomitable, 
it is the murder of a superior officer under wartime 
conditions. (p. 45). 
The fact that the British are engaged in the Napoleonic 
Wars is a vital contingency to Vere's legalistic argument 
since he invokes the Articles of War. "Apart from its 
effect the blow itself is, according to the Articles of War, 
a capital crime" (111B). C. B. Ives notes that the 
Articles of War were a combination of enactments by both 
the Parliament and Admiralty in 17^9. The specific regula­
tion to which Vere alluded is as follows: 
If any Officer, Mariner, soldier or other person in 
the Fleet, shall strike any of his Superior Officers 
... on any Pretense whatsoever, every such Person 
being convicted of any such offense, by the sentence 
o f  a  C o u r t  M a r t i a l ,  s h a l l  s u f f e r  d e a t h  . . . .  
(Ives, 1962, p. 32) 
In addition to the Articles of War, Captain Vere also 
states, "We proceed under the law of the Mutiny Act" 
(1113). Arguing the necessity of this law, Vere points 
out that the King's forces must be kept at acceptable 
levels regardless of the individual conscience of conscripts 
since the enemy does not make a distinction between the 
killing of an impressed seaman or a patriotic volunteer. 
Vere says war is concerned only with the appearance of 
things "and the Mutiny Act, War's child takes after the 
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father. Budd's Intent or non-intent is nothing to 
the purpose" (112M). E. H. Rosenberry (1971) aptly 
comments on Vere's reliance on the military law of war: 
Legality as music is a figure seemingly out of keeping 
with the harsh spirit of that "child of War," the 
Mutiny Act. Yet in a world in which mutiny is a 
serviceable metaphor for the moral and theological 
condition of man, an imposed order is the only kind 
that is possible, and the articles under which Captain 
Vere takes his authority are not radically different 
from those which Moses took his. With respect to the 
taking of life, neither the military nor the biblical 
statute goes beyond a general prohibition. (p. 53) 
Captain Vere, indeed, has eloquently played the role 
of prosecutor, believing to be on firm ground under the 
aforementioned laws. He has also implored that the court 
no reason with compassion. "But the exceptional in the 
matter moves the hearts within you. But let not warm 
hearts betray heads that should be cool" (HIT). He also 
requested that the court act quickly in arriving at its 
decisions since the "enemy may be sighted and an engagement 
result" (112M). In order to expedite the court's decision, 
Vere added that the verdict, despite the circumstances, 
must be clear-cut under the law. "We must do; and one of 
two things must we do—condemn or let go" (112M). 
At the last statement, the sailing master ventured, 
"Can we not convict and yet mitigate the penalty?" 
(112M). In reply, Vere adamantly warned that existing law 
would not permit such a deviation. In another context, 
Vere argued to the court that a reduced penalty might have 
adverse consequences among the crew which respects strict 
adherence to naval law and tradition. This very tradition 
precludes explanation of considerations surrounding a 
court's verdict. Besides, Vere stated, the men would not 
generally have the intelligence to comprehend such mitigat­
ing considerations. "No, to the people the foretopman's 
deed, however it be worded in the announcement, will be 
plain homicide committed in a flagrant act of mutiny" 
(112B). Vere also warned that the crew would ruminate and 
view a penalty less than death as a sign of weakness and 
fear among superiors, thus provoking new trouble. "Will 
they not revert to the recent outbreak at the Wore?" 
(112B). Adding that even Billy would understand the nature 
of such military necessity, Captain Vere concluded, "You 
see then, whither prompted by duty and the law, I stead­
fastly drive .... I feel as you do for this unfortunate 
boy" (113T). Though Vere appears ambivalent in this last 
statement, Phil Withim (1961) states that the core of 
Vere's argument is the compulsion of men bowing to legal 
necessity. This is the foundation of tradition which 
engenders unwavering dedication to martial duty and other 
forms of institutionalized behavior. This belief is 
reflected in Vere's words as follows: "With.mankind," 
he would say, "forms, measured forms, are everything; 
. . ." (128T). In essence, "Vere is saying that men cannot 
think for themselves, that form and habit can control men 
112 
i 
as if they were no more than beasts" (Within, 1961, p. 84). 
Thus, Vere's arguments make it incumbent for the court 
members to arrive at the decision for which they were 
appointed. 
Vere crossed the deck and "resumed his place by the 
sashed porthole, tacitly leaving the three to come to a 
decision" (113M). Melville reminds us that these were 
loyal, plain, and practical men. Vere had appealed to 
their pride in duty as naval officers to act in conformance 
with both the Articles of War and the Mutiny Act lest the 
consequences be similar to the outbreak at the More. This, 
Melville notes, was a situation analogous to the later 
incident aboard the Somers and made certain the guilty 
verdict "demanding prompt infliction of the penalty" (113-B). 
Though the historical circumstances were different aboard 
the Somers, "the urgency felt, well-warranted or otherwise, 
was much the same" (ll^T). Thus, "Billy Budd was formally 
convicted and sentenced to be hung at the yardarm in the 
early morning watch, it being now night" (ll^M). 
The Visitation 
Captain Vere took it upon himself to communicate the 
court's verdict to the prisoner. "Beyond the communication 
of the sentence, what took place at this interview was 
never known" (ll^B). However, Melville uses this scene to 
portray the humanitarian side of Vere's character reflecting 
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"the passion sometimes latent under an exterior stoical 
or indifferent" (115M). The civilized man devoted to martial 
duty gives way momentarily to "what remains primeval in 
our formalized humanity" (115M). Within this more natural 
vein, Vere is symbolized as a father-figure and "may in the 
end have caught Billy to his heart, even as Abraham may 
have caught young Isaac on the brink of resolutely offering 
him up in obedience to the exacting behest" (115M). 
H. H. Pogle (i960) interprets Vere as a paternal symbol 
as follows: 
In executing his constitutional law, he himself stands 
outside it. Vere as well as Billy Budd must be the 
sacrifice, as is indicated by the private interview 
after the verdict, which associates the two as father 
and son, Abraham and Isaac (or God the Father and God 
the Son). . . . Vere's duty is to remain agonizing 
and to a degree equivocal, in the tragic jugglery of 
circumstances. (p. 202) 
C. R. Anderson (19^0) cuts through Fogle's symbolic 
interpretation and offers a more direct, though unique, 
thematic explanation. "Billy Budd, the foundling of 
obviously noble descent, it is intimated, was the natural 
son of Captain Edward Fairfax Vere, who was thus faced with 
the historic dilemma of choosing between patriotic duty 
and paternal love" (p. 3^5). 
The senior lieutenant was the first man to see the 
Captain as he emerged from his private meeting with Billy. 
"The face he beheld, for the moment one expressive of the 
agony of the strong, was to that officer, though a man of 
fifty, a startling revelation" (115B). This is one of the 
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first indications of Vere's inner suffering while effecting 
his duty under martial law. "That the condemned one 
suffered less than he who mainly had effected the condem­
nation was apparently indicated by the former's exclamation 
in the scene soon perforce to be touched upon" (115B). 
Shortly after Vere's meeting with Billy, all hands 
were assembled in the early evening hours. Due to the 
continued absence of both Claggart and Billy, the men 
anticipated that the Captain's announcement might be 
concerned with their master-at-arms and beloved foretopman. 
Surrounded by his wardroom officers, Captain Vere related in 
brief detail "that the master-at-arms was dead, that he who 
had killed hirn had been already tried by a summary court and 
condemned to death, and that the execution would take place 
in the early morning watch" (116B). In relating these 
facts, the word mutiny was not used and Vere refrained from 
preachment as to the maintenance of discipline, thinking 
perhaps that under existing circumstances in the navy 
the consequence of violating discipline should be made 
to speak for itself. (117T) 
The effect of Vere's words was one of shocking disbelief 
among the crew which remained in total silence for a moment 
after the pronouncements. "Their captain's announcement 
was listened to by the throng of standing sailors in a 
dumbness like that of a seated congregation of believers in 
hell listening to the clergyman's announcement of his 
Calvinistic text" (117T). As the men began to murmur among 
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themselves, the shrill boatswain's whistle reminded them 
of their appointed duties. "The word was given to about 
ship" (117M). In addition, the sentry guarding Billy was 
given strict orders that no one, except the chaplain, was 
to have communication with the prisoner. "And certain 
unobtrusive measures were taken absolutely to insure this 
point" (118 T). 
The Execution 
The beginning of the early morning watch was signalled 
by the ringing of eight bells aft. But on this day, 
another signal was sounded. "Instantly the silver whistles 
were heard summoning all hands to witness punishment" 
(122M). Attended by the Chaplain, Billy was brought up 
and stood under the mainyard, facing aft toward the quarter­
deck. Vere was facing forward on the poop deck. "Just 
belov/ him on the quarter-deck the marines in full equipment 
were drawn up much as at the scene of the promulgated 
sentence" (123T). As the rope was placed about Billy's 
neck, he exclaimed, "God bless Captain Vere!" (123M). 
Captain Vere received the words with suppressed emotion. 
At the pronounced words and the spontaneous echo that 
voluminously rebounded them, Captain Vere, either 
through stoic self-control or a sort of momentary 
paralysis induced by emotional shock, stoo.d erectly 
rigid as a musket in the ship-armorer's rack. (123B) 
Billy's words just prior to hanging are perceived as the 
height of irony by Joseph Schiffman (1950). 
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The first officer, sword under arm, awaited the customary 
reports of readiness from the sworded lieutenants in 
charge of each gun battery. The intention of this rather 
lengthy procedure was to disperse the crew and occupy time 
since the drumbeat had been ordered one hour earlier than 
usual for such an evolution. "That such variance from usage 
was authorized by an officer like Captain Vere, a martinet 
as some deemed him, was evidence of the necessity for 
unusual action implied in what he deemed to be temporarily 
the mood of his men" (127B). 
Vere's Death 
Melville prepares us for the eventual demise of Vere 
as he digresses momentarily on the rechristening of a 
French warship. It seems that the St. Louis line-of-
battle ship was renamed the Athee (the Atheist) and Melville 
notes symbolically that this name, "While proclaiming the 
infidel audacity of the ruling power, was yet, though not 
so intended to be, the aptest name . . ." (129T) . On its 
return passage to the English Fleet, the Bellipotent engaged 
the Athee in battle. 
Captain Vere was in the process of bringing the 
Bellipotent alongside for boarding when he was wounded by 
a musket ball. As Vere was carried below, the senior 
lieutenant assumed command. The French ship was success­
fully defeated and taken into the port of Gibraltar. There, 
Captain Vere was taken ashore with the rest of the wounded. 
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Vere lingers for some days, kept alive by the influence 
of a drug which, "soothing the physical frame, mysteriously 
operates on the subtler element in man" (129B). Shortly 
before death, "he was heard to murmur words inexplicable to 
his attendant: 'Billy Budd, Billy Budd"' (129B). 
Melville quickly adds that "these were not the accents of 
remorse" (129B) judging from what the attendant conveyed 
to the Belllpotent's senior officer of marines, "the most 
reluctant to condemn of the members of the drumhead court" 
(129B). According to Duerksen (1968), it would seem that 
the fatherly impulses in Vere did not, even in the end, 
triumph over military dedication. 
Despite Vere's obvious allegiance to military duty, 
he falls symbolically short of those heroic qualities of 
an Admiral Nelson as Melville notes that Vere was unhappily 
cut off from the glories that would enshrine Nelson at the 
Nile and Trafalgar, "The spirit that 'spite its philosophic 
austerity may yet have indulged in the most secret of all 
passions, ambition, never attained to the fulness of fame" 
(129B). 
Vere: A Further Analysis 
Melville's final remarks concerning Vere's death 
indicate that the Captain falls short of the ideal hero 
projected through the historical personage of Admiral 
Nelson. Not only did Nelson help defeat the revolutionary 
ideas of the French but he was able to inspire crews which 
other commanders had difficulty managing. According to 
R. W. Willett (19^7), Vere is unable to emulate the Nel-
sonian ideal. He is "an illustration of Melville's con­
tention that man, at any level below that of hero, is the 
victim of his own ambiguities and inconsistencies, and of 
history" (p. 370). With regard to this heroic ideal, 
Thomas Carlyle (18*11) suggests that "a man is right and 
invincible, virtuous . . . when he joins himself to the 
great deep Law of the World, in spite of all superficial 
laws, temporary appearances, profit-and-loss calculations" 
(p. 51). Carlyle further asserts that "every Great Man . 
is by the nature of him a son of Order, not of Disorder 
. . . He is the missionary of Order. Is not all work of 
man in the world a making of order?" (p. I85). In rela­
tion to Carlyle's definition and Melville's ideal, Willett 
suggests the following: 
In other ways, too, Vere is the negation of Carlylefs 
and Melville's "Great Man." He lacks the spontaneity 
that characterizes Carlyle's hero, being rather a man 
of prudence, the naval counterpart of the Benthamite 
utilitarians who evoke the scorn of both writers. . . 
Vere partakes of the work of man as defined by Carlyle 
but cannot impose order through the exhibition of a 
heroic personality. This is his tragedy and by 
implication, the world's. (p. 372) 
In a sense, then, Willett perceives Nelson as the 
embodiment of Melville's lifelong concern with order. In 
Carlyle's view, Nelson is "practically the summary for us 
of all the various figures of Heroism; Priest, Teacher . . 
to command over us ... to tell us for the day and hour 
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what we are to do" (p. 178). In summation, Willett notes: 
In Billy Budd, Sailor, Vere, another stern disciplina­
rian, is faced with a dilemma which crystalizes the 
claims of the heart for justice and of the mind for 
social order; but he is too driven to break the law, 
for he lacks the personal resources and versatile 
gifts that single out the Jack Chases and Lord Nelsons 
of the World. (p. 375) 
Vere in Retrospect 
Vere is essentially the man caught in the middle- of a 
dilemma as well as the character symbolically between the 
extremes of Billy and Claggart. One must criticize Vere 
within the contingent circumstances and the uniqueness 
of the case before the court. 
In a legal view the apparent victim of the tragedy 
was he who had sought to victimize a man blameless; 
and the indisputable deed of the latter, navally 
regarded, constituted the most heinous of military 
crimes. . . . The essential right and wrong involved 
in the matter, the clearer that might be, so much the 
worse for the responsibility of a loyal sea commander, 
inasmuch as he was not authorized to determine the 
matter on that primitive basis. (103T) 
According to Wendell Glick (1953), Melville chose 
Captain "Starry" Vere as his raisonneur, a man who was 
clear-headed and who possessed a broad enough base of human 
experience to enable him to weigh the most difficult of 
alternatives, choosing rationally between them. The choice 
which Captain Vere had to make involved more than a simple 
distinction between black and white. Rather, "it was a 
choice between two standards of human behavior, to each of 
which men owed unquestioning loyalty" (p. 104). Glick 
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adds that the Captain's decision was also Melville's in 
that "Melville felt no disposition in the waning years 
of his life to trifle with reality and call the process 
truth-seeking" (p. 104). 
W. Y. Tindall (1971) would agree with Glick's assess­
ment that Vere's decision was one that defied easy resolu­
tion. The choice involves the entire, sensitive adult 
being of Vere's character. "Agony shows on his face as he 
emerges from his interview with Billy, and a final exclama­
tion shows how deeply he is stirred" (p. 35). Tindall 
sees Vere's decision based on a choice between military and 
natural moral codes. The first code is obvious and well 
defined, symbolic of Vere's "measured forms." The second 
reflects the more natural code of the "noble savage" 
in which Melville was interested. The Captain's conflict 
"is between the balanced claims of justice and equity, 
order and confusion, law and grace, reason and feeling, or, 
as Melville puts it, 'military duty' and'moral scruple'" 
(Tindall, p. 35). Symbolically, it is obvious, in R. H. 
Fogle's estimation, to which code Vere adheres. "He is 
certainly used as a symbol for order: nicknamed 'Starry' 
Vere, he represents the steadfast, well-regulated system of 
the heavens, the ideal conservatism" (p. 192). 
Another interesting interpretation of Vere is the one 
offered by E. L. G. Watson (1933) in an allusion to Pontius 
Pilate. 
122 
Like "Pilate, he condemns the just man to a shameful 
death, knowing him to be innocent, but unlike Pilate, 
he does not wash his hands, but manfully assumes the 
full responsibility, and in such a way as to take half, 
if not more than half, of the bitterness of the execu­
tion upon himself. (pp. 323-324) 
Watson further suggests that there is a spiritual under­
standing between Billy and Captain Vere as expressed in 
the visitation chapter, despite their separate existences. 
John Seelye (1971) agrees with Watson in the interpretation 
of Vere as Pilate, but perceives the portrayal within a 
more sympathetic context. In his analogy, Seelye uses a 
comparison between a lawyer and a scrivener (copier or 
writer). 
Confronted by the purity of innocence and the purity of 
malevolence, Vere ignores absolute considerations for 
relative ones, while yet appealing to absolute (though 
temporal) order. Like the lawyer, he plays a sorrowing 
Pilate, in whom is found a matching of both head and 
heart, rational action and human sympathies. Like the 
lawyer, the Captain owes his allegiance to the 
temporal world, while Billy—like the scrivener— 
seems to have descended from other realms. (p. 21) 
Vere's strict adherence to the measured forms of 
temporal law has often been criticized to be the catalyst in 
sealing Billy's doom. During the drumhead court, Vere is 
the chief agent of the law. C. A. Reich (1971) notes that 
several critics believe "Vere is everything from a 
conscientious but rigid military disciplinarian to an 
unprincipled autocrat" (p. 57). He adds that the drumhead 
court was both illegal and unnecessary. Furthermore, 
Reich concludes that Vere's misrepresentation of the spirit 
of the lav; reveals a Captain bent on expediency at all 
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costs which might confirm the temporary insanity suggested 
by the surgeon. Thus, rather than a protagonist of the 
law, Vere is simply a man faced with a choice in an awful 
dilemma. Vere goes with the security of "measured forms" 
because "he is a man in and of society, because he occupies 
a position of duty and responsibility, he chooses the law, 
however inadequate it may be" (p. 60). 
As has been noted earlier, two of the laws which Vere 
uses in his argument to the court are the Articles of War 
and the Mutiny Act. C. B. Ives (1962) states that, with 
regard to the Mutiny Act, "the body of laws falling under 
that title applied only to the army and were without 
significance to his situation" (p. 32). In fact, as Vere 
often reminded the court, Billy was being tried for the 
act of striking a superior officer during war which was 
punishable by death (regardless of consequence to the 
victim). Under the Articles of War, Ives points out that 
there is nothing in the Articles which advocates immediate 
execution if the accused is convicted. Also, a conviction 
in a matter of such gravity could only be decided by a 
court martial "by which term was meant a general court-
martial called by the commander of a detachment, a squadron, 
or a fleet" (p. 33). The drumhead court aboard the 
Bellipotent was the equivalent of a summary court-martial 
for which there is no provision in the Articles of War of 
17^9 for Billy's offense. 
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Ives qualifies his analysis of Vere's decision by 
noting that in the event of an actual mutiny or as a matter 
of absolute necessity, a captain could disregard the Articles, 
and hang mutineers. However, Billy was not a mutineer and 
was not hanged for mutiny. "Mutiny required a 'combination 
of two or more persons' and besides, Vere declared emphati­
cally, 'I believe you my man,' when Billy protested his 
loyalty" (p. 33). 
The positional power of a captain of a man-of-war, 
Ives notes, was practically god-like enabling a commander 
to exercise his disciplinary whims with little expectation 
of reproof. Vere draws upon the Articles of War and yet 
refuses to be controlled by them. Noting that the Articles 
of War did not allow a mitigation of the death penalty, 
Vere also rejects the alternative of referring the case 
to the admiral which was a provision in this matter. 
Phil Withim (1961) asserts that the court did not guide 
Vere, rather, he guided them. "Apparently, all Vere wants 
is to have on record a trial agreeing with his decision" 
(Withim, p. 82). It seems that Vere was deliberately 
trying to make the court's decision difficult on the side 
of human compassion through a sense of duty to a legal code 
which he, himself, seems to ironically violate. 
He cited the Articles of War (which did not, in fact, 
support him), the Mutiny Act (which did not apply), 
the practicalities of the situation (which to every 
other judgment called for delay at least), and the 
necessity, as he said, of doing what no one wanted to 
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do, of suppressing Nature, of injuring the heart— 
"the feminine" in man—even of violating the conscience 
.... In' all this, Vere was guided not by the mind, 
as he professed, but by the heart turning against 
itself. (Ives, 1962, p. 37) 
In agreement with Ives, R. H. Fogle (I960) observes 
that the situation has set man apart from nature. Law 
has become distorted through human perversity. In 
seeming to maintain the law, Vere violates it. Pogle 
maintains that 
Vere is the priest celebrant of a mysterious ceremonial 
sacrifice, which he must perform with decorum in 
spite of imperfect assistants and a confused and 
turbulent congregation, the crew of the Indomitable. 
(p. 203) 
Wendell Glick (1953) concurs with Fogle in that Vere was 
determined to maintain the ordered functioning of his ship 
through a willingness "to sacrifice even the ideal of 
justice when the absolute necessity arose" (p. 105). 
Richard Chase (1948) adds that Vere is defending a law of 
the man-of-war world and that his decision "that a human 
life must be sacrificed to this law is impeccable, 
irrefutable, and fully conscious of the pathetic irony 
of the situation" (p. 1215). Chase also notes that even 
though Vere's name indicates that he is Man [vir], he is 
civilized Man. In this respect, Vere is not unlike 
Claggart as Phil Withim states: "He like Claggart, is 
civilized; he, like Claggart, uses reason to a bad end" 
(1961, p. 85). 
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The sacrificial means of preserving Vere's idea of an 
ordered society was obviously viewed as a practical 
necessity in his rnind. Wendell Glick (1953) believes that 
Vere realized the necessity of abridging many private 
rights in maintaining order was the only way to prevent 
anarchy and chaos which would inevitably sacrifice every 
human right. "The ideal society which abridged no 
prerogatives and guaranteed all private liberties was, 
in the considered opinion of Captain Vere, a figment of 
the imagination" (p. 106). However, R. A. Duerksen (1968) 
points out that "Vere knows that the system, on the basis 
of which he passes judgment, is ultimately false" (p. 63). 
Though a rational man, Vere will not think beyond his 
"measured forms." The excerpt from a naval chronicle 
which Melville quotes near the end of the novel reveals, 
in ironic form, the perpetuation of the system through an 
inversion of the truth. "Yet Captain Vere, as has Billy 
Budd before him, goes to his death without any questioning 
of the system whose very perpetuation so largely demands a 
distortion of truth" (p. 64). 
With regard to the maintenance of an ordered system 
at the expense of individualism, it would seem that Mel­
ville agreed with Vere. The verdict implies that the 
claims of civilized man might, in Wendell Glick's 
interpretation, constitute a higher ethic than the 
personal justice of natural man as defined by Emerson and 
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Thoreau. 
But he agreed with the Captain that justice to the 
individual is not the ultimate loyalty in a complex 
culture; the stability of the culture has the higher 
claim, and when the two conflict, justice to the 
individual must be abrogated to keep the order of 
society intact. (Glick, 1953, p. 104) 
It should be noted, however, that Captain Vere's 
adherence to his convictions required a great deal of 
personal sacrifice. William Brasswell (1961) states that 
"Vere is portrayed as suffering more than Billy" (p. 101). 
Brasswell adds that Vere tends to believe the forms of 
maintaining order are, by necessity, dearer than the life 
of any single individual. In a sense, Vere "sets imperfect 
order above anarchic disorder" (p. 101). Commenting on 
the nature of ordered forms, John Seelye (1971) contends 
that even though "political forms are ultimately illusory, 
in that they belie the eternal flux of life, they are the 
only bulwark civilized man has against the chaos that is 
the opposite extreme" (p. 24). However, Seelye warns that 
mindless adherence to forms can lead to inhumane formalism 
advocating an inflexibility of what is "right." According 
to Seelye, strict formalism of law seems to impose a dead 
balance between extremes which seems "to halt the natural, 
pendulum-like movement by which nature manifests its own 
balance" (p. 24). Captain Vere is caught up in the 
circumstance of time and fate and tries to strike a dead 
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balance through his "measured forms." As Seelye concludes, 
"his execution of Billy, though perfectly just, is perfectly 
unnatural" (p. 24). Throughout the trial, Vere stressed 
the irrelevance of natural ethics in reminding the court 
that they are to judge the consequence and not the intent 
of Billy's actions. Instinctive feelings have no place in 
war which only looks to the "frontage" and "appearance" 
of things. Obviously, then, Vere's allegiance is always 
to the temporal law of the King (the system) and away from 
the moral justice of natural law. Seelye sums up Vere's 
decision as follows: "Vere is neither for nor against 
Billy; he is for the dead balance of martial order, the 
preservation of forms against the threat of flux" (p. 25). 
The balance which Vere pursues legally may also be 
symbolic of his position, in terms of character, between 
Billy and Claggart. Ray B. Browne (1963) observes that 
some critics "generally agree that in the struggle between 
Claggart and Budd, Captain Vere stands ground between the 
two, forced by the power of evil to destroy that which he 
loves" (p. 321). This irony has been noted by aforementioned 
instances of Vere's almost fatherly relationship to Billy, 
especially during the visitation scene, in contrast with 
his martial stoicism during the trial and execution. 
The intellect of mind to assure order aboard the micro-
cosmic society of the Bellipotent was able to suppress 
the natural instincts of the heart, and a bit too quickly. 
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The fact that Vere so hastily pursued his course of 
action has been a crucial point of conjecture among critics. 
R. II. Fogle (I960) sees Vere as a symbolic agent of tyranny, 
violating the very codes by which he is bound. Vere's 
arbitrariness during the court-martial disturbs his 
officers and Fogle sees the execution as an irregular 
event carried out with masterly forethought. "He could 
have waited—it would have been more customary to wait— 
upon the judgment of his admiral, but he hurries Billy 
to his death" (p. 192). C. B. Ives (1962) adds:"A more 
normal captain would never have been so eager to hang 
Billy Budd, and a more practical one might not have 
hanged him at all, in view of his great value to the 
morale and efficiency of the crew" (p. 39). Ives goes on 
to suggest that the "priestly motive" alluded to earlier 
might simply be a manifestation of Vere's temporary 
insanity as he deceptively interprets the Articles of War. 
It is ironic, that he should engineer Billy's death so 
expeditiously, fearing reprisal in the form of mutiny 
when Billy seemed to be such an asset to morale. Recent 
mutinies in other fleet units certainly contributed to 
Vere's paranoia, causing him to act quickly. In this 
regard, C. A. Reich (1971) believes that even'though Vere 
had the option of holding the case for the admiral, he was 
directed by his unswerving allegiance to martial duty as 
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well as the nature of his circumstance. "The urgency of 
preventing any slumbering embers of the Nore Mutiny from 
igniting among the crew overruled for him every other 
consideration" (p. 57). Adding that the danger of 
insurrection did not really exist, Reich agrees with 
Melville's warning noted earlier. "But are we entitled 
to judge the actions of a military commander in wartime 
by hindsight?" (Reich, p. 57). Alice Chandler (1967) 
believes that all critical judgment of Vere, in the last 
analysis, is simply a matter of opinion. 
Whether Vere is God or Pilate, the good commander or 
a tyrannous autocrat, the benevolent father or an 
Oedipal archetype—or some ironic and ambiguous 
compound of all these—is very much a matter of 
opinion. (p. 86) 
However, in terms of character, Brasswell (1961) 
believes Melville intended Vere to be looked upon sym­
pathetically as a man caught in a moral dilemma requiring 
tragic circumstances. R. H. Fogle (I960) believes that 
Vere was a portrayal of Melville's own isolation as the 
Captain preaches the necessity of tragedy to his reluctant 
drumhead court. Vere understands the limitations of his 
formalized, martial code and, as Fogle notes, "clearly 
distinguishes between its empirical measures and the 
absolute values of divine justice" (p. 199). Symbolically, 
it is fitting that Vere dies fighting the Atheist, 
holding fast to his reasoned, martial code. In some 
contradiction to Fogle's assertion of Vere as a spokesman 
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for Melville, Ray B. Browne (1963) contends Vere's accep­
tance of forms might be Melville's resistance. "Instead 
of being the voice of the author, Vere is in fact Melville's 
antagonist" (p. 321). Finally, as a last comment on 
Vere's character, the following quotation is offered to 
sum up the microcosm of Vere which might pervade the 
macrocosm of universal man:4 
A review of these aspects of Vere's nature justifies 
the conclusion that the Captain's sudden decision to 
hang Billy was a sacrificial gesture, born of a kind 
of self-punishment that had become habitual in Vere's 
life, the sacrifice and denial that are involved in 
man's search for the comprehension of fact that 
destroys fancy, in man's search for the experience that 
gives him truth but robs him of innocence. All of his 
life Vere had devoted himself abnormally to this 
emphasis, killing repeatedly the affections that 
manifested themselves only in moments of dreaminess, 
moments that embarrassed and irritated him when they 
were discovered. Billy represented all of this nearly-
destroyed side of him—the affectionate side, the heart, 
the feminine—and stirred him to such a pitch that 
when the innocent sailor delivered the death blow to 
Claggart, Vere's suppressed love for Billy and for all 
that Billy stood for rose suddenly to the surface. 
However, Vere's self-disciplinary passion for the 
harshness of fact-searching and heart-denial rose 
equally fast and dominated his will as it always had 
done. (p. 38) 
Captain Vere and Fiedler's Contingency Model 
Chapter IV delineated a combination of situational 
variables aboard the Bellipotent which are embodied in 
Octant I of Fiedler's Model Since Vere has been charac-ft 
terized as a very task-motivated (low LPC) leader, the 
contingency of his effectiveness is quite favorable for 
this type of leader in an Octant I situation. Though there 
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is a compassionate side to Vere's character which is an 
important attribute of a relationship-motivated leader 
(high LPC), his primary allegiance is to temporal law and 
martial duty in the accomplishment of his wartime mission. 
Captain Vere, therefore, acts quite predictably since more 
natural and considerate concerns must become secondary 
to his unwavering allegiance to duty. 
For a few tense moments in the novel, especially 
during the execution of Billy, it would appear that the 
factor of "leader-member relationships" sufficiently 
deteriorated to the point of "poor." Other factors being 
constant, this would move the situation into Octant V of 
Fiedler's Model. In this octant, a relationship-motivated 
leader is considered to be more effective which might seem 
contradictory to Fiedler's theory of contingency. However, 
it should be noted that Melville took pains to portray 
Vere as a commander who, like Nelson, elicited great 
respect from his men due to his competence and sense of 
fairness. This inspirational quality, though certainly 
unheroic during the short period covering Billy's trial 
and execution, would probably be tarnished but not destroyed 
in the minds of the crew who were conditioned by "measured 
forms" and the absolute power of a man-of-war captain. 
There is also a case, based on the evidence presented 
in this chapter, that the uniqueness of Billy's act 
within existing circumstances might have caused a rather 
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"unstructured" dilemma within a highly structured warship 
regulated by martial law. Coupled with a momentary 
deterioration in "leader-member relations," there is 
evidence that our task-motivated leader was also effective 
in an Octant VII situation in Fiedler's Model. Whether 
or not Vere was morally correct is not the question in 
terms of effectiveness. The result which Vere engineered 
through the variable situation reflected in Octants V and 
VII eventually led to his determined reinstatement of the 
situation depicted in Octant I. After all, this was the 
efficient equilibrium which had existed at the beginning 
of the story before Billy came aboard. 
One may conclude then, that Vere acted predictably 
according to Fiedler's Model within the evidence presented. 
While there are moments when the situation possibly 
develops into Octant V or VII, Vere's suppression of any 
considerations which a relationship-motivated leader might 
display, reflects his obsession to maintain the smooth-
functioning order aboard the Bellipotent in conformance with 
the situational factors of Octant I in Fiedler's Model. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
HERMAN WOUK AND THE CAIHE MUTINY: A LOOK AT 
THE MAN AND HIS NOVEL 
As indicated by the chapter on Melville and Billy 
3udd, one must become somewhat knowledgeable about an author 
prior to fully comprehending an analysis of his work, 
especially those factors which might have had an influential 
bearing on the work itself. Just as Melville's maritime 
background lends credibility and realism to the fictional 
Billy Dudd, the same is true of Herman Wouk's experiences at 
sea which produced the highly realistic novel, The Caine 
Mutiny. Thus, a chronology of Wouk's life will first be 
outlined, followed by comments on specific events to 
confirm the authenticity of occurrences aboard the Caine 
based on the credentials of Wouk's life experiences. 
Brief Chronology of "Wouk's Life 
May 27, 1916. Born in New York, N. Y.; the son of Abraham 
Isaac Wouk (industrialist in power-laundry field who 
started as an immigrant laundry laborer at $3 a week) 
and Esther (Levine) Wouk. Grew up in the Bronx. 
1934. Graduated from Columbia University with a B.A. in 
Philosophy and Comparative Literature. 
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1934-1935. Gagman for radio comedians in Hew York City. 
1936-1941. Script writer for the late Fred Allen. 
19^1. U. S. Treasury Department, do11ar-a-year-man, writing 
and producing radio plays to promote war bond sales. 
1942. Graduated from Midshipman School at Columbia in the 
top 20 of a class of over 500. Wrote "The Responsibilities 
of Naval Leadership" in verse and in the meter of a 
French ballade. 
1942-1944. Assigned to the destroyer-minesweeper Zane. 
Swept mines in the Pacific off the Marshalls, K'wajalein, 
Eniwetok, the Marianas, Guam, Saipan, and Tinian. Served 
as the Zane's communications officer, first lieutenant 
(deck officer),and navigator. Began writing his first 
novel, Aurora Dawn. 
1944-1946. Assigned to another minesweeper, the Southard, 
and saw action in six Pacific campaigns. Eventually 
became executive officer and was later recommended to 
become captain of the Southard, but it was wrecked in a 
typhoon at Okinawa. Awarded four campaign stars and a 
Commendation Ribbon. Continued to serve in Reserves after 
the war. 
1944. Met Betty Brown in San Pedro, California while Zane 
in port for repairs. She had graduated Phi Beta Kappa from 
the University of Southern California and was serving as a 
supervisor of filing clerks. Though a Protestant, Betty 
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studied Judaism and converted a year later on her 25th 
birthday (Hebrew name of Sarah Batya). 
December 9» 19^5. Married Betty Brown. They had three 
children: Abraham Isaac (deceased), Nathaniel, and Joseph. 
19^6. Aurora Dawn published (Book-of-the-Month Club 
selection). 
19*18. City Boy published (Reader's Digest Condensed Book 
Club selection, Family Book Club selection). 
19^9. Wrote Hurricane. a screenplay for 20th Century Fox. 
Another play, The Traitor, produced on Broadway. 
1951. The Caine Mutiny published (Reader's Digest Condensed 
Book Club selection, Literary Guild alternate selection). 
1952. Won the Columbia University Medal of Excellence and 
the Pulitzer Prize for Fiction. 
195^. The Caine Mutiny Court-Martial produced on Broadway. 
1955. Marjorie Morningstar published (Reader's Digest 
Condensed Book Club selection, Book-of-the-Month Club 
selection). Received L.H.D. from Yeshiva University. 
1957. Nature's Way, a comedy produced on Broadway. 
1959. This Is M.y God published (Reader's Digest Condensed 
Book Club selection, Book-of-the-Month Club selection). 
1962. Youngblood Hawke published (Reader's Digest Condensed 
Book Club selection, Book-of-the-Month Club selection). 
1965. Don't Stop the Carnival published (Book-of-the-Month 
Club selection). 
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1968. Lomokome Papers published. 
Today. Herman Wouk presently resides with his wife in an 
apartment in Manhattan, occasionally retreating to an 
ocean-front home he owns on Fire Island, N. Y. 
(Sources: Contemporary Authors, Vols. 5-8, 1969, 1277-78; 
the book section of Time Magazine, September 5, 1955.) 
Wouk and the Realism of Traditional Values 
Like Melville, Herman Wouk's life consisted of several 
years at sea, providing the experience upon which future 
novels would be written. He began writing the manuscript 
for Aurora Dawn (19^6) while aboard the Zane in the Pacific 
during World War II. His most famous novel, The Caine Mutiny 
(1951), was based on Wouk's observations during the war 
though it is not considered an autobiographical work. 
Winning him the Pulitzer Prize in 1952, The Caine Mutiny was 
immensely popular, according to some impressive facts and 
figures in a 1955 issue of Time summarized as follows: 
It sold more than three million copies and it is estimated 
that over 25 million people were exposed to the novel in 
some way. Selling more than two million copies in Britain, 
the novel was translated into more than 17 languages. The 
play, The Caine Mutiny Court-Martial» lasted two seasons on 
Broadway and grossed about $2,500,000. The movie, starring 
Humphrey Bogart as Queeg, grossed over 12 million dollars 
and continues to be shown (Time, p. 48). According to W. S. 
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Hudson, (1969) The Calne Mutiny has also often been recommended 
by the Naval Officer Candidate School as collateral reading. 
It would seem, then, that even though The Caine Mutiny was 
written as a work of fiction, its foundation is one of 
realism which might account for its immense popularity among 
readers in postwar America. "Reviewers compared it favorably 
with Mutiny on the Bounty and Mister Roberts; with Conrad's 
Lord Jim and Melville's Billy Budd; and with almost all the 
novels of C. S. Forester" (McLean, 1953, p. 224). As with 
Melville, one must have some knowledge of the author's 
biography beyond the aforementioned chronology in order to 
understand the essential themes of the works produced. 
Both of Wouk's parents were Jewish immigrants from 
Minsk, Russia. After his arrival in New York, Wouk's 
father began work by washing clothes in a basement and 
eventually became president of one of New York's largest 
power laundries. Though City Boy (19^9) was a nostalgic 
reflection of Wouk's early boyhood days in the Bronx, he 
actually got off to a rather depressing start. "He was the 
neighborhood fat boy, forever guzzling chocolate milkshakes" 
(Time, 1955, p. 50). Herman remembers being "clobbered" 
in street fights but also recounts the influential consola­
tions of a strong family life and an early interest in books. 
"As soon as he learned to read, he would sprawl on the 
floor for hours with a tattered old dictionary, glorying in 
big words like anthropomorphism" (Time, 1955, p. 50). 
139 
Considered to be rather lazy in school, Wouk made good 
grades simply by cramming before exams. Herman seemed to 
become more disciplined in his studies when his grandfather, 
Rabbi Mendel Leib Levine, arrived in the United States from 
Russia and took over Wouk's religious training. Rabbi 
Levine "is one of the two men who, Wouk believes, have most 
influenced his life (the other: Columbia's late Philosopher 
Irwin Edman)" (Time, 1955, p. 50). 
While attending Columbia University, Wouk majored in 
comparative literature (like Willie Keith in The Caine 
Mutiny) and philosophy (like Noel Airman in Mar.1 orie Morning-
star). He also worked for the college newspaper, edited a 
campus humor magazine, and wrote two collegiate theater 
plays. Referring to his college days as a "sophomoric 
enlightenment," Wouk began to stray from traditional religious 
practices as he discovered the great works of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. However, he later returned to his 
orthodox devotion to the Jewish faith. "I felt there's a 
wealth in Jewish tradition, a great inheritance. I'd be a 
jerk not to take advantage of it" (Time, 1955, p. 50). 
Upon graduation from Columbia, Wouk announced his 
intention to be a writer despite the objections of his father 
who wanted him to write advertisements for the. Fox Square 
Laundry and his mother who wanted him to become a lawyer. For 
several years, Herman was a "gag" writer for radio comedies 
and a script writer for Fred Allen. He was making $200 a 
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week during the Depression, dating showgirls, and living 
in a luxury apartment in Manhattan. When Pearl Harbor 
was attacked, Wouk joined the Navy through midshipman school 
at Columbia University. . 
After graduating in the top 20 of a class of over 500 
midshipmen, Herman Wouk experienced a varied amount of 
sea duty during the war years as delineated in the chronology. 
This time in his life provided tne background of realism 
for The Caine Mutiny and made an impression on Wouk per­
sonally. "In the Navy, I found out more than I ever had 
about- people and about the United States. I had always been 
a word boy, and suddenly, I had to cope with the peculiar, 
marvelous world of the machine" (Time, Sept. 5, 1955, p. 51). 
W. S. Hudson (1969) reiterates Wouk's dedication to the Navy 
even after the war years. "Wouk has always had the highest 
esteem for the U. S. Navy; even after the war was over, he 
retained his commission, became a member of the Reserve 
Officers' Naval Services, and continued to serve on several 
training missions of various kinds as an officer" (p. 177). 
Lydia McLean (1953) also notes that the Navy fully 
cooperated with Wouk in his research which often required 
use of naval facilities and the interviewing of naval 
personnel. The navy was cognizant of the title and manu­
script before The Caine Mutiny was published but did not 
request editing privileges. In fact, "the day The Caine 
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Mutiny was awarded the Pulitzer Prize, Wouk got a telegram 
which read 'Congratulations on a high honour well earned1 
signed by Admiral Robert F. Hickey for the Secretary of the 
Navy" (p. 223). 
Having looked briefly at Herman Wouk's background, one 
can easily see why Frederic Carpenter (1956) concludes that 
"both in philosophy and literature, Wouk has always been a 
traditional realist" (p. 212). W. S. Hudson (1969) reiterates 
Carpenter's conclusion in terms of Wouk's themes of conflict 
between generations, the individual and society, and the 
conflict between traditional and modern values. "In most 
cases, the conflict is resolved in a reaffirmation of tradi­
tional values, a submission to the wisdom of older genera­
tions and of authority, and a reacceptance of individual 
responsibility" (p. 3). Hudson states that this conflict in 
Wouk's novels is depicted as tragedy in its resolution if 
there is a lack of self-discipline and moral preparation 
within characters. 
Thus, Maxwell Geisman (1955) sees The Caine Mutiny as 
a reaffirmation of Wouk's belief in the traditional values 
of "(1) decency in language as well as deeds, (2) honor, 
(3) discipline, (4) authority, and (5) hallowed institutions 
like the U. S. Navy" (p. 399). Hudson (1969) adds to this 
perception the idea that The Caine Mutiny is Wouk's way of 
looking at the insanity and tragedy of the great war through 
the sanity of laughter. In essence, Wouk attempted 
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to write a tremendous comic epic, the epic stumblings 
of the poor old fumbling Caine, through the vast events 
of the war and the three civilians who came aboard and 
never lost their civilian outlook, the Mutiny as the 
great protest of common sense against the idiocy of war 
and militarism. (p. 184) 
Hudson sees Wouk's sad, comic conclusion of the Mutiny as 
an error, considered a wrong act until all men become sane 
enough to loathe war. 
Surrounding the insights of war and ideological lessons 
of the Mutiny, Frederic Carpenter (1956) believes that the 
more specific conflict is between individual liberty and 
totalitarian authority in time of war. In fact, Carpenter 
notes that Lt. Tom Keefer, a major character in the novel, 
calls attention to the parallel of the Caine1s situation 
with that of Melville's Billy Budd. 
Without ever putting the question explicitly, it asks 
whether the civil rights of individuals must always be 
abrogated in time of war—whether the "mutinous" Billy 
Budds must always be condemned to death. (p. 213) 
In a sense, Carpenter states that war makes the ideal of 
individual liberty an illusion as intended in the Declaration 
of Independence and the Bill of Rights. 
In a further comparison with Melville's Billy Budd, 
Carpenter (1956) notes that Melville perceived the world's 
times of peace only as truces. Thus, even though Billy had 
been conscripted against his will and had intended no 
mutiny, Melville had to condemn him to death. 
The Caine Mutiny now alters the conditions somewhat, 
contrasting an unjust Captain Queeg with a just Captain 
Vere. But the mutineers of the Caine would also be 
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condemned except for Queeg1s neurotic self-incrimination. 
In time of war, martial law must prevail, even though 
the captain be cruel and incompetent. (p. 213) 
This view is re-emphasized by Hudson (1969) as he asserts 
that The Caine Mutiny accomplished what Wouk intended in 
terms of reaffirming values of tradition through literary 
realism. 
It will also be admitted that Herman Wouk accomplished 
what he set out to do in this novel—to express his 
thanks to the Navy for what it had done for him and for 
his country, and to make the point that military 
authority is a worthwhile tradition and that those who 
exercise it deserve their nation's gratitude. (p. 176) 
Brief Synopsis of The Caine Mutiny 
In December of 19^2, Willie Keith, a Princeton 
graduate, enters the Navy after midshipman school. His 
assignment is aboard the minesweeper Caine stationed in the 
South Pacific under the command of Captain de Vriess. Despite 
the fact that the Caine has a reputation of accomplisning 
her missions, Willie is shocked at the filthy appearance 
of the ship and the surly conduct of the crew. Very shortly, 
Captain de Vriess is rotated to shore duty and is replaced by 
Captain Philip F. Queeg. Initially, Keith believes that 
Queeg is good for the Caine because things are being done 
"by the book." However, the new "skipper" is obsessed with 
a monomania for meticulousness, a driving ambition, and a 
propensity to "bend" regulations in the issuance of unwarranted 
orders. The effect on the crew and officers is devastating 
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in terms of morale which leads to a situation of general 
paranoia and emotional instability throughout the ship. 
LTJG Tom Keefer, an intellectual, convinces the 
relatively uneducated executive officer, Lt. Steve Maryk, 
that Queeg is mentally "unfit" for command. Maryk begins 
to keep a detailed, private log of incidents which substan­
tiate Keefer's psychological analysis. After a few months, 
the Caine becomes caught in a terrible typhoon and Queeg 
seems to panic, becoming nearly speechless while insisting 
that the Caine maintain present course as last dictated by 
the tactical commander. Maryk invokes Article 184 as he 
relieves Queeg of his command. Taking the deck, Maryk 
orders a reversal of course into the wind to avert capsizing. 
When the ship returns to port, Queeg has Maryk put on 
report for mutiny and names the rest of the officers as 
accomplices. Through the shrewdness of his lawyer, Lt. 
Barney Greenwald, Maryk is acquitted and Queeg is relieved 
of command and given a desk job. However, Maryk's career 
is abruptly halted as he is denied a regular commission. 
Willie returns to the Caine as executive officer 
under Keefer who is made the new captain. Keefer proves to 
be a coward by abandoning ship unnecessarily after the Caine 
takes a direct hit. Willie saves the ship and becomes 
commanding officer when Keefer is discharged. He takes the 
Caine to the yards for decommissioning and, as World War II 
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ends, decides to leave the Navy. Willie wants to marry 
May Wynn, a nightclub singer with whom he has been involved 
during the war, and applies to graduate school in order to 
prepare for a university teaching career. 
1H6 
Foreword to Chapters IX, X, ana XI 
Though the characters of Keith, I'laryk, and Keefer 
represent various important leadership types, the focus 
of inferential analysis will be on Queeg, primarily due 
to his absolute positional authority aboard the Caine. 
All leadership analysis must necessarily emanate from his 
actions (or inactions) and secondary characters will be 
analyzed relative to the contingencies which developed 
over a period of fifteen months aboard the Caine. 
It was not a mutiny in the old-time sense, of course, 
with flashing of cutlasses, a captain in chains, and 
desperate sailors turning outlaws. After all, it 
happened in 19^ in the United States Navy. 
(Preface to The Caine Mutiny)* 
* All quotations in reference to Wouk' s  The Caine Mutiny 
will be cited only with a page number followed by (T) top, 
(M) middle, or (B) bottom, indicating exact location in 
the novel. The text used was published by Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 195^. 
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From the Navy Regulations 
Article 184. 
It is conceivable that most unusual and extra­
ordinary circumstances may arise in which the 
relief from duty of a commanding officer by a 
subordinate becomes necessary, either by placing 
him under arrest or on the sick list; but such 
action shall never be taken without the approval 
Unusual of the Navy Department or other appropriate higher 
Circum- authority, except when reference to such higher 
stances, authority is undoubtedly impracticable because 
of the delay involved or for other clearly 
obvious reason. Such reference must set forth 
all facts in the case, and the reasons for the 
recommendation, with particular regard to the 
degree of urgency involved. 
Article 185 
In order that a subordinate officer, acting upon 
his own initiative, may be vindicated for reliev­
ing a commanding officer from duty, the situation 
must be obvious and clear, and must admit of the 
single conclusion that the retention of command 
by such commanding officer will seriously and 
irretrievably prejudice the public interests. 
The subordinate officer so acting must be next 
in lawful succession to command; must be unable 
to refer the matter to a common superior for one 
of the reasons set down in Article 184; must be 
certain that the prejudicial actions of his 
commanding officer are not caused by secret 
instructions unknown to the subordinate; must 
have given the matter such careful consideration, 
and must have made such exhaustive investigation 
of all the circumstances, as may be practicable; 
and finally must be thoroughly convinced that the 
conclusion to relieve his commanding officer is 
one which a reasonable, prudent, and experienced 
officer would regard as a necessary consequence 






Intelligently fearless initiative is an important 
trait of military character, and it is not the 
purpose to discourage its employment in cases of 
this nature. However, as the action of relieving 
a superior from command involves most serious 
possibilities, a decision so to do or so to 
recommend should be based upon facts established 
by substantial evidence, and upon the official 
sibilitv views others in a position to form valuable 
opinions, particularly of a technical character. 
An officer relieving his commanding officer or 
recommending such action, together with all others 
who so counsel, must bear the legitimate responsi­
bility for, and must be prepared to justify, such 
action. 
U S S CAINE (DMS-22) DESTROYER MINESWEEPER 
Ife 
e n g i n e  n o o / n s  
As part of his orientation aboard the Caine, Willie Keith had to make a sketch 
of the major parts of the ship. This is a port side view of the Caine as 




THE SETTING OF THE CAINE MUTINY EVALUATED WITHIN THE 
SITUATIONAL FAVORABLENESS DIMENSION OF 
FIEDLER'S CONTINGENCY MODEL 
"We get our first impression of the Caine from Willie 
Keith, an ensign who gravitates into the Naval Reserve by 
way of Princeton, Broadway night clubs, and Furnald Hall, 
Columbia" (Weeks, 1951, p. 79). Edward Weeks goes on to 
describe Willie as a kind of dilettante and mother's boy 
whose greatest accomplishment was the composition of ribald 
songs at the piano. He was a chubby but goodlooking 
youngster with a rather casual attitude toward life. 
"Nothing in his training had prepared him for such a slovenly 
ship, nor for his berth in the clip shack, temperatures 105, 
ventilation straight from the funnel" (Weeks, 1951» p. 79). 
From the very beginning, when Willie is met at the 
fleet landing in Pearl Harbor, he is astonished at the 
disparity between the Navy he was taught and the Navy he 
encounters on the Caine. As Ensign Paynter, the boat officer 
signalled, "three sailors lying in a half-canopied greasy 
gray boat alongside the dock rose wearily and mounted the 
steps. Their blue dungarees were ragged, and the shirttails 
hung outside the trousers" (66b). AS the boat headed for 
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the Calne, two of the sailors, Meatball and Horrible, cursed 
at each other throughout the ride. Willie was astounded that 
Paynter would permit such language in the presence of 
officers. "But the stream of gutter talk appeared to trouble 
Paynter no more than the lapping of the water" (67M). 
Normally an immaculate, hallowed place of entry aboard 
ship, the quarterdeck aboard the Caine astounded Willie 
beyond belief. "It was a place of noise, dirt, bad smells 
and thug-like strangers" (69T). The deck was littered with 
debris and most of the sailors were shirtless. As the men 
crossed and recrossea the quarterdeck area, Keith noticed 
that their ragged haircuts and untrimmed beards did not 
conform with Navy regulations. "Oaths, blasphemies, and one 
recurring four-letter word filled the air like fog" (69M). 
As Paynter took Ensign Keith below to meet LCDR 
de Vriess (the Captain), they passed through the Caine's 
wardroom, the dining and lounge quarters for ship's officers. 
"Willie noted with horror several secret publications among 
comic-strip books, leg-art magazines, and frayed Esquires" 
(69B). 
Willie was led from the wardroom to the executive 
officer's quarters (second man in command) of LT. Gorton. 
Pin-up pictures literally covered the green bulkheads 
[walls] of the XO's cabin. Willie extended his hand to 
LT. Gorton. "An enormously fat, husky young man, nude 
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except for tiny drawers, sat up on a raised bunk, scratching 
his ribs and yawning" (69b). Almost simultaneously, Captain 
de Vriess came to the doorway and Willie was again shocked. 
"The captain was absolutely naked. In one hand he carried a 
cake of Lifebuoy soap, in the other a lighted cigarette" 
(70T). Willie's first impulse was to salute the Captain, the 
supreme authority aboard ship, but he suddenly remembered 
that Navy regulations prohibit the saluting of a superior 
when he is uncovered (without his official hat or "cover"). 
"And he had never seen a more uncovered superior than his 
commanding officer" (70M). 
When Ensign Keith stood his first in-post quarterdeck 
watch, he was appalled at the slackness of the enlisted 
watchstanders. Some were reading comic books, other were 
smoking or even sleeping while on guard duty on the fore­
castle (forward part of the ship) or the fantail (aft part 
of the ship). After threatening to put the men on report, 
most of them sullenly manned their posts in a regulation 
manner. After the watch, Willie reported his difficulty 
with the enlisted watchstanders but LT. Adams was not 
surprised. He told Keith that the Caine had been in the 
forward area since March '42; the men had seen a great deal 
of action and were slightly Asiatic. "They probably think a 
fantail watch in Pearl Harbor is foolishness. The trouble 
is, the skipper thinks so, too" (82T). 
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Below decks, the condition of the Caine was even worse 
than Keith's impression of its outward appearance. When 
reveille was sounded, hardly a sailor moved from his bunk 
despite the glaring overhead lights. "The deck was as nasty 
as a chicken yard with butts, papers, clothing, and moldering 
scraps of food. The fetid air sickened him" (83t), 
Willie's sleeping quarters were not much better. He was 
assigned to the "clip shack" along with Ensign Harding. 
Their two hammocks were hung in the metal box structure 
(6' x 71 x 3') which was located amidships and had little 
ventilation (average temperature about 105°). 
Willie found it difficult to get much sleep in the 
cramped, hot quarters and soon began"dragging" in trying to 
keep up with his watchstanding and decoding duties as 
assistant communicator to LT. Keefer. A bitter resentment 
for Captain de Vriess began to build up in Willie, bordering 
on hatred. 
De Vriess was the man who permitted all the filth 
and sloth of the Caine, for which he deserved a court-
martial .... The ship was the measure of the commanding 
officer. He had fallen into the hands of a bullying 
stupid sloven. (84T) 
When Willie asked LT. Keefer how a moron like deVriess 
could get command of a ship, Keefer replied: "He isn't 
commanding a ship. He's commanding the Caine" (86M). In 
his final analysis, Willie concluded that "the Caine was a 
pile of junk in the last hours of decay, manned by hoodlums" 
(71B). 
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Realizing that the commanding officer generally sets 
the tone of a ship, Willie noted an obvious slackness toward 
regulation even by his fellow officers. "He was beginning 
to realize that the wardroom was a tangle of subtle, complex 
evaluations by the officers of each other, knotting centrally, 
as it were, in the person and attitudes of the captain"(90B), 
Keith was, therefore, somewhat surprised at the transforma­
tion which occurred when the Caine got under way from Pearl. 
As the lines were cleared fore and aft, Captain de 
Vriess issued a series of rudder and engine orders in quick 
succession as the Caine began to shudder her way from the 
pier. The efficiency of the sea detail greatly impressed 
Keith since it was handled with expert seamanship. His 
perception of de Vriess began to change as the Caine cleared 
the channel and was making twenty knots through the blue 
waters of the Pacific. "Knowledge was in his eye, authority 
in his manner, decision in the sharp lines of his mouth" 
(92M). 
The Caine began steaming with other minesweepers for an 
exercise in deploying sweep gear. The other DMS' t. looked 
very sharp in appearance compared to the Caine but when the 
competition began, the crew of the Caine became one machine 
and deployed paravanes (cutting gear) before the other crews 
had even readied their equipment. LT. Steve Maryk was the 
deck officer in charge of the sweeping detail and was an 
expert in seamanship. The Caine1s time was 45 minutes as 
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she soundly beat everyone else in the exercise, but Captain 
de Vriess wasn't satisfied. "Book calls for one hour, the 
standard on this ship is thirty minutes" (102B). The Caine 
also beat the other ships handily in recovering the paravanes 
which delighted Captain De Vriess since one of his friends, 
Iron Duke Sammis, commanded the DMS Moulton. 
The next day, Keith visited one of his classmates aboard 
the Moult on and could not reconcile the differences 
between the two ships. He had considered de Vriess a tyrant 
but compared to Iron Duke Sammis, his skipper was "lazily 
benevolent." In terms of appearance, "the Moulton was a 
model of naval order and efficiency, the Caine a wretched 
Chinese junk by comparison" (109T). But the Moulton had 
dropped a paravane during the exercise and the Caine had 
led in all categories of performance. He could not logically 
come to a conclusion but recalled the maxim of the Caine's 
intellectual, LT. Tom Keefer: "The Navy is a master plan 
designed by geniuses for execution by idiots, and ask 
yourself, 'How would I do this if I were a fool?'" (109T). 
Shortly after returning from the Moulton, Keith was 
summoned to the Captain's cabin. De Vriess called him on 
the carpet for a missing, routine precedence message which 
Willie had misplaced during the excitement of the minesweep-
ing exercises. Willie regarded his error as a simple mistake 
but the Captain reminded him of the gravity of such an error. 
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"There are mistakes and mistakes. The margin for error is 
narrow in the Navy, Willie. There's too much life and 
property and danger involved in every act" (HIT). In 
addition, the Captain revised Keith's fitness report from 
"excellent" to "above average" which was essentially a 
blackball in Navy usage of tue report. "The fitness report 
was so dread an instrument that few commanding officers had 
the bowels to be coldly honest. As a result, the average 
officer was judged 'excellent' on these forms" (112T). 
The effect on Willie was noticeably irritating since he 
realized that "to call a man 'Above Average' was to inform 
the Bureau that he was a nonentity" (112T). To add insult to 
injury, de Vriess restricted Keith to the ship for three 
days (the amount of time the message had been lost) since 
"the punitive use of the fitness report negates the value 
of the system and is strictly forbidden by a Sec Nav direc­
tive" (11233). In Willie's mind, however, the Captain 
had used the fitness report as a means of discipline, a 
strong punishment for having mislaid a message of routine 
precedence, the last two lines of which read as follows: 
"Training duty of Lieutenant Commander Philip F. Queeg has 
been canceled and he is proceeding to relieve at once" 
(110M). 
Prior to the inferential analysis of Queeg in a later 
chapter, the evidence so far presented must be assessed in 
terms of Fiedler's Contingency Model. Lieutenant Commander 
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William H. de Vriess has been the focal point of leadership 
on the Caine as must be the captain of any ship by virtue 
of his absolute positional authority and power. 
The facts and incidents aboard the Caine thus far 
indicate a situational "favorableness" on the left spectrum 
of Fiedler's Contingency Model, more specifically by the 
variables in Octants I and III. It can be inferred that 
leader-member relations are good and that leader position power 
is strong. By virtue of the fact that the Caine is a 
military vessel on an assigned, wartime mission, the task is 
highly structured as depicted in Octant I. However, there 
is enough evidence of nonregulation conduct, especially 
in port, which is indicative of a seemingly unstructured 
environment as noted in Octant III. For example, Captain 
de Vriess has the same type of tasking as other DHS's but 
he tends to unstructure the "how" of accomplishing those 
tasks (in-port guard duty) while going "by the book" on 
others (launching and recovering paravane equipment). 
De Vriess seemed to know how to walk the thin line 
between the obsessive task-motivated leader who is only 
interested in results of performance and the relationship-
motivated leader who understands the humanistic factor in 
getting the job done through inspirational incentive. In a 
wartime situation with so much time at sea, the skipper of 
the Caine was a master of knowing what to emphasize and when. 
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To have unrelentingly enforced every Navy regulation on men 
who were often battle-fatigued would have greatly drained 
efficiency and promoted low morale. To the untrained eye of 
Ensign Keith, Captain de Vriess was a slovenly Prussian 
who knew how to handle a ship. To the men who knew him, 
de Vriess as an ideal "skipper" whom they would follow to 
hell and back. Thus, de Vriess embodies that unique blend of 
both the task (low LPC) and relationship (high LPC) motivated 
type of leader whose outward way of doing things might lead 
one to believe that he was all task-motivated. Underneath 
his gruffness was a heart of compassion which could temper 
his judgment in matters of regulation enshrouded in an 
unpretentious competence which instilled respect in sub­
ordinates. Yes, Captain de Vriess was task-motivated only 
in those matters of the greatest magnitude but he moved more 
toward the high LPC, considerate leader in the personal 
perception of his men summarized as follows as he is relieved 
by Queeg: 
. . .you can do things with some ships that you can't 
do with others. . . . Between you and me, these damn 
buckets ought to be melted down to razor blades. They 
roll and pitch too damn much, the power plant is shot, 
all the machinery is obsolete, and the men are crowded 
like animals. These are the only firerooms in the Navy 
where the black gang has to work under air pressure. 
If anything goes wrong, a blowback can kill them all. 
The men know the kind of deal they've got. The strange 
thing is, most of the crazy bastards like it. Damn 
few of them put in for transfers. But they have to do 
things their own way. It's the Hooligan Navy, to look 
at them. But give them a chance, and they deliver. 
They've backed me up in some bad spots— (127M) 
159 
Queeg cut de Vriess short probably because he wasn't 
listening either out of personal disagreement or ignorant 
rudeness based on egocentricity, or both. As will be seen 
in the next chapter, it would have been better for Queeg 
to have heeded the wise insight of de Vriess' accumulated 
experience aboard the Caine. However, Lieutenant Commander 
Philip F. Queeg was obsessed, almost from the onset, on doing 




As mentioned earlier Queeg will be the focal point 
of inferential analysis of leadership in relation to 
Fiedler's Contingency Model. This chapter will also deal 
with secondary characters (Keith, Keefer, Maryk) collectively 
as an illustration of their respective leadership traits 
and actions. It is imperative that the reader remember 
the situational variables of octants I and III which 
existed aboard the Caine prior to Queeg's arrival. The 
reason is that Queeg's competence, intentions, actions, 
and inactions will greatly affect the situational leader 
favorableness of the Contingency Model, forcing a shift 
toward the right side of the spectrum of octants which 
tend to be unfavorable situational variables for leaders. 
The reader should be aware that this chapter will be 
largely summary in its presentation of the leadership 
profiles of Queeg, Keith, Keefer, and Maryk. It is neces­
sarily lengthy as a case study but great effort was expended 
to extract only pertinent dialogue, action, and descriptions 
which would have a direct bearing on leadership types within 
the Fiedler Model and the nature of the bureaucracy in 
which the characters interacted. The reader will see Queeg 
as a classic example of Fiedler's task-motivated (low LPC) 
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leader but operating in changing situational variables as 
noted above. Other aspects of the Model with regard to an 
inferential analysis of predictable behavior of all the key 
characters relative to the Mode1 will be undertaken in the 
next chapter. As for now, the reader should keep Fiedler's 
Model well in mind as the following factual summary 
unfolds. 
Queeg's Arrival: DeVriess' Departure 
LCDR Philip F. Queeg's unexpectedly early arrival 
aboard the Calne embarrassed Ensign Harding, the officer-of-
the-deck who greeted the new captain. As usual, the deck 
v/as a mess and the general atmosphere of "slackness" was 
pervasive. However, Queeg exhibited no outward indication 
of being disturbed. "Queeg's voice and manner were pleasant. 
He gave no sign of being disturbed at the dishevelment of 
the Caine, or even of being aware of it" (120 T). 
However, as the relieving of command progressed 
in De Vriess' cabin, it became apparent that Queeg's calm 
exterior belied his inner tension which was fueled by what 
he had thus far seen and heard. For the first of what were 
to be many occasions, Queeg began to exhibit a strange 
manifestation of inner stress. Queeg reached into his pocket 
and "brought out a couple of bright steel ball bearings the 
size of marbles, and began rolling them absently between the 
thumb and fingers of his left hand" (122T). 
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In a rather pressing manner, Queeg asked to see the 
officers' fitness reports De Vriess had recently completed. 
Despite the unusual request, De Vriess consented, sensing 
that Queeg (an Annapolis man) was slightly perturbed about 
the number of reserve officers who would be serving under 
him. "'That's one against how many—twelve?"' (122 M). As 
Queeg goes through the fitness reports and asks questions, 
De Vriess gives his varied opinions of the officers, 
especially Maryk, Keith, and Keefer. His comments are a 
reflection of a relationship-motivated (high LPC) leader 
who knows his men while maintaining the expectation of high 
performance of the task-motivated (low LPC) leader. Through 
these comments, initial analysis of secondary leaders is 
obtained. 
Queeg is first impressed by LT. Steve Maryk's fit­
ness report. "'Pretty nice. This about Maryk, especially. 
For a reserve'"(122 B). De Vriess replied that Maryk was 
a "crackerjack" of a first lieutenant (deck officer). 
"'He's one in a hundred. Used to be a fisherman. He 
knows more about seamanship than some chief boatswain's 
mates' " (122 B). 
Next, Queeg reviewed Keith's fitness report. "'What's 
the matter with this Keith?"'(123 T). De Vriess 
answered,"'Nothing. He's going to be a good officer. 
Needed a kick in the pants and I gave it to him'"(123 T). He 
further states that Willie has a "good head" and adds that 
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he will probably rewrite the report before forwarding it 
to BuPers (Bureau of Naval Personnel). After De Vriess 
explains about Keith's misplacing the message, Queeg asks 
why the communication officer, LTJG Tom Keefer, was not also 
punished for not catching Keith's error. 
De Vriess seems to defend Keefer by stating that 
no system is foolproof and adds'Keefer does very well 
. . . . Brilliant mind. A writer .... Son of a gun's 
been working on a novel in off hours—1" (123 M). Queeg 
interrupts and inquires further about disciplinary measures 
for Keefer. In a firm but pleasant tone, De Vriess reiterates 
that he considers both Keith and Keefer as excellent officer 
material. Adding that Keefer has "the brains to do anything 
superlatively," De Vriess points out that Keefer's somewnat 
older age reflects divided interests with regard to the 
military in general and the Navy in particular. However, 
De Vriess concludesZou engage his loyalty and he'll 
deliver the goods. Stands a fine 00D watch under way'" 
(123 M). 
De Vriess then asks Queeg about his experience in 
handling destroyers and Queeg states that he's had many 
hours as 00D (officer-of-the-deck) under way. With regard 
to coming alongside, mooring, etc., Queeg merely states that 
he's "given the orders and so forth" (124 M). Queeg adds 
that he had only been the exec on the destroyer Falk for 
a month before being sent to a carrier where his 
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opportunities to conn (maneuver) a ship were almost 
nonexistent. When De Vriess offers to take the Caine out 
for a few runs so that Queeg can get the feel of the ship, 
Queeg shrugs off the offer and announces his intention to 
complete the relieving process by the next morning. 
Captain De Vriess was pleased but also startled. 
Since he had been exec on the Caine for several months 
prior to becoming captain, he had relieved his commanding 
officer in forty-eight hours because he was so familiar with 
the ship and its routine. "Queeg was stepping into a 
vessel of a new type, about which he knew almost nothing" 
(125 M). De Vriess had assumed that Queeg would have taken 
at least a week to relieve, including several days at sea 
to observe the Caine and its crew in action. He merely 
consented and took Queeg on a "Cook's tour" of the ship. 
Willie first met Queeg in the Caine's wardroom as 
De Vriess made the introductions. 
In one anxious glance Willie took in these details: 
a small man, slightly shorter than himself; natty blues 
with two campaign ribbons and one battle star; an 
oval, somewhat plump fair face with small narrowed eyes; 
and some strands of sandy hair across an almost bald 
head, with thicker fringes at the sides. (126 M) 
As De Vriess stepped back into his cabin, Willie and Queeg 
began checking the inventory of registered publications. 
Early the next day, De Vriess was ready to leave the 
Caine after being aboard almost five years. Members of the 
crew interrupted their work to cast one last look at their 
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ex-skipper. Chief Budge emerged from a group of petty 
officers and presented De Vriess with a gift from the crew. 
De Vriess looked at the watch and then turned toward the 
sailors. "'Well, everybody's a damn fool. I can't accept 
it. It's against Navy Regulations'" (12 8 M). One of the 
sailors quickly responded, "'You don't always go by regs, sir— 
To which De Vriess answered,That's my goddamn trouble. 
I've been in the hooligan navy too long'"(12 8 B). Chief 
Budge placed the watch dejectedly on the cover of a nearby 
ventilator. 
As he began to depart the ship, De Vriess turned 
once again to the men. '"You guys take an even strain with 
the new skipper .... you chiefs and first-class P.O.'s 
run the ship, as you know damn well. Keep the men in line 
and give things a chance to break in—'"(129 T). Very 
quickly, De Vriess began to descend the ladder to the gig 
(captain's motorboat) when he suddenly stopped, spying the 
watch glittering in the sun. "'Some silly bastard left a 
watch lying around .... Might as well steal myself a 
souvenir of this old buckefe-. Not a bad watch at that'" 
(129T). De Vriess saluted the crew with a "thanks" and 
disappeared into the waiting gig. As the gig pulled away, 
De Vriess was "slouched on the cushions under the canopy, 
reading a paper-bound mystery" (129 M). 
Absently rolling the steel balls in his left hand, 
Queeg suddenly emerged from below and the crew immediately 
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set to work, heads bent. He directed Engstrand, the gang­
way petty officer, to note the exact time of De Vriess1 
departure. Then, turning to Keith, the in-port 00D, Queeg 
firmly stated:"'Pass the word to your relief that while 
we're in Pearl the gangway watch will be stood in undress 
whites'"(130 T). Willie snapped to, thinking that it was 
about time the Caine was restored to the "real" Navy. 
Queeg rolled the steel balls more relentlessly as he scru­
tinized the condition of the Caine. He once again turned 
to Willie: '"Pass the word. Meeting of all officers in 
the wardroom at 1630'"(130K). 
The New Regime 
It is obvious that DeVriess1 style of leadership 
enhanced his effectiveness aboard the Caine in the per­
formance of its mission, lie knew when to exercise leader­
ship motivated by task as well as relationships. This 
flexibility in leadership style, however, required a personal 
knowledge of and interest in subordinates as well as a 
high degree of competence in carrying out the functional 
aspects of tasks or missions. An extreme task-motivated 
leader (low LPC) can be effective without strong leader-
member relations if he is very competent just as a highly 
relationship-motivated leader (high LPC) can be effective by 
being somewhat deficient in functional competence, relying 
heavily on the personal competence of subordinates. 
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If a person in a position of authority possesses neither 
quality, it is doubtful that he could be an effective 
leader except in a highly structured situation where leader­
ship makes little difference. 
Initially, Queeg gives the impression that he is a 
personable, flexible individual with a somewhat calm 
demeanor, save for the occasional nervous rolling of the 
steel ball bearings. In addition, he is overly confident 
or overly ignorant about his knowledge of the ship, especially 
in ship handling. Most new captains would have taken several 
trial runs with the old skipper to learn the ship's handling 
characteristics as well as the proficiency of the crew. 
As evidence is presented, the focus will be on Queeg's 
functional competence with his ability to handle people as 
a secondary consideration. 
Every new leader must make known his or her expecta­
tions and anticipated objectives if different from the 
previous leader. Therefore, Queeg wasted little time as 
his officers gathered in the Caine's wardroom to meet the new 
captain. Queeg's opening remarks indicated that his first 
impression of both the ship and crew is favorable. He 
further stated his anticipation of a good cruise with good 
"hunting." This is tempered somewhat by the following 
remarks: 
"I intend to give you every cooperation and I expect 
the same in return. There is such a thing as loyalty 
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upward, and such a thing as loyalty downward. I desire 
and expect to get absolute loyalty upward. If I do, 
you'll get loyalty downward. If I don't well, I'll 
find out why, and I'll see to^ it that I do." (131 M) 
Queeg proceeded to laugh after these remarks but then quickly 
became serious about exactly how he wanted things done 
aboard the Caine. '"Now there are four ways of doing a 
thing aboard a ship—the right way, the wrong way, the Navy 
way, and my way. I want things on this ship done my way»» 
(131M). Asking for questions after this last remark, 
Queeg only received blank stares. Keefer was standing back 
near a corner, slowly shredding a cigarette as he listened. 
Next, Queeg left no doubts as to the basis for judg­
ing competence aboard ship. He ordered his officers to 
perform strictly by naval regulation and policy which ap­
peared ^0 be a contradiction between doing things Queeg's 
way versus the Navy way unless, of course, the two were one 
and the same. 
"Now, I'm a book man, as anyone who knows me will tell 
you. I believe the book is there for a purpose. When 
in doubt, remember we do things on this ship by the book. 
You go by the book and you'll get no argument from me. 
You deviate from the book and you better have a half 
dozen damn good reasons—and you'll still get a hell 
of an argument from me. And I don't lose arguments on 
board this ship. That's one of the nice things about 
being captain." (131 B) 
Queeg then closed his wardroom talk with a word on 
the standard of performance he expected."'Aboard my ship, 
excellent performance is standard. Standard performance 
is sub-standard. Sub-standard performance is not permitted 
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to exist'" (132T). Queeg quickly added that since the 
Caine had been steaming such a long time without benefit of 
his leadership he didn't expect everything to change 
overnight. He stated that if anything was to be changed, 
department heads would find out about it fast enough. 
'"Meantime, you will go on with your duties as before, 
remembering, as I say, that on my ship excellent performance 
is standard"1 (132T). 
At this point, not many people would take issue with 
Queeg's remarks regarding his desire to run a taut ship. 
However, the rate at which he expects change will be 
phenomenal based on the nature of the situation when he 
assumed command. He will make little effort to get to 
know his officers beyond their fitness reports but personal 
relationships will not be of prime importance to Queeg 
as future incidents will prove. It should be noted here 
that during Queeg's initial wardroom talk, he states that 
the officers are a "splendid bunch" three times which might 
indicate an over-compesation for his true, inner feelings 
about the competence of reserve officers. 
The first test of Queeg's "excellence is standard" 
expectation involved the communication officer, Tom Keefer. 
Tom explained to Queeg that while the Caine was moored to a 
nest of destroyers each destroyer took its turn in copying 
message traffic for all the destroyers. Queeg became 
slightly agitated and asked Tom about trusting other ships to 
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copy messages for the Caine, especially if something should 
happen to the destroyer on communication duty. Tom 
replied, "'Look, Captain, suppose the Betelgeuse blows up? 
Suppose we do? You have to assume certain normal condi­
tions—'" (136m). Queeg became very forceful and stated, 
'"Nothing will be assumed on this ship from now on, not a 
goddamned thing'" (136r 1). Finally, Queeg explained in a 
pleasanter tone the reason for his rationale. 
"Now listen, Tom, in this Navy a commanding officer gets 
a chance to make one mistake—just one mistake, that's 
all. They're just waiting for me to make that one 
mistake. I'm not going to make that mistake, and 
nobody on this ship is going to make it for me. I 
can keep my own radio gang from doping off if it takes 
six months restriction apiece, and breaking them all 
to seaman second class, to wake them up. But I can't 
do anything about some silly ape who dopes off on the 
Betelgeuse." (i36m) 
Shortly after this explanation, Tom stopped by to see 
Steve Maryk and asked his opinion of Queeg, especially in 
comparison to De Vriess. Maryk stated that De Vriess was 
a good officer and shiphandler to which Keefer replied: "'For 
crying out loud, Steve. He ran this ship like a garbage 
scow'" (l^OM). Keefer added that Queeg was what the Caine 
needed. "'I wouldn't be surprised if someone in ServPac 
alerted the Bureau to send us a red-hot book man, to clean 
things up'" (lMOI-1). Maryk summed up the fact that the Caine 
had performed well under the circumstances. "'Everything 
gets done that has to get done—not the Navy way, maybe, out 
it gets done somehow'" (l^OM). Steve reminded Tom that the 
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Caine had less repair time than any other "four piper" 
in the fleet and seemed to be held together by nothing more 
than "baling wire and chewing gum." Steve concluded, 
"'She gets under way, she goes where she has to go, the gun 
crews shoot pretty good, the engine plant holds together'" 
(l^OM). Finally, in comparing De Vriess with Queeg, 
Maryk asked, "'What's Queeg going to do except try to get 
things done by the book, instead of the Caine way? . . . 
All De Vriess cared about was results'" (140B). 
Keefer hated to admit it, but he acknowledged that 
"the book way is the right way" while noting that the Caine 
got things done simply by dumb luck. Maryk's face became 
more perplexed as he replied, "'Sure, the book way is the 
right way, for the right ship. By the book, though, the 
Caine should be in the boneyard. Maybe this ship has to 
be run screwy because it's screwy for her to be afloat 
at all—'" (1^IT). 
Keefer interrupted with a comment which generalized 
about the disparity between regular and reserve officers. 
"'We're civilians, free citizens, and it burns us to be 
treated as dumb slaves by these Queegs, who are the most 
colossal ignoramuses in the world except for their book'" 
(141T). However, Keefer said that maybe the book was all 
that mattered because of the war. 
So, the new regime has begun "by the book" and 
there seems to be a mixed reaction among the officers as 
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depicted by the viewpoints espoused by Keefer and Maryk 
who have been on the Caine for some time. The question 
seems to be whether or not Queeg can achieve the same or 
better results than De Vriess in a much more regulation 
manner. It should be kept in mind that the variable of 
"task structure" will not change appreciably since the 
Caine will maintain its present mission of sweeping mines 
and performing escort duty. However, the reader may note 
a gradual shift from octants I and III of the Contingency 
Mo de1 to the octants on the right of the spectrum. 
"Leader-member relations" will begin to deteriorate due to 
various actions by Queeg ultimately forcing a complete 
weakening of "leader position power." 
The Caine Gets Under Way 
The Caine received orders to proceed southeastward 
on convoy duty to Pago Pago. As she was preparing to get 
under way, Queeg came up to the bridge smiling and greeting 
each man in a jovial manner. Willie noticed a blue book 
under Queeg's arm entitled On a Destroyer's Bridge, a manual 
of good shiphandling. 
When all lines had been singled up, Queeg merely 
said, "'KayThen without hesitation he ordered,'" tfell, 
let's go. All engines back one third*"(144 T). As the 
Caine shuddered backward, the fluke of the decked anchor 
ripped along the forecastle of the Moulton. Then a jagged 
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hole was made in the Moulton*s bridge and the gun on the 
Caine's galley deckhouse ripped out two antennas as it 
battered down the side of the Moulton. As Captain Queeg 
screamed a tangle of orders, smoke billowed from the stacks 
and descended on the bridge and people were running around 
wildly in the smoky gloom. When it was all over, "the Caine 
was stuck fast by the stern in the mud on the other side 
of the lock, canted over about ten degrees" (144M). 
Captain Queeg was not the least bit disturbed as 
he sent a message of apology to Captain Sammis for the 
mishap. The report from the fantail was that no hull damage 
had been done but that the ship's propellers (screws) 
were buried in mud. Queeg merely nodded. '"Kay, a little 
mud bath never hurt a propeller, shine 'em up a little, 
maybe'"(144 B). When it was suggested that a grounding 
report be sent to ComServ Pac, Queeg said no report would 
be filed. 
After a nearby tug pulled the Caine free, Queeg 
again took the conn and proceeded to a nearby fueling dock. 
The crew held their breath as Queeg tore in towards the dock 
at a sharp angle and at a speed of fifteen knots. "But in 
the very last seconds Queeg backed down emergency full, 
and the Caine slowed, shuddering fearfully, and dropped 
into its berthing space as neatly as a New York taxicab 
parking" (145 M). Queeg then pocketed the two steel balls, 
17 ̂ 
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ordered refueling to commence and sauntered off the bridge, 
Maryk muttered,"1 Jesus, a wild man from way back'"(1^5 M). 
Shortly after refueling, Willie wrote a note to -May 
Wynn which containac1 his perceptions of the new Captain. 
He stated that while Queeg is a strange man "like most of 
these regular officers," he is just what the ship needs. 
"He's a strict perfectionist and a hard taskmaster, and pure 
Navy through and through" (1^5 B). Willie also said that 
Queeg has a "remarkably pleasant disposition" and is full 
of "zip." Willie seemed optimistic about the recent change 
aboard the Caine. 
A Change of Orders 
The next day, a message from ComServPac was received 
inquiring why a grounding report had not been filed and 
ordering that a report be filed immediately stating causes. 
Queeg's reply reflects a trait that will persist throughout 
his tenure aboard the Caine—an inability to accept respon­
sible blame. Point two of his subsequent report states: 
"The reason for the grounding was failure of the engine room 
to respond in time to engine orders telegraphed from the 
bridge" (1M6 B). Queeg adds that the conditions aboard the 
Caine warrant a drastic drilling program to improve readi­
ness, assuming no blame for what De Vriess had allowed to 
deteriorate in terms of training. Queeg concludes by 
asserting that a report was to be made soon by messenger 
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rather than despatch. "Report was not made to ComServPac 
at the time because help was at hand, damage was nil, and 
the matter appeared to be disposable without troubling 
higher authority unnecessarily" (1^7 T). In response to 
Queeg's report, ComServPac ordered the Moulton to replace 
the Caine on convoy duty. Instead, the Caine was to remain 
at Pearl Harbor for target-towing duty. 
As in future mishaps, Queeg will not go by the book 
when it protects his lack of competence. Also, he compensated 
for his inadequacy by blaming subordinates for lack of 
dedication and loyalty towards him. His grounding report 
also assumes certain conditions surrounding the grounding 
which is contradictory to his philosophy on assumptions. 
It should be noted that as Queeg continues to make "mistakes," 
and as he continues to blame the officers and crew in his 
paranoia, he will gradually tighten up more and more 
in making and imposing absurd policy. For example, shortly 
after receiving the change of orders, Queeg sends his 
executive officer (LT. Gorton) to meet witn the operations 
officer for ComServPac to see if the grounding was the cause 
of the change. During this exchange, Signalman Third 
Class Urban brings a despatch in and has his shirttail 
hanging out, standard dress aboard the Caine. Queeg orders 
Gorton to place the following announcement in the plan of 
the day: "Hereafter all shirts will be tucked inside 
trousers. Failure to comply will result in heavy 
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disciplinary action" (151 T). He also instructs the XO 
to call a meeting of all officers in the wardroom at 1300. 
Queeg is slightly agitated as he tells his officers 
that their standard performance has not been as excellent 
as expected. He then adds a comment with regard to the 
recent change of orders. "'Either ComServPac decided that 
this ship is so outstanding that it deserves some extra-nice 
duty—or ComServPac decided that this ship is so lousy 
that it might not be competent to carry out an assignment 
in a forward area'" (152 T). Queeg answers his own choice of 
reasoning by saying that not only the engineering department, 
but the entire ship had better become outstanding "pretty 
damn quick." 
In the same serious tone, Queeg asserts that if the 
Caine is going to tow targets the next few weeks she'll 
be the best damn target-towing ship this Navy has ever 
seen. Again mentioning the grounding, Queeg emphatically 
denies any responsibility due to the lack of training aboard 
the Caine. However, he quickly adds that he is responsible 
for anything that happens from now on. "'I don't intend to 
make a single mistake and—I won't tolerate anybody making 
any mistakes for me, and I kid you not'" (152 M). 
Still rasping the steel balls, Queeg then asks who 
is the morale officer aboard the Caine. No reply is made so 
Queeg appoints Willie Keith morale officer. His first duty 
is to make sure all members of the crew have their shirttails 
tucked in. He tells Willie to be as tough as he pleases 
and he'll back him to the limit. "'If we want these men to 
start acting like sailors we've got to make them start look­
ing like sailors'" (153 T). 
In five paragraphs of beautiful rolling prose, 
Willie instructed the crew to tuck in their shirttails. 
To his amazement, the order was obeyed. "The crew, wise 
as wolves, knew perfectly well where the order came from. 
They were walking softly with their new captain" (153 B). 
Pearl Harbor was too nice a port to risk restriction to the 
ship. Also, Queeg himself had lost his ebullience and 
his dashing ship handling had been replaced by "painful 
inching toward a dock or away from it." 
A Cable Is Cut 
One morning as the Caine was preparing to get under 
way for towing duty, a fog bank drifted in over the harbor. 
Queeg secured the special sea detail but the fog persisted 
arousing a sense of anxiety in Queeg. Despite the dense 
fog, Queeg finally ordered the 00D to stand by for getting 
under way. As the Caine backed into the channel, a tremen­
dous blast which seemed almost on top of the Caine, shattered 
the air. Queeg screamed to stop all engines. "He ran past 
Willie again and again, circling the bridge in frenzy four 
times, stopping each time for an instant in the wheelhouse 
to yank the foghorn cord" (154 M). A monstrous tanker 
loomed past the Caine's stern. 
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Next, Queeg yelled at Gorton for a course to the 
channel gate but Gorton replied that he couldn't give a 
course until the ship had backed and turned around. Even 
though Queeg knew the course should be 220° from the ship's 
berthing spot, he ordered the helmsman, GI12 Stillwell to 
call out compass headings for every 20°. 
Stillwell, tall with thick black hair and sensitive 
boyish features, began calling out headings while he gripped 
the wheel and stared at the gyrocompass. In the meantime, 
Queeg yelled through the pilothouse to confirm a course of 
220° to the gate. Finally, Stillwell said, "'Steadying 
up on 220, sir'" (155M). The action which ensued has to be 
quoted for the reader to gain full insight into Queeg's 
handling of the matter. 
"WHAT?" yelled Queeg. He dived into the pilothouse. 
"Who gave you the order to steady up?" 
"Sir, I thought—" 
"You thought! you thought! you're not being paid to 
think!" the captain screeched. "You just do as you're 
goddamn told and don't go thinking—please!" 
The helmsman's legs were trembling. His face was 
white and his eyes seemed to be popping from his head. 
"Aye, aye, sir," he gasped. "Shall I come left again—" 
"Don't do ANYTHING!" Queeg screamed. "What course 
are you on?" 
"Tu-tu-two-five, sir, coming right—" 
"I thought you steadied on 220—" 
"I stopped steadying, sir, when you said—" 
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"For Christ's sake will you stop telling me what I 
said? Now, you come left and steady on 220!! Is that 
clear?" 
"Aye aye, sir, 1-left and steady on 220," 
Still in a rage, Queeg yelled at Maryk for the name 
and rating of the helmsman. Maryk told Queeg that Still-
well was the ship's best helmsman but Queeg demanded that 
Stillwell be relieved at once. While Queeg continued to 
"chew" on Stillwell in the pilothouse, Willie shouted to 
the Captain that a battleship lay dead ahead about three 
hundred yards. 
Queeg was horrified as he looked at the giant hulk 
bearing down on the Caine. He opened and closed his mouth 
three times before he uttered, "'All engines back pull— 
back—back—belay that—All stop.'" The battleship slipped 
down the starboard side of the Caine "like a. steel cliff 
going by." When the lookout notified the bridge that a red 
channel buoy was one point off the port bow, Maryk told 
Queeg that the Caine was on the wrong side of the channel. 
"'We're not on the wrong side of anything. If you'll tend 
to your business and get another helmsman, I'll tend to my 
business and conn my ship, Mr. Maryk!'" (156M). After this 
remark, Queeg thrust his hand into his pocket and brought 
forth the steel balls. 
The fog soon lifted and the Caine proceeded to 
rendezvous for target-towing duty. Late in the afternoon, 
Stillwell reported for his normal watch at the helm since 
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he had not been taken off the watch bill as yet. The Caine 
received a call from the last destroyer wi'th a "well done" 
for its towing efforts. Queeg acknowledged and ordered 
Stillwell to come right with standard rudder. This order 
amazed the rest of the watch since the target and towline 
had not yet been recovered. 
It seems that Queeg was preoccupied with "chewing 
out" Urban on the starboard wing of the bridge for having 
his shirttail out. Keith, the morale officer, was summoned 
to the bridge to provide an explanation for Urban's appearance. 
When Keith stated that he had been working on the fantail 
and had not seen Urban during the target exercise, Queeg 
became quite irritated. "'I didn't ask for an alibi! I 
am talking about your failure to carry out my orders, and 
impress this ship's crew with my desires regarding uniforms!'" 
(158 D). After instructing Willie to prepare a written 
report on his "failure" to carry out orders, Queeg turned on 
Keefer who still had the deck. "'Have you any explanation 
for the fact that the first man to violate my uniform 
orders is in your department?'" (158 B). 
While Queeg was busy haranguing Urban, Keith, and 
Keefer on the starboard wing of the bridge, Stillwell 
continued to maintain right standard rudder. Knowing that 
the turning diameter of the Caine was a thousand yards and 
the towline was twice that long, Stillwell wanted to inform 
the Captain that the ship would soon cut its own towline. 
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"Ordinarily he would have called this fact to the Captain's 
attention, but today he would have bitten his tongue out 
before speaking" (159 M). 
As Queeg was instructing Keefer to submit a report 
on why Urban's shirttail was out, especially while Keefer 
had the deck, the Calne passed over its own tow cable with 
a slight shudder and glided on. Chiefs Bellison and Budge 
were on the forecastle uttering profanities about the 
situation. Soon, Bellison remarked in a low shaken tone, 
"'I'm an unholy son of a bitch. This ship has gone around a 
full circle, and is starting around again!'" (159 B). 
Budge replied, "'Maybe the old man's slipped his trolley—'" 
(160 T). 
About the time Chiefs Bellison and Budge were 
running aft to check the tow cable, Queeg was winding up 
the shirttail emergency. 'When Queeg noticed the target 
off the bow, he wheeled toward Keith and Keefer. "'Where 
the hell are we? What the hell's going on?'" (160 H). 
Noticing the rapidly rotating compass, Queeg screamed at 
Stillwell who merely reminded the Captain of his last order 
for right standard rudder. Queeg calmly agreed but could not 
figure out why the target was in front of the Caine. 
When the fantail watch reported that the cable was cut, 
Queeg became infuriated and decided to prove the report 
wrong. He ordered the rudder amidships and the Caine 
steamed two miles at standard speed leaving the target a 
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speck on the horizon. Blaming ConServPac for issuing bad 
cables, Queeg wrote the following dispatch: "Defective 
towline parted southwest corner of gunnery area Charlie. 
Target adrift, menace to navigation. Am returning to base. 
Suggest tug recover or destroy target at dawn tomorrow" 
(161T). 
At this point, Maryk arrived on the bridge from the 
fantail and told Queeg that the target could be recovered 
in about an hour if the Caine would close to about fifty 
yards. Queeg shrugged off Maryk's suggestion and stated 
that the Caine's responsibility did not include "emergen­
cies arising from defective gear." In disbelief, Maryk 
asked Keefer in a whispered tone if Queeg realized he cut 
his own tow line. Keefer merely shook his head. "'Steve, 
don't ask me what goes on in his mind. We're in trouble 
with this joker, Steve. I'm not fooling'" (161M). 
Maryk again pressed the Captain to recover the 
target but Queeg retorted by alluding to the Caine's 
poor seamanship and stating that some "enlisted dumbheads" 
would probably be drowned in the process. The exec, Gorton, 
backed Steve but Queeg sent for Chief Bellison to get an 
opinion. The Chief agreed with Maryk's original suggestion 
so Queeg sent another dispatch to ComServPac. • "If you 
prefer can attempt recover target. Request instructions" 
(162M). ComServPac radioed for Queeg to "act at discretion." 
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Queeg becomes visibly upset by this reply fo.r it was 
not a direct order to take one prescribed action. A 
discretionary action would place responsibility on his 
shoulders. Muttering that the Navy is always "passing the 
buck" and then asking for a receipt, Queeg decides to 
head for Pearl. "'They're not hanging the responsibility 
on me for missing tomorrow's exercise and maybe breaking 
some thick sailor's neck. Let's head for the barn'" (162 B). 
The next day, there were no exercises scheduled for 
the Caine but a message from the operations officer of 
ComServFac was received as follows: "At 1300 22 October 
commanding officer Caine will submit in person repeat in 
person written report on latest fiasco to operations 
officer ComServFac" (163 M). Queeg read the message and 
drew the steel balls from his pocket as he confronted Gorton, 
his executive officer, with the message. Queeg asked 
Gorton's candid opinion about what Queeg's superiors 
considered a fiasco. Noting a similar incident of a severed 
cable and quick recovery, Gorton stated that the difficulty 
of recovery might have been overestimated. Queeg then 
glared at Gorton as he asked why this "vital piece of 
information" had not been given at the time it was needed. 
Gorton9 very surprised, reminded Queeg that he had backed 
Maryk's suggestion for recovery. But Queeg retorted that 
Gorton had not given a reason for backing Maryk. When 
Gorton mentioned the word "assumed" in his defense, Queeg 
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broke into a tirade about not assuming "a goddamn thing" 
in the Navy. "'That's why I have to submit a written report 
to ComServePac, because you assumed'" (164 M). 
Queeg Explains the Fiasco 
As Queeg was preparing his written report for Com 
ServPac, Willie asked Keefer for help in submitting his 
report on the shirttail incident. Keefer had written his 
as fast as he could type it and Willie was amazed. Keefer 
explains that one must develop an ear for Navy prose. 
An official letter must have split infinitives, frequent 
use of the word "subject," and a repetition of standard 
phrases. Keefer even volunteers to write Keith's report 
which is fine with Willie. "'I actually enjoy writing Navy 
letters. It's like a concert pianist improvising on 
Chopsticks'" (165 B). 
Keefer concludes his lesson for Keith with a compari­
son of De Vriess and Queeg. Noting that Queeg doesn't 
have the personal force of a De Vriess to look people in the 
eye, he must adopt a technique called "4X" which Keefer 
describes as follows: "'This consists of retreating into 
his official identity, like a priest inside a mumbo-jumbo 
idol, and making you address him through that scary 
image. Standard Navy'" (166 T). 
But now it was Queeg's turn to account for his actions 
through a written report. The operations officer for 
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ComServPac, Captain Grace, was a large, foreboding man with 
a dominating personality. He read Queeg's report as Queeg 
sat motionless, hands folded in his lap. Upon finishing 
the report, Captain Grace brushed it aside with his massive, 
hairy hand, inhaled deeply on his pipe and said "unsatisfac­
tory" as he looked straight at Queeg. When Queeg asked why, 
Grace replied, '"Because it says nothing I didn't know 
before, and explains nothing I wanted explained'" (166 M). 
Captain Grace went on to question Queeg about why 
he divided the blame among his subordinates as well as his 
predecessor De Vriess. Grace also wanted to know what was 
so complicated about recovering a target. Queeg responded 
to each question with plausible answers as he began rolling 
imaginary steel balls with his hands. Queeg's answers 
always diverted blame from himself in accepting responsi­
bility for mistakes. In an almost fatherly tone of under­
standing, Captain Grace stated that no man in the Navy had 
never made a mistake, especially new captains with first 
commands. In short, Grace understands the anxiety of initial 
command but Queeg is persistent in denying that any mistake, 
at least by him, had been made. 
"No, Captain, I assure you I appreciate what you say, 
but I am not so stupid as to lie to a superior officer, 
and I assure you my first version of what happened is 
correct, and I do not believe I have made any mistake 
as yet in commanding the Caine nor do I intend to, and, 
as I say, finding the caliber of my officers and crew to 
be what it is, I am simply going to get seven times as 
tcUgh as usual and bear down seven times as hard until 
the ship is up to snuff which I promise will be soon." 
(167 B) 
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Following this statement, Captain Grace asked Queeg 
a direct question: '"Did you come around in a complete 
circle, Commander Queeg, and cut your own towline?'" 
(168 M). Queeg became visibly uncomfortable stammering that 
he considered the question an insult. In fact, Queeg 
asserted that if that incident had occurred, he would have 
recommended his own court-martial. 
Captain Grace told Queeg that the Admiral (ComServ 
Pac) had wanted the question asked, especially in view of 
preceding mishaps aboard the Caine. Queeg made the mistake 
of asking Grace in what regard the Admiral had found fault 
in the Caine's performance. Captain Grace's reply was as 
follows: 
"Well, hang it man, first time under way you run up 
on the mud—of course, that can happen to anybody—but 
then you try to duck a grounding report and when you do 
send one in upon request, why, it's just a phony 
gun deck job. And then what do you call that dispatch 
to us yesterday? 'Dear me, I've lost a target, please, 
ComServPac, what shall I do?' Admiral blew up like a 
land mine. Not because you lost the target—because you 
couldn't make a decision that was so obvious a seaman 
second class could have made it! If the function of 
command isn't to make decisions and take responsibility, 
what is it?" (168 M) 
Again, Queeg offered a reasonable defense for his 
actions adding that the Admiral seemed to be reprimanding 
him for reporting one incident and not going to higher 
authority for the other. While Queeg does admit that the 
two situations were different he perceives no difference in 
principle. Finally, Captain Grace tells Queeg that he 
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could arrange for him a state-side transfer with no reflec­
tion on past performance aboard tne Caine. However, Queeg 
responds, "'And I wonder how that would look in my record, 
sir—relieved of my first command after one month"' (170 T). 
Even though Captain Grace guarantees a fitness report which 
would remove any possible doubt, Queeg remains staunch 
in his desire to remain aboard the Caine• 
"I don't pretend to be the cleverest or smoothest 
officer in the Navy . . . but I'll tell you this, sir, 
I'm one of the stubbornest. I've sweated through 
tougher assignments than this. I haven't won any 
popularity contests, but I have bitched and crabbed and 
hollered and bullied until I've gotten things done the 
way I wanted them done, and the only way I've ever 
wanted things done is by the book. I'm a book man. 
The Caine is far from what I want it to be, but that 
doesn't mean I'm going to give up and sneak off to some 
shore billet .... I am captain of the Caine and I 
intend to remain captain, and while I'm captain the 
Caine will carry out all its assignments or go to the 
bottom trying. I'll promise you one thing, sir—if 
stubbornness, and toughness, and unremitting vigilance 
and supervision by the commanding officer are of any 
avail, the Caine will come through any combat duty 
assigned. And I'll stand by the fitness report I'll 
get when my tour of duty is over, sir. That's all I 
have to say." (170 M) 
Needless to say, Captain Grace was impressed with 
Queeg's apparent "professional pride and sense of duty," 
commenting that the Academy over-emphasized the need for 
perfection in naval officers. Grace concluded the discus­
sion with some advice for Queeg. "'If I were you, comman­
der, I'd worry a little less about making mistakes, and a 
little more about doing the most sensible and useful thing 
that occurs to you in any given circumstance'" (171 T). 
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Bearing Down 
Queeg lost no time in living up to his commitments 
voiced during his meeting with Captain Grace. Upon return­
ing to the Caine, Queeg noticed Stillwell, the petty officer 
of the watch, idly reading a comic book while Ensign Harding 
was on the forecastle checking the mooring lines. After 
screaming at Harding about an 00D being responsible for 
"every goddamned thing" which happens on his watch, Queeg 
ordered Harding taken off the watch bill and Stillwell put 
on report along with restriction to the ship for six months. 
Storming off the quarterdeck, Queeg went below and 
found Keefer's and Keith's reports on the shirttail incident. 
Calling Keefer in, Queeg fumed that his report was "unsatis­
factory." When Keefer asked why, Queeg uses the exact 
words of Captain Grace. "'It tells me nothing I didn't 
know before, and explains nothing I wanted explained'" 
(172 B). Showing Keith's report to Keefer (which Keefer 
had written for Willie), Queeg tells Keefer to resubmit 
another report before 1600 of the same quality as Keith's. 
'"Try to see why Willie has written a perfect report 
whereas yours is a phony gun-deck job'" (173 T). 
While Queeg was busy getting "seven times as tough," 
Captain Grace was making his report on Queeg to the Admiral. 
When the Admiral asked about Grace's opinion of Queeg, the 
Captain offered the following summation: 
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"An old lady, I'm afraid, sir. I think he's earnest 
enough and probably pretty tough, but he's one of those 
that are never wrong, no matter how wrong they are— 
always some damn argument to .defend himself, you know— 
and I don't think he's very bright. One of the low men 
in his class. I've been checking around." (173 M) 
The Admiral asked about the towline incident but 
Grace could not give him a straight answer, noting that it 
would take a court of inquiry to really determine the truth 
of Queeg's word. Finally, the Admiral asked Grace about 
the possibility of having Queeg relieved adding,"'But I 
don't like the cut of the man's jib, Grace. Too many 
questionable occurrences too fast"1 (173 B). Captain Grace 
defended Queeg's mistakes as a result of "overtension" in 
a first command and that he should be given another chance. 
Remembering that CINCPAC wanted two DMS's sent to the 
States for overhaul and new radar installations, the Admiral 
asked Grace if there was any reason the Caine could not be 
sent. Captain Grace said that the Caine had been in the 
forward area for 22 months and would be a good choice. The 
Admiral ordered the dispatch sent to the Caine for state­
side overhaul. "'Let this Queeg pull his next butch some­
where else'" (17^ T). 
Of course, a yard overhaul in the States was almost 
prayed for during time of war. After over a year at sea, 
De Vriess had not been able to arrange it for the old Caine. 
"Queeg had achieved it in his first four weeks, commanding 
the Navy's best goddamn target-towing ship" (17^ T). 
190 
The Voyage Home 
The officers and crew were elated at the news of the 
overhaul in the yards at San Francisco. Even Queeg seemed 
in a better mood. Before everyone could celebrate in 
Honolulu, Queeg bought up all the officers' liquor rations 
which netted him 31 bottles of scotch. As he was counting 
the bottles, Queeg summoned Carpenter's Mate Second Class 
Langhorne to his cabin to discuss the specifications of a 
crate for the booty. As Langhorne goggled at the contra­
band, Queeg told him that the bottles would be considered 
as medical supplies adding that, "'if asked, you've never 
seen these bottles and know nothing about them'" (177 B). 
However, Queeg's apparent euphoria did not mitigate 
his punishments at Captain's Hast. Willie, the recorder, 
noticed that Queeg never put a man on report personally but 
always designated an officer as the accuser even if the 
officer had not witnessed the sailor's infraction. Queeg 
took particular pleasure in announcing Stilwell's sentence 
of six months restriction to the ship despite the fact 
that the sailor had not been home in two years. 
After sentencing, Stillwell approached Willie about 
the possibility of intervening with Queeg for a few days' 
leave to Idaho. Stillwell admitted that he had reason to 
believe his wife was being unfaithful and wanted to see if 
he could set things straight. Like most other people 
aboard the Caine, willie liked Stillwell and wanted to help. 
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As Stillwell appeared in Keith's doorway, Wouk describes the 
sailor much in the same manner as Melville described Billy 
Dudd. 
There are young men, slim, well built, and clean-faced, 
with bright eyes and thick hair, and an open, cheery 
look, who invite good feeling and make things pleasant 
wherever they are, almost in the way pretty girls do, by 
the pure morning light that is on them; the gunner's 
mate was one of these. (175 M) 
Stillwell was elated by the fact that Willie felt there was 
a good chance of getting approval for a few days' leave 
despite the six-month restriction. 
During the voyage to San Francisco, Queeg ordered a 
General Quarters drill during which everyone mans his 
battle station dressed in full combat gear (helmets, life 
jackets, etc.). When the drill was sounded, very few men 
were equipped with battle dress gear. Queeg had the word 
passed that all men not in full battle dress would be put 
on report. Suddenly helmets and life jackets came out of 
nowhere as the men frantically reacted to the announced 
orders over the ship's PA system. Queeg became enraged 
and ordered that violators be arrested but his order was 
too late as virtually all sailors -stood ready in full battle 
dress. Not to be defeated, Queeg muttered that the innocent 
must suffer with the guilty; leaving punishment up to the 
crew among themselves. '"I arn hereby depriving every man 
on this ship of three days leave in the States'" (181 T). 
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The next day, Willie approached Queeg about the 
circumstances of Stillwell's case in requesting leave. Queeg 
merely gave Willie a lecture on the merits of strict naval 
discipline, especially during war. Queeg pointed out that 
pressure must be maintained on the men at all times because 
the entire organization might come apart. "'When a war is 
on you've got to get tougher with enlisted men, not easier1" 
(183 T). 
Exasperated,Willie blurted out that reading on watch 
could not really be any greater offense than transporting 
whisky aboard ship. With a slight smile, Queeg state that 
"rank hath its privileges" and that the enlisted men should 
"do as we say, not as we do." Queeg illustrated his point 
by saying, "'An admiral can wear a baseball cap on the 
bridge. That doesn't mean the helmsman can'" (183 B). 
Queeg concluded that the only way to make the enlisted men 
obey orders is "to get goddamn tough with them and make 
it stick." Stillwell was going to be made the example for 
the rest of the crew. 
As the Caine approached the Golden Gate Bridge several 
days later, Queeg asked Gorton for a course to Oakland. 
Gorton seemed surprised since yard Pier 91 was not in 
Oakland. However, Queeg insisted that the Caine would 
lie off Oakland for a while before entering the Navy Yard 
for overhaul. Gorton advised that now was the best time to 
dock at Pier 91 since it was "slack" tide. The current could 
be as much as five knots later which would make an approach 
dangerous. "'Let me worry about landing this ship. Give 
me a course to Oakland"1 (185 T). 
The Caine lay to off Oakland a few hundred yards 
from a nearly deserted street. Queeg ordered his crate of 
"medical supplies" brought up on deck. Ke then appointed 
Willie as boat officer to oversee the loading of the liquor 
aboard the captain's gig (motorboat). Once the heavy crate 
had been safely loaded, it departed for shore on the gig 
with three sailors and Captain Queeg. At the dock, Queeg 
barked orders as the three sailors heaved and tugged at the 
crate. The result was catastrophic as the boat lurched and 
the crate went crashing over the gunwhale and bubbled to the 
bottom of the bay. 
Upon returning to the Caine, Queeg was furious at 
Willie for what he termed a fiasco. Willie apologized but 
added that he hadn't been ordered to supervise the unloading 
of the crate. '"I don't tell you to wipe your nose, either, 
Mr. Keith, when it needs it. There are certain things 
that an officer is assumed to understand for himself'" 
(187 T). Willie was a bit surprised at Queeg1s use of the 
word "assumed." Finally, Queeg fumed that he didn't 
appreciate such a foul-up of a simple detail as transport­
ing cargo, especially when it cost him a hundred and ten 
dollars. 
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As the Caine left Oakland and approached Pier 91, it 
was not making much headway at five knots due to the 
predicted strong current. Queeg ordered linehandlers to 
stand by as he ordered engines ahead two-thirds in his 
approach to the pier ladened with the waiting civilian 
friends and families of the crew. Queeg backed down too 
late and the Caine crashed into the pier at an angle of 
twenty degrees. "A hideous splintering din arose, mingled 
with the shrieks of the lady spectators scurrying to the 
other side of the wharf" (188B). 
As Queeg ordered "emergency back full," the Caine 
reversed its course leaving a huge, thick shaving over 
twenty yards long gouged in the pier. In a slower second 
approach, the bow was secured quickly but the current, 
along with Queeg's order to back on the wrong screw 
(propeller), caused the stern to drift out too far and the 
aft line fell short of its mark. A passing tug finally 
pushed the stern in and as the lines were secured, several 
spectators were sarcastically asking if the ship belonged 
to the Chinese navy. 
Queeg screamed for Maryk to pass the word about 
further restriction to the ship of the entire crew due to 
the docking fiasco. Maryk hesitated in disbelief and Queeg 
threatened to triple the punishment if he didn't pass the 
word stated as follows: "'Due to the lousy seamanship of 
the after line-handling party, the entire crew is 
deprived of two days leave'" (190 T). 
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The Overhaul 
Only a skeleton crew remained on the Caine 
as most men were on leave, including Queeg who went to 
Arizona to be with his wife. .Queeg had left Gorton in 
charge. Willie was with May Wynn again who had flown from 
New York to be with hiin. He told May about the "crate" 
incident and how Queeg balked at giving him a 72-hour 
pass until the record had been set straight. Willie stated 
that he finally felt compelled to admit full responsibility 
to Queeg and insisted on reimbursing him. Queeg suddenly 
became very pleasant and signed the three-day pass. As 
Willie related other facets of his life aboard the Caine , 
May's response was simply, "'Ye gods, this Queeg, he's a 
—he's a monster, a maniac'" (19 3 B). 
In the meantime, Maryk took Keefer out on the town 
since he had grown up in San Francisco and knew the best 
clubs. Their conversation about the nature of the naval 
organization as well as Queeg provides some good insight 
concerning the character of both men which will figure 
heavily in later circumstances. Away from the ship, both 
men learned more about each other over a bottle than they 
had in a year of sailing together. Keefer, of course, was 
proud to brag about his collegiate background, his literary 
lectures, and his anticipated success as a novelist. 
Maryk was flattered by Keefer's probing questions concerning 
his commercial fishing background. 
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While Keefer thought such a hardy life would be 
meaningful and romantic compared to the Navy, Maryk 
replied that it was a "business for dumb foreigners" 
like his father. "'I'm dumb, too, but I'm not a foreigner. 
I'll find something else to do'" (203B). Keefer jokingly 
asked if Steve means the Navy. "'Okay, I'm stupid. I like 
the Navy'" (203B). But Keefer protested that at least 
fishing is honest work with little wasted effort and a 
purpose. 
"You of all people, to want the Navy! Paper, paper, 
paper—nothing but phony kowtowing and gun-decking and 
idiotic drills, all to no purpose whatever—utter 
waste—Christ, and the peacetime Navy—Sunday school 
every day of the week for grown men—" (20 3B) 
'when Maryk forced Keefer to admit that the country needed a 
Navy for a strong defense, Steve then asked him who is 
going to man it. "'The yueegs, of course. Not useful 
citizens'" (204T). 
Maryk countered by saying that the Navy did not 
consist totally of Queegs to which Keefer remarked that 
Queeg was a product of the Navy system, '" buckled into a 
monster because his feeble little personality can't stand 
the pressure of Navy standards'" (204T). Keefer added 
that Maryk could never fit in to the real Navy because it's 
a "tight little father-and-son group" much in the tradition 
of the British governing class. "'You don't shine in— 
you'd just be one of the lowly timeservers—'" (204M). 
Maryk quickly interjected that he felt his seamanship 
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skills would get better results in the Navy than as a 
commercial fisherman. "'I know seamanship, and I'd 
damn sight rather put in twenty years for the Navy and get 
a pension than get arthritis and a sprung back hauling fish 
out of water'" (204 M). A few days later, Gorton received 
orders. Keefer was made the senior watch officer, Keith 
became the new communications officer and Maryk became the 
executive officer and assumed command of the Caine in 
Queeg's absence. 
Soon after Maryk became the XO, the Caine received 
orders to suspend all yard repairs not thirty percent 
complete and report to Pearl within three weeks. Out of 
consideration for the second section of the crew which had 
not yet been on leave, Maryk phoned Queeg in Phoenix to 
request approval for recalling members of the first section 
so others could go on leave. At first Queeg balked but 
instructed that for each man returning, another could be 
sent on one-week leave. 
Stillwell brought in a telegram from his brother 
stating that his mother was near death and requesting 
that he hurry home. Steve Maryk confronted his first 
dilemma. Willie pleaded the special circumstances of 
Stillwell's case confiding to Maryk that the telegram was 
probably a fake but that Stillwell needed to straighten 
things out at home. Keith remarked that Stillwell had not 
really done anything to be "chained up like a beast." 
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Maryk replied, "'I'm supposed to carry out the captain's 
orders and intentions. I know damn well what his inten­
tions would be in this case'" (214 M). At last, Maryk 
relents and gives Stillwell a 72-hour pass with his sworn 
promise to return on time. 
As luck would have it, Queeg returned before 
Stillwell and was inspecting the crew at morning muster. As 
Queeg finished his inspection, Keith saw Stillwell 
sneaking up the gangway. When Queeg asked about Stillwell, 
Willie told Maryk and the Captain that he had seen Stillwell 
shortly after muster. Queeg ordered Maryk to have Still­
well put on report for being late to muster. To Willie's 
surprise, Maryk confessed that he had given Stillwell a 
72-hour pass. Queeg was astounded. "'Goddamn it, Steve, 
what kind of stupid trick was that with Stillwell?'" 
(217 M). 
As Queeg continued his ranting, he said something 
which startled Maryk. "'I owe all the trouble I had with 
ComServPac to that little sneak. Remember when we cut the 
towline?'" (217 M). In Queeg's mind, Stillwell was just 
playing it smart, trying to get the Captain in trouble 
by not warning him of imminent danger. Queeg regarded 
Stillwell as a "vindictive little troublemaker" bearing a 
grudge but Queeg asserted he would get him. "'I'm gunning 
for that little squirt and I'm going to get him.'" 
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Then, Queeg warned Maryk that he didn't appreciate 
his lack of loyalty, especially in his capacity as execu­
tive officer. He also warned Maryk that he still wrote 
the fitness reports. "'I know damn well that the whole 
ship is against me ... . You'd just better make up your 
mind whose side you're on'" (218 T). At this remark, 
Maryk admitted his mistake and promised never to be disloyal 
in the future. Queeg shook Maryk's hand and accepted his 
apology, promising to forget the incident. "'I regard you 
as a damn good officer, Steve, far and away the best on 
the ship, and I consider myself lucky to have you'" (218 li). 
Queeg concludes that he understands Maryk's position 
between consideration for the men and loyalty to the Captain 
as second in command. He also gives a rare insight to his 
self-perception as follows: 
"Now, I'm well aware that I'm not the easiest man in 
the world to get along with, and not the smartest 
either. I probably have done a lot of things that 
strike you as damned queer, and I'll probably go right 
on doing them. I can only see one way to run this 
ship, Steve, and come hell or high water that's how it's 
going to be run. And you're my exec, and so you're 
in the middle. I know all about that. I was exec for 
the unholiest son of a bitch in the Navy for three 
months, and during that time I did my duty and was the 
second unholiest son of a bitch. That's how it goes." 
(218 B) 
The Caine was hastily put back together and on the 
thirteenth of December she departed San Francisco for Pearl. 
However, the Caine was "minus some twenty-five of her crew, 
who had elected court-martial for missing ship rather than 
another cruise with Queeg" (219 M). 
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Bad to Worse 
Upon reaching Pearl, the Caine received orders to 
take part in an amphibious assault on Kwajalein, the 
largest atoll of the Marshall Islands and a key Japanese 
stronghold. During the time of rehearsals for the assault, 
Queeg lapsed into a tremendous lassitude. He could be found 
at almost any hour in his bunk playing with a jigsaw puzzle 
or emerging only at night to watch the movie on the fore­
castle while the ship was in port. At sea, during maneuvers, 
he would not be seen for days, giving orders to the OOD's 
through a voice tube. "He stopped coming to the wardroom 
for meals, and ate almost nothing but enormous quantities 
of ice cream with maple syrup, brought to his cabin on a 
tray" (229 T). 
Many of the officers figured that Queeg was busy 
studying the operation order and committing the Caine's 
mission to memory. However, Willie knew better for he 
often went to the Captain's cabin with decoded messages. 
He always found Queeg eating ice cream, sleeping, or read­
ing a magazine. Many times, he found Queeg simply "lying 
on his back, staring with round eyes at the overhead." 
Willie surmised that possibly Queeg had had a bad quarrel 
with his wife during the overhaul or received bad news in 
the mail. "It never crossed the ensign's mind that the 
bad news might have been the operations order" (229 M). To 
Willie, Captain Queeg acted like "a man trying to forget a 
terrible sorrow." 
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Queeg began issuing order after order about absurd 
standards of spotlessness and military appearance. The 
orders became so numerous that they had to be numbered and 
were posted daily. Each order always ended with the 
following statement: "Failure to comply will result in 
heavy disciplinary action for the entire crew" (231 T). 
One morning, he found a cigarette butt in a scupper of 
the forecastle and cancelled liberty for the crew. 
As a result, the crew became quite cunning in its 
ability to work around Queeg1s orders. "He was moving now 
in a curious little circle of compliance that followed him 
like a spotlight, extending to the range of his eyes and 
ears; beyond that, the Caine remained the old Caine" 
(231 M). Outside this circle of compliance, life was just 
as rough and filthy as before Queeg's arrival. Some of the 
sailors who enjoyed the dirt, gambling, and sleeping late 
openly stated that Queeg was the best skipper afloat 
"just so's you keep out of his sight." But the general 
feeling of the crew toward Queeg was like an unconscious 
conspiracy. "The attitude of the crew toward Queeg varied 
from mild dislike, as a general thing, to poisonous hate 
in a few men who had run foul of him" (231 B). 
As the task force steamed to its rendezvous area 
near Kwajalein, Willie had the deck (OOD). Willie told 
Queeg that the Caine was supposed to lead a group of LVT's 
(tracked landing vehicles) from APA 17 (troop transport). 
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Keith found Queeg perched on a flagbag talking casually 
with a signalman as the operation was about to begin. When 
Willie asked for further orders, Queeg merely giggled and 
said that Willie could do "whatever he pleased." 
Finally, Maryk came to the bridge looking for Queeg 
as the LVT's began departing the APA, heading for the Caine 
which was to lead them to a line of departure 4000 yards 
toward the beach. Queeg stormed to the bridge, told Maryk 
to take the conn, and then he disappeared again. 
As Maryk steered toward the line of departure, he 
received a signal from the lead LVT requesting the Caine to 
slow. Steve was just about to give a new engine order 
when Queeg suddenly reappeared and asked what was going 
on. Maryk explained but Queeg stated that it was tough 
luck for the LVT's if they couldn't reach the line of 
departure by H-hour. '"If they can't keep up with us 
we'll throw over a dye marker when we reach the spot, and 
that'll have to do'" (2 38 M). 
When Maryk reported that the line of departure was 
1,500 yards, on a bearing of 045° from Hoi Island, Queeg 
screamed that the beach wasn't 1,500 yards and ran to check 
the bearing on the alidade, even though Urban had just 
called out a bearing of 064°. Queeg, in a panic, yelled 
that it was 054° and quickly ordered right full rudder. "'All 
engines ahead full! Throw over a dye marker!'" (238 B). 
203 
The LVT's quickly became bobbing specks astern of the Caine 
and near them was a giant stain of yellow dye. 
Later in the day, Keefer was in the wardroom with Keith 
and Maryk discussing the incident with the LVT's. Keefer 
began by saying, '"Well, what did you think of the performance 
of Old Yellowstain today?"' (240 M). Maryk told him to 
"knock it off" but Keefer persisted, remarking that Queeg 
"turned tail" and left the LVT's to navigate for themselves. 
Turning to Willie, Keefer asked, '"Willie, you had the deck 
all day. Did you ever see Captain Queeg on the side of the 
bridge that was exposed to the beach?"' (240 B). In a flash, 
Willie knew that Queeg never had but tactfully stated he 
wasn't sure. Keefer laughed, "'Take a bow for trying to 
protect the honor of the Caine and the Navy"' (241 T). 
Suddenly, Queeg came in, rolling the steel balls in 
his hand. He complained about missing several numbers of 
decoded messages and told Keefer that Ducely (a new ensign) 
had not submitted his next assignment. Reminding Keefer to 
check his "smart-alecky tones," Queeg abruptly left the 
wardroom. 
Keefer laughed again. '"Invasion or no invasion, 
Ducely does his assignment. You never saw a more fearless 
wielder of a checklist than Old Yellowstain—'" (242 M). 
Maryk interrupted and told Keefer to refer to Queeg only 
as Captain Queeg. "'None of this Old Yellowstain or 
anything but plain Captain Queeg'" (242 M). 
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As Maryk and Keefer left the wardroom, Keith was 
left alone with Harding, an ensign who had been silently 
listening to the conversation. Looking at Willy, Harding 
said, "'The purpose of a captain is to get us out of jams, 
Willie, not to check off due dates on reports and assign­
ments'" (24 3 T). Noting that he was a graduate CPA who 
had volunteered for the Navy, Harding said he didn't 
mind counting 0'Henry bars in the ship's store for audit 
if it would help the war effort. "'But in return the Navy's 
supposed to give me a ship that goes, and a captain that 
fights—That's what all this muck is for isn't it'" 
(243 M). Willie's answer was '"We're stuck with a lemon. 
Misfortune of war'" (243 M). 
The next day, two action messages came in and Willie 
decoded them in Queeg's presence. The first was a new 
mission for the Caine to proceed to Funafuti Atoll for 
escort duty of a group of LST's (landing ships for tanks). 
The second message was from BuPers which ordered LTJG 
Rabbitt to leave the Caine and report to the DMS OAKS 
under construction in San Francisco. Queeg snatched the 
second message and turned to Willie. "'I and I alone 
will decide when Mr. Rabbitt is to know about his orders, 
understand me?'" (247 T). When Willie protested that the 
orders were addressed to Rabbitt, Queeg countered as follows: 
'"For your information, this message is addressed to the 
Caine, of which I am the captain, and I can detail Mr. 
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Rabbitt at my pleasure, now that I know the desires of the 
Bureau'" (2^7 T). Queeg added that Rabbitt would be 
released only when a satisfactory relief had been thoroughly 
trained, possibly taking four or five months. 
The next day, a new commander followed Queeg into 
the Caine's wardroom as Willie was busily decoding messages. 
During the conversation, Willie overheard Commander Frazier 
tell Queeg that he was going to command a new DK5 called 
the Oaks and that he was visiting the Caine to get the "feel" 
of a DMS since he had recently commanded a destroyer. 
Willie couldn't believe it when Frazier also told Queeg 
that he wanted to take Rabbitt back with him the next day. 
Having received a copy of Rabbitt's orders, Frazier was 
glad to have an experienced first lieutenant fly back with 
him to his new command. Though Frazier appreciated Queeg's 
remarks about training a new relief, he told Queeg that 
Rabbitt would be leaving with him for the States. Queeg 
had to obey and suppress his anger, clacking the steel 
balls in his left hand. "Within the hour Captain Queeg 
threw a fearful tantrum" (251 M). 
In the days following Frazier's and Rabbitt's 
departure, Queeg became even more isolated from his 
officers and crew. "It had become instinctive with all 
the officers to listen for the clang of the captain's door, 
and to spring into attitudes of virtue as soon as they 
heard it" (25^ T). They would immediately appear to be 
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working earnestly on something official. When Paynter 
brought him the daily fuel and water report just prior to 
deployment for Funafuti Atoll, it showed that the crew's 
water consumption had been ten percent above normal during 
the Kwajalein operation. Queeg went into a rage. "'No 
water for officers' and crew's personal use for forty-
eight hours! Maybe that'll show'em I mean business, 
here!'" (251 M). 
En route to Funafuti Atoll, the Caine had a following 
wind which made the relative wind off the bow virtually 
zero. Very little wind was passing through the deck 
ventilators to relieve the crew below. The stack residue 
was settling on the deck and the men walked around with 
parched tongues and soaked uniforms from sweat. After 
24 hours, Maryk went to see Queeg who was languishing 
in his bunk under two small fans directed at his face. 
Maryk asked Queeg to secure the water regulation 
due to the extraordinary wind conditions. Queeg replied 
that Maryk was missing the point completely. "'The point 
is, the men on this ship have been wasting water, and for 
their own good they've got to be taught a lesson, that's 
all'" (252 M). Arguing that he is just as concerned as 
Maryk about the men's welfare, Queeg asserts that he will 
not change his initial decision. "'If these men get the 
idea that I'm one of these shilly-shallyers who doesn't 
mean what he says there'll be no controlling them'" (252 M). 
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Even when Maryk pointed out that increased water consumption 
was normal during an invasion like Kwajalein, Queeg cut him 
off without further argument. 
Only fifty miles from the equator, the Caine 
continued to steam with no relief from the wind. Dirty, 
half-naked bodies, sprawled on the rusty deck plates at 
night using li-fe jackets as pillows. As the sun rose each 
day, the air became hotter and more humid. "And still the 
ship wallowed over the glittering sea, trapped in its own 
stench of stack gas and cabbages" (253 M). Finally, the 
men revolted in their own covert way. "The black gang 
began to bootleg water in the after engine room where the 
evaporators were, so that no pressure would be found by 
Queeg in any pipes" (253 M). Even though the officers 
were "unanimously disloyal" to Queeg, they did not parti­
cipate in what the crew was doing. When Paynter reported 
the large number of sailors violating Queeg's orders, 
Maryk replied, "'Can't hear a word you're saying. Stack 
gas has got my ears ringing'" (253 B). 
Jorgensen, another new ensign, sneaked into the 
officers' head late in the second day and drained the 
water in the pipes over his body from the shower nozzle. 
At that moment, Queeg entered the head and, staring fixedly 
at Jorgensen, told him to convey the following order to 
Maryk. "'The crew's water restriction goes off at five 
o'clock. The officers' restriction will continue for another 
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forty-eight hours'" (25^ B). The officers cursed Jorgensen 
in their own private wanner but openly remained unanimous 
in their feeling toward Queeg. "There was nothing to do but 
suffer, and slander the captain. The officers did plenty 
of both" (255 T). 
Stillwell's Court Martial 
When Queeg had learned of Stillwell's 72-hour pass, 
he had wired the Red Cross near Stillwell's hometown to 
confirm his doubts of Stillwell's truthfulness. A letter 
was received from the Red Cross which disputed the veracity 
of Stillwell's concern for his mother's health. Queeg 
ordered a summary court-martial for Stillwell with 
Lieutenant Keith as recorder. 
Willie studied his duties in a copy of Courts and 
Boards which indicated that his function would be a 
combination of prosecutor and legal adviser for the captain. 
Captain Queeg summoned Willie to his cabin both to con­
gratulate him on his recent promotion to Lieutenant and 
to make sure he understood his assigned duties as recorder 
for Stillwell's court-martial, iueeg was very direct in 
what he expected of Willie and the court board. 
"I've been a recorder five, six times and the last 
thing I know anything about—or want to know anything 
about—is law. The important thing is to have a 
yeoman who's on the ball and gets the whole thing typed 
u p  r i g h t ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  f o r m  i n  t h e  b o o k  . . . .  
Stillwell's going to get a bad-conduct discharge and 
I want to be damn sure it sticks." (259 B) 
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When Willie asked how the captain knew what the court's 
decision would be, Queeg became adamant. '"Hell, he's 
guilty, isn't he? A fraud like that calls for the stiffest 
sentence a summary court can give, which is a BCD'" 
(260T). As Queeg showed Willie a written confession signed 
by Stillwell, he remarked that the court-martial was a mere 
formality in legal procedure. 
Later, as Willie studied Stillwell's confession, he 
became increasingly concerned and underlined several 
sentences in Courts and Boards under the section on con­
fession. He sent for Stillwell who explained the circum­
stances of signing the written confession. Stillwell 
quoted Queeg's explanation of his legal choices as follows: 
'"Take your choice. A clean breast of it, and a summary 
court on the ship, or try to bluff through, and get your­
self a general court back in the States, and probably ten 
years'" (260B). Unofficially, Willie advised Stillwell 
to plead "not guilty" since there was no evidence that he 
instigated the fraudulent wire from his brother and the 
fact that the confession had been obtained under duress. 
Stillwell took Willie's advice, and Willie reported Still-
well's change of mind to Queeg. 
Queeg was livid with rage and demanded that Still­
well be sent to his cabin immediately. After more than an 
hour in Queeg's cabin, Stillwell emerged visibly shaken 
with his copy of Courts and Boards in one hand ana a sheet 
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of paper in the other. In effect, the paper was a state­
ment, signed by Stillwell, that his initial confession had 
been obtained without duress and no promise of better treat­
ment. When Willie told Stillwell that the second paper was 
signed under duress too, Stillwell flung Courts and Boards 
over the side and cursed at Willie. "'I never heard of 
duress! Keep your goddamn nose out of my business!'" 
(263 B). 
When Willie related the extortion incident to Maryk and 
Keefer during a beer party on the beach, Keefer looked at 
Maryk and asked in a very grave tone, "'Steve, has the thought 
ever occurred to you that Captain Queeg may be insane?'" 
(264 B). When Maryk asked Keefer not to spoil a good after­
noon, Keefer persisted in his psycniatric diagnosis. "'It's 
the clearest picture I've ever seen of a psychopathic 
personality. He's a paranoid, with an obsessive-compulsive 
syndrome'" (264 B). Maryk asserts that everyone is idiosyn­
cratic to some degree but keefer feels that Queeg is a 
"Freudian delight" in outward symptoms (the shirttail obses­
sion, ice cream mania, inability to look one in the eye, talk­
ing in slogans). Admitting that most people are psychopathic 
to some degree, Keefer thinks Queeg is an extreme example, 
"bordering on the twilight zone between eccentricity and real 
psychosis." Finally, Keefer refers back to the "yellowstain" 
incident in his analysis. "'And because he's a coward, I 
think that being in a combat zone is beginning to drive him 
over the red line'" (265 T). 
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Maryk downgraded Reefer's analysis by saying that 
"'Captain Queeg is nothing but a strict guy who likes his own 
way and there are a thousand skippers more or less like him"' 
(265 M). Noting that Keefer's theories sound convincing, 
Maryk said that everybody is a "screwball" to some extent 
and that "'common sense is worth more than all the talk and 
all the books in the world'" (265 M). 
But Keefer stated that Queeg's desire to "rig" Still-
well's court-martial went against all Navy principles based 
on consideration for the enlisted man. '"You know damn well 
that the enlisted man is God in this Navy. For two reasons, 
first, because he is_ the Navy, and second, because his 
relatives back home pay the Navy's appropriations'" (265 B). 
Keefer Arent on to note that regulations fairly "bristle" 
with enlisted men's rights. "'Queeg's juggling dynamite 
and giggling happily'" (265 B). 
The next day, Keefer headed the summary court-martial 
board. In very brief terms Stillwell pleaded guilty on 
charges of fraud, but added, "'I didn't think reading a comic 
book at the gangway was enough reason to ruin my life'" 
(266 B). After half an hour, Keefer cleared the court 
except for the two other officers on the Board (Harding and 
Paynter). Forty minutes later, Keith brought Stillwell in 
and recorded the following Verdict read by Keefer who seemed 
almost amused. "'Court finds specification proved by plea. 
Sentence is loss of six liberties'" (267 T). Willie 
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recorded the sentence realizing that it was virtually 
meaningless and a direct insult to Queeg. Within five 
minutes after Queeg read the court's decision in his cabin, 
he ordered Maryk to pass the word for all officers to 
assemble in the wardroom. 
Queeg entered the wardroom with hunched shoulders and 
rage could be seen in his demeanor. Saying that he was 
convinced that there was absolutely no loyalty aboard ship, 
Queeg instituted a new edict which was based on demerits 
given for any mistake. A certain number of demerits would 
mean an unsatisfactory fitness report. "'As I say, if you 
gentlemen had played ball with me I might have played ball 
with you, but you gentlemen have made your bed and now you're 
going to get the book thrown at you'" (268 T). Just 
before storming out of the wardroom, Queeg referred to 
Stillwell's court-martial as "goddamn childish vindictive 
stupidity." 
Later in the day, Maryk went to see Keefer about Queeg's 
reaction to the court-martial. Asking why Queeg must hate 
Stillwell so much, Keefer replied with a reference to 
Melville's Billy Budd. "'He hates Stillwell for being 
handsome, healthy, young, competent, and naturally popular 
and attractive—all the things that Queeg is not'" (26 8 M). 
Noting that "infantilism" is very strong in Queeg's 
character, Keefer stated that "'Stillwell is a symbol of 
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all the captain's frustrations, all the things he would like 
to smash because he can't have them, like a child wanting 
to break another child's toys'" (268M). Keefer then got a 
little deep in theory when he added that Queeg's "repressed 
desire" turns to hate based on an unconscious, violent 
"repressed inversion." 
Maryk admitted that Keefer's theory sounded good and must 
be profound. "'I'm just a dumb comic-book reader who made a 
straight C-minus at college. But I know a fact or two that 
you don't'" (26 8 B). Maryk told Keefer that the captain 
was out to get Stillwell because he believed Stillwell 
deliberately caused the Caine's towline to be cut, resulting 
in the trouble with ComServPac. Keefer couldn't believe 
this since he didn't think Queeg realized that the Caine cut 
its own townlin. But Maryk added, "'He realizes. He told me 
in San Francisco what I just told you'" (269 T). 
Maryk then asked Keefer if he would accompany him to see 
a medical officer aboard the Pluto (a supply ship) and 
relate what they had been discussing about Queeg. Keefer 
backed off saying that it was Maryk's responsibility as 
second in command. But Maryk said that he couldn't explain 
the psychological terms to convince the medical officer that 
Queeg might be crazy. Tom quickly interjected that he never 
said Queeg was crazy but only "teetering on the edge" 
which makes him almost impossible to diagnose since Queeg's 
kind can shrink back into the "most convincing goddamn 
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normal attitudes you ever saw." Adding that he and Maryk 
would only "hang" themselves, Keefer stated that only a 
state-side clinic could see through a Queeg who treads a 
"thin line between being a bastard and being a lunatic." 
Maryk concluded the conversation by telling Keefer that if 
he wasn't going "to put up" by going to a medical officer 
about Queeg, then he should shut up his talk about Queeg's 
sanity. As Keefer left the room, Maryk returned to a copy 
of a psychology text called Mental Disorders. 
The Screw Tightens 
In the months that followed, Maryk worked increasingly 
late at night on a secret log while telling everyone that 
it was simply paper work that had to be done. "Actually, 
Maryk had begun a record of the captain's eccentricities 
and oppressions, labeled 'Medical Log on Lieutenant Comman­
der Queeg'" (270 B). Knowing that Queeg had the combina­
tions to the ship's safes, Maryk changed his and gave the 
new combination to Keith in a sealed envelope with instruc­
tions to open the safe only in the event of his death or 
disappearance. 
Also, over the months following Stillwell's Court-
martial, the Caine was attached to the Seventh Fleet and 
began a long tour of "grinding, nerve-rasping" duty of 
monotonous escort service for slow-moving amphibious ships. 
"During this captivity Captain Queeg became more irascible, 
secluded and strange" (271 M). When he occasionally emerged 
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from his cabin, Queeg would become caught up in some out­
rage prompted by some minor infraction of his rules. Each 
incident was noted by Maryk and recorded in his personal 
log. 
He incarcerated sailors and put officers under hack; 
he cut off water, he cut off coffee ... He made endless 
demands for written reports and investigations. . . . 
Once he kept all the officers sitting in session for 
forty-eight hours, trying to find out which mess boy 
had burned out a Silex ... He developed a settled 
habit of summoning officers for conferences in the 
middle of the night. . . . They averaged four or five 
hours of broken sleep a night. A gray mist of fatigue 
settled over their minds. (271 M) 
Finally, the Caine was relieved from escort duty and 
assigned to help screen a main body of attack transports 
going to Saipan. As the invasion began, the Caine was 
assigned an anti-submarine patrol sector about two miles 
from the beach. Suddenly, the destroyer Stanfield became 
straddled by a Japanese gun battery from the beach. Towers 
of white water appeared all around the Stanfield as she 
attempted to return the fire with five-inch guns. Willie 
had the deck and requested permission from Queeg to open 
fire on the enemy gun emplacement. Seeming not to hear 
Willie who shouted that the gun crews were "locked on," 
Queeg ordered right standard rudder and all engines ahead 
full. "The minesweeper was now headed directly away from 
the shore battery, leaping through the water at twenty 
knots" (27^ T). 
After the Stanfield incident, Queeg's rage began to 
focus on Keith rather than Keefer. "Once the captain's 
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favorite, he had suddenly become the wardroom goat" (275 B). 
Life aboard ship became "a static vexatious weariness." 
As the Caine was continually reassigned all over the Pacific, 
Queeg became more and more withdrawn and Maryk's log entries 
began to dwindle. "All personalities had been explored, and 
even Queeg, it seemed, had at last run through his surprises" 
(275 M). Willie, like most of the other officers and men, 
had developed a kind of dull hatred towards Queeg. 
It was like the hate of a husband for a sick wife, a 
mature, solid hate, caused by an unbreakable tie to 
a loathsome person, and existing not as a self-justifi­
cation, but for the rotten gleam of pleasure it gave 
off in the continuing gloom. (276 T) 
By September, Queeg had been aboard a year and the 
messages were closely monitored for the arrival of orders 
for a new skipper. The crew had changed dramatically since 
the days under De Vriess. "Eccentricities, those fungi 
of loneliness and boredom, began to flourish rankly on the 
Caine" (276 B). The men began to have their beards and hair 
cut in various shapes such as hearts, crosses and stars. 
Paynter caught a giant fiddler crab and kept it in his room, 
walking it at the end of a long string on the forecastle 
at night. Ensign Ducely fell in love with a woman in a 
corset advertisement in the New Yorker and swore it was the 
girl he was destined to marry. "He languished on his 
bunk, sighing over the corset ad, by day and by night" 
(277 T). Willie wrote wildly passionate letters to May 
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toynn for she becarae the symbol of nis longed-for civilian 
reality. However, "reality was the rolling minesweeper, and 
the sea, and shabby khakis, and binoculars, and the captain's 
buzzer" (278 M). 
Eventually, the Caine was assigned target-towing duty 
near Ulithi. The tedious routine of towing the target 
sled out each morning and towing it back in at dusk had a 
marked effect on Queeg. He became more cantankerous than 
ever, often lashing out at everyone in the pilothouse. 
Suddenly he lapsed into a comatose condition and turned over 
all conning duty to Maryk. "Occasionally in fog or rain 
he would come to the bridge and take the conn. Otherwise 
he lay in his bunk, day and night, reading or playing with 
a jigsaw puzzle, or staring" (2 79 M). 
A few days later, Queeg called a meeting of all officers 
in the wardroom at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. It seemed 
that Whittaker, the head steward, had brought Queeg his usual 
ice cream but without the strawberry topping which Queeg 
loved so much. After going over the disposition of 
strawberries recently received aboard, Queeg was convinced 
that someone had stolen the last quart of strawberries by 
making a duplicate key to the food locker. Determined to 
catch the culprit, Queeg wanted an investigation launched 
immediately with an arrest made by 8:00 o'clock. Maryk was 
appointed head'of the investigation team which consisted of 
all the officers. 
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Everyone was interviewed and Maryk reported that the 
investigation was a dead end. But Queeg ordered a stem-to-
stern search of the ship for the duplicate key which he was 
convinced had been made. Additionally, he ordered that all 
keys be turned in, tagged, and accounted for despite the 
fact that over two thousand existed on the Caine. Lastly, 
each sailor was to be stripped dovm and searched for the 
duplicate key. 
As the various phases of "Operation Strawberry" were 
carried out, Queeg became increasingly cheerful, very pleased 
with himself. He continued to talk about how he looked 
forward to an arrest being made and that he even knew who 
the culprit was. However, during the height of the 
investigation, Ducely was leaving the Caine under new orders 
and confided to Keith that he had seen several stewards 
taking the strawberries late at night. Willie conveyed this 
to Queeg but the captain dismissed it as one of Ducely's 
pranks. Later, however, the leading chief Porteus reported 
that another chief had seen the stewards take the straw­
berries, confirming Ducely's story. The effect on Queeg was 
devastating. "Queeg pulled steel balls out of his pocket 
and began to roll them. The happy look was fading from his 
face, the sick wrinkles reappearing" (307 T). • 
The strawberry incident was too much. Keefer had not 
made any references to Queeg's sanity since Stillwell's 
court-martial but now he felt Queeg had crossed the "red 
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line." In private, Keefer asked Maryk, "'Well, Steve— 
is he, or is he not, a raving lunatic?'" (29^13). Maryk 
showed Keefer his private log on Queeg and asked him to read 
it in his presence. When ".Keefer put the folder down, he 
looked at Maryk and said, "'I congratulate you. It's a 
clinical picture of a paranoiac, a full case history, 
not a doubt in the world of it. You've got him, Steve'" 
(309 3). Maryk then stated that he was ready to turn in 
Queeg's case to ComFifthFleet under Article 18M and asked 
Keefer if he would accompany hir.i. Again Keefer hesitated but 
Maryk persisted. "'I'm going to be walking in on admirals 
and they'll be calling in doctors, and I just can't present 
the thing myself'" (310 T). Finally, Keefer relented, 
thinking of the time he could have seen his brother, Rowland, 
on a nearby carrier but had been thwarted by Queeg. The 
next week, Keefer's brother was killed in action trying to 
save other lives aboard the carrier. Going with Maryk 
was a way to put Queeg away. 
ComFifthFleet happened to be Admiral William F. 
("Bull") Halsey whose flagship was the battleship U.S.S. 
New Jersey. Maryk and Keefer engaged in nervous conversa­
tion as they approached the New Jersey armed with Maryk's 
log. Keefer remarked, "'I don't know how I'll like looking 
Halsey in the eye and telling him I've got a crazy captain'" 
(312 T). Adding that the Captain did handle the ship fairly 
well in a recent storm, Keefer commented how difficult it 
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was going to be to prove their Gase. "'It's amazing how 
cleverly these paranoids walk the narrow dividing line 
between outright lunacy and acts which can be logically 
explained'" (312 M). 
As Maryk and Keefer ascended the gangway, they were 
impressed with the awesomeness of the New Jersey. Every­
thing was not only immaculate but gigantic as well. A 
single gun turret weighed more than the entire Caine 
and "one link of the battleship's anchor chain would have 
stretched across the minesweeper's bow." Unable to locate 
Halsey's aide, the two men stopped before Halsey's door 
with brass nameplate and four silver stars. Keefer 
grabbed Maryk and hurried him outside. He nervously told 
Maryk that the New Jersey was the real Navy and that the Caine 
was a "booby hatch" by comparison. "'Everybody's Asiatic 
on the Caine, and you and I must be the worst of all, to 
think we could get away with pulling Article 184 on yueeg'" 
(31^ B). Keefer excitedly explains that after the war he 
is going to be a "scribbler" again but that Maryk was 
jeopardizing his career. "'You'll smash yourself, Steve, 
against a stone wall. You'll be finished in the Navy forever'" 
(315 T). Noting that the log would be convincing for a 
competent psychiatrist, Keefer reminds Maryk that they 
have to present the evidence to the Navy comprised of 
"benighted bastards." He continues to plead with Steve. 
"'Sure, they can conn ships, and fight, but their minds are 
221 
back in the feudal system! What the hell does Halsey know 
or care about paranoia?'" (315 M). But Fiaryk says he can't 
go steaming around any longer with a skipper who's crazy, to 
which Keefer answers: "'That's by your standards. By 
Navy standards, for all you know, he's still a commendable 
disciplinarian'" (315 B). At last, Maryk backs down after 
Keefer admits he's scared. As they await the gig, Maryk 
remarks that Tom had really started the whole "paranoia" 
thing about Queeg but didn't want to go through with the 
evidence. "'Your trouble is, you want to back down when 
the going looks tough, and you also want me to congratulate 
you for doing it. You can't have it both ways, Tom. 
That's like Queeg'" (316 M). 
The Mutiny 
It was the height of the typhoon season as the Caine 
and Halsey's task force steamed out of Ulithi Lagoon bound 
for the assault on Luzon. Keith was assisting Maryk 
in the plotting of sighted typhoons which Queeg watched 
daily with increasing interest. At one point in the 
transit, it appeared inevitable that the task force would 
be caught up in the path of a large typhoon. Halsey 
began to have the destroyers refuel since many were down to 
ten percent capacity and would need plenty of fuel to ride 
out the storm. As the seas began to rise, Willie became 
amazed at the size and power of the swells. "They were as 
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tall as apartment houses, marching by majestic and rhythmi­
cal; the Caine was a little taxicab among them" (235 B). 
Fuel lines and span wires began to part as the roll and pitch 
of the ships became extreme. It was almost impossible to 
maintain stations in the tactical formation as well as 
ordered course and speed. The barometer stood at 29.05 
and continued to drop as the typhoon hit full force with 
winds up to 150 miles per hour. 
It should be noted that destroyers are built primarily 
for power and even the Caine which weighed a little over 
one thousand tons could oppose gale force winds with 
thirty thousand horsepower, "enough to move a weight of 
a half million tons one foot in one minute." Since the 
rudder works by dragging against the water, it can become 
almost useless if the wind of gale force becomes astern of 
a ship since "the water may start piling along as fast as 
the rudder so that there is no drag at all." At this point 
a ship may yaw or even broach to (when a ship becomes 
broadside to the wind and is in danger of capsizing). 
The typhoon's worst weapon is the psychological terror 
it can impose on men with its eerie sounds and erratic 
effects on a ship. It is capable of distracting a captain 
from doing the sensible thing and if the wind can keep a 
ship wallowing broadside long enough, the engines can be 
killed and then the typhoon wins. "A destroyer deprived 
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of its engines in a typhoon is almost certain to capsize, 
or else fill up and sink" (329 M). Most authorities on 
handling ships in typhoons are not in full agreement enough 
to make exacting generalizations. However, "when things 
get really bad, the books say, the best idea is to turn 
the ship's head into the wind and sea and ride out the blow 
that way" (329 M). The authorities do agree in one respect 
as follows: "A modern warship, functioning properly and 
handled with wisdom, can probably ride out any typhoon" 
(329 T). 
The last order from Halsey was for the formation to 
discontinue fueling and reorient the screen on new fleet 
course l8u° with all units to make best speed. Maryk 
had to use hard right rudder and manipulate the engines 
by ordering standard speed on the port screw and backing 
on the starboard screw to bring the ship's head around to 
the new course. The sea state was so bad that the radar 
scope showed nothing but "grass" (clutter) which made it 
impossible to check ranges and bearings for proper station 
in the formation. 
Maryk also recommended to Queeg that all depth charges 
should be put on safety and that ballasting fuel tanks 
would increase the Caine's weight to aid in maneuverability, 
Queeg refused both recommendations noting that a submarine 
could still be picked up in the next five minutes and that 
Halsey had not ordered ballasting for any units. 
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At this point, Stillwell who had the helm remarked to 
Queeg that the depth charges were already set on safe by 
order of Ton Keefer (the deck officer) whenever the seas 
became too rough. Queeg blew up at Stillwell. "'You 
speak when you're spoken to, you goddamned imbecile, and not 
otherwise!1" (332 D). 
A few minutes later, Stillwell called out that he had 
full rudder on but the Caine was losing her 180° heading 
and being pushed by the wind toward a more easterly heading. 
Queeg checked the compass reading and then leaped to the 
EOT (engine order telegraph). Grasping the handles, he 
rang up flank speed on the port engine and "stop" on the 
starboard engine. The Caine was beginning to "heel" to 
starboard and was taking on so much water that she could not 
right herself. "Willie's face was pushed against the window 
and he saw water no more than inches from his eyes" (333 B). 
Noticing that Queeg's last order was not bringing the bow 
to starboard, Maryk told Queeg that the Caine was "broach­
ing to" and that he must back the starboard engine! 
"Queeg, clinging to the telegraph with his knees and arms, 
threw him a frightened glance, his skin greenish, and 
obediently slid the handle backward" (333 B). Queeg 
remained frozen to the telegraph stand, oblivious to the 
situation as Maryk continued to give rudder orders which 
gradually brought the Caine back on course. 
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Suddenly, a huge gust of wind and sea knocked the Caine 
to port once again and Maryk recommended ballasting the stern 
tanks if Queeg wished to remain steaming before the wind. 
This would enable rudder and engine orders to become more 
effective. "The captain's face was screwed up as though 
he were looking at a bright light" (336 M). After a moment 
or two, Queeg simply uttered a "negative" to Maryk's request. 
Then, the Caine's bow started coming fast to port as she 
began yawing badly before the wind. Ilaryk recommended that 
the ship head into the wind to avoid "broaching to." Queeg 
calmly answered, "We've received no orders to maneuver at 
discretion—" (336 B). At that instant, a huge wave crashed 
over the pilot house, gushing water up to Willie's knees. 
Maryk screamed, "'Sir, we're .shipping water on the goddamn 
bridge! We've got to come around into the wind!'" (337 T). 
Suddenly the Caine lurched almost completely on her port side 
and everyone but Stillwell went sliding across the deck and 
piled up against the windows. Queeg was still frozen to the 
telegraph with a look of horror on his face. "Maryk crawled 
across the deck, threw himself on the engine-room telegraph, 
wrested the handles from Queeg's spasmodic grip, and reversed 
the settings" (337 M). Like most of the other officers, 
Willie had lost his bearings and could not immediately 
appreciate the logic of what Maryk was doing, using the 
twisting momentum of the ship to bring her around into the 
wind on a northerly course. 
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The Caine began to ride easier as Maryk ordered Still-
well to steady on course 000° (due north and opposite of 
l80°). "The captain, blinking and shaking his head as though 
he had just awakened, said, 'Come left to l80'" (338 M). 
Queeg's voice was faint as he looked glassily ahead and he 
reminded Maryk not to disobey his orders. However, Maryk 
ordered Stillwell to maintain 000° and told Queeg that there 
was no way to check the formation course since the radio 
antennas were down and the radars remained completely clut­
tered. Stillwell stood frozen in panic as Queeg again ordered 
him to come left to course 180. At this point, Maryk told 
Willie to note the exact time in the 00D log. Striding over 
to Queeg, Maryk saluted him and said, "'Captain, I'm sorry, 
sir, you're a very sick man. I am temporarily relieving you 
of this ship, under Article 184 of Navy Regulations'" 
(339 T). Queeg again ordered Stillwell to come left and 
Stillwell looked to Willie Keith who was still OOD. 
"'Steady on 000, Stillwell. Mr. Maryk has the responsibility. 
Captain Queeg is sick'" (339 B). Queeg ordered both Maryk 
and Keith below, placing them under personal arrest. 
Ignoring Queeg, Willie buzzed the fireroom and ordered 
Paynter to ballast all empty tanks as Maryk ordered all 
available officers to the bridge. In the meantime, Willie 
reported that the barometer was up to 29.00 and rising. The 
storm was beginning to subside. 
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Under Queeg's protest of mutinous conduct, Maryk explained 
his actions to the assembled officers and stated that his 
commands would be obeyed as temporary captain of the ship. 
Queeg screamed that all the officers would "hang" with Keith 
and Maryk for collusion in mutiny. But Maryk calmly assured 
the officers that he alone was responsible and would face 
charges in a court-martial to determine if his action was 
justified under Article 184. 
Suddenly Stillwell yelled that something large was 
directly up ahead. Ordering hard right rudder, Maryk 
squinted through the ocean spray and recognized the long, 
red hull of a capsized destroyer. "It slipped slowly down 
the port side, endlessly long and red, rolling gently under 
the breaking waves" (341 B).Maryk took charge of a search 
for survivors and circled the destroyer's hull twice but 
only three men were found. One of the survivors identified 
the destroyer as the George Black and related his tale of 
horror. "The George Black had been thrown broadside to the 
wind and all combinations of engines and rudder had failed 
to bring it around" (344 M). With water flooding the 
ventilators and engine rooms, the destroyer had simply 
rolled to starboard and never righted herself. 
As Maryk continued to issue orders, Queeg turned once 
again to the officers. "'You'll be interested to know, 
gentlemen, that I was about to issue orders to ballast and head 
into the wind when Mr. Maryk committed his panic-stricken 
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criminal act'" (3^ T). -Maryk ordered Queeg below unless he 
refrained from speaking on the bridge. Queeg replied that 
the Caine was still his responsibility regardless of the 
mutiny. "'I shall not speak unless your acts appear to 
me to be endangering my ship'" (3^5 T). So Queeg remained 
sullenly on the bridge, Maryk continued to issue all conning 
orders and Keefer relieved Keith as 00D. As Willie left the 
bridge, he muttered, "'God help us all.1" 
The Court-Martial 
Captain Theodore Breakstone, district legal officer 
for Com Twelve, was having difficulty finding a legal officer 
for Maryk's defense due to the sensitivity of the case. 
His assistant, LCDR Challee, finally came up with a good 
prospect in LT Barney Greenwald, USNri. Challee reported 
that he had gone through Georgetown Law with Greenwald. 
Before the War, Greemvald had nad a very successful practice 
specializing in Indian cases. Greenwald had gone through 
the V-7 program, switched over to aviation, and become a 
fighter pilot with two Japs to his credit. Ke was presently 
on temporary limited duty to Com Twelve legal recovering from 
severe burns in an aircraft accident. Challee recommended 
him because Greenwald had a reputation for winning cases for 
"underdogs." 
Captain Breakstone interviewed Greenwald privately to 
sound him out on his views on the case. In an almost arro­
gant manner, Greenwald stated that if the case was 
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"handled with any brains," Maryk, Keith, and Stillwell would be 
acquitted because the charge of mutiny was absurd since 
no force or disrespect was used. "'The toughest charge 
that could possibly stick would be conduct to the prejudice 
of good order or discipline"1 (351 M). 
After Breakstone told Greenwald that Challee would be 
the prosecutor for the Navy, Greenwald again stated that he 
didn't want to become involved. He further stated that 
the psychiatrists' reports proved that Queeg was not crazy 
and that the accused were wrong in their actions. Asserting 
that he was a "damned good lawyer and a very expensive 
one," Greenwald said he didn't want to contribute his services 
in acquitting the defendants,, "'These fools find a para­
graph in Navy Regs that gives them ideas, and they gang up 
on a skipper who's mean and stupid—as a lot of skippers are— 
and make jackasses of themselves and put a ship out of action'" 
(352 T). However, Greenwald finally consented to accept 
the case and visited his client, Maryk, the next day. 
Greenwald questioned Maryk about relieving Queeg and 
the information Maryk had given the investigating officer. 
Maryk flatly stated that he relieved Queeg because he 
thought "he was nuts" and became irritated as he perceived 
Greenwald couldn't appreciate the circumstances of his 
action. "'I'll tell you this, the same things seem goddamn 
different in the middle of a typhoon when they're happening, 
and six thousand miles away in the Federal Office building 
when you're talking about thera—'" (35^ B). Adding that he 
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wasn't trying to take over the ship, Maryk stated that he 
was simply trying to save the ship. Greenwald advised him 
to plead "not guilty" since there was no "criminal intent." 
When Greenwald said he would rather be prosecuting 
than defending in this case, Maryk was astounded. "'I 
don't know yet just how guilty you are. But you're either a 
mutineer or one of the dumbest goofs in the whole Navy'" 
(356 M). Maryk reported that the only way for his action 
to be proved right was if the Caine and her crew were at 
the bottom of the sea. Noting that three destroyers went 
down in that particular typhoon, Greenwald interjected, 
"'Sure. About forty of them stayed afloat, though, without 
the exec relieving the skipper'" (35b B). 
After hearing the entire story about events leading 
up to the typhoon, Greenwald comments about Keefer. "'Well, 
I'll tell you, Maryk. Your sensitive novelist friend is the 
villain of this foul-up, all right, but it doesn't do us any 
good—'" (357 B). Greenwald felt that Keefer somehow knew 
what the outcome would be in a real showdown about Queeg's 
mental condition, which explained his backing down on the 
New Jersey. As Greenwald left, he turned to Maryk, "'You're 
really a great naval hero. I'll be seeing you'" (359 M). 
The general court-martial board consisted, of Captain 
Blakely, the "toughest disciplinarian of Com Twelve," 
one regular lieutenant commander,and five lieutenants. One 
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of the lieutenants was regular line, two were reserve line, 
and two were naval reserve doctors. The trial began with 
the reading of the specification against Maryk as follows: 
In that Lieutenant Stephen Maryk, USNR, on or about 
December 18, 19^, aboard the USS Caine, willfully, 
without proper authority, and without justifiable cause, 
did relieve from his duty as commanding officer Lieu­
tenant Commander Philip Francis Queeg, USN, the duly 
assigned commanding officer of said ship who was then 
and there in lawful exercise of his command, the United 
States then being in a state of war. (300 M) 
The key words which Greenwald had to disprove were 
"without proper authority and without justifiable cause" 
which implied criminal intent. The judge advocate antici­
pated that Greenwald would try to establish the fact that 
Maryk had acted for the good of the service despite his 
mistaken diagnosis of Queeg's mental competence. At the 
very least, Maryk could be convicted of "conduct to the 
prejudice of good order and discipline" which was usually 
invoked in cases of this complexity. "If this were not true, 
if the precedent set by Maryk were to go unpunished, the 
entire Navy chain of command was in jeopardy!" (381 M). 
In a sense, any skipper who seemed odd to his exec was in 
danger of being relieved. 
For his first witness, Challee called LCDR Philip 
Francis Queeg. Maryk had not seen him for almost two months 
and couldn't believe the Queeg he saw now. "The man before 
him was erect, confident, and good-looking—and youthful 
despite the few blond strands over a pink scalp" (3B4 T). 
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Queeg testified that Maryk had opposed his stern measures to -
bring the Caine "up to snuff" almost from the start. Noting 
that Maryk had always been conceited about his seamanship, 
Queeg remarked that Maryk suffered under the delusion that 
only he could save the ship in the typhoon. Queeg asserted 
that Maryk simply went into a panic and acted irrationally. 
He added that the incident would not have occurred if Keith and 
Stillwell had not been on watch at the time since these men 
hated him as much as Maryk. Any other officer or helmsman 
would have obeyed his orders. 
Queeg continued to maintain a calm, dignified, military 
bearing as further questions about his record of fourteen 
years' service were put to him. He had received no unsatis­
factory fitness reports, his medical record from the Academy 
to the present was without blemish or unusual illness, and 
he had one letter of commendation in his jacket. Each 
incident of the past was handled by Queeg in a rational 
manner with cool logic which made his answers convincing 
in the best traditions of the Navy. 
Greenwald would have to find a way to discredit Queeg 
in terms of naval standards of competence based on the 
phrase in Article 185 which states that the conclusion to 
relieve a commanding officer must be one which a "reasonable, 
prudent and experienced officer would regard as necessary 
from the facts thus determined to exist" (387 M). The second 
witness called was Tom Keefer. 
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Keefer was asked why he took no action to restore 
Queeg to command since he was third in command. Keefer 
admitted that he had not been present when Queeg was relieved 
and therefore was not cognizant of the circumstances. * 
To try to override Maryk might have been considered mutinous 
in itself. Maryk bit his knuckle as Keefer was asked if 
at any time aboard the Caine he ever considered Queeg insane. 
Keefer hesitated, looked at Maryk, then away from him. 
'"I don't—I can't answer that question intelligently, not 
being a psychiatrist"1 (390 B). When questioned about 
Maryk's log on Queeg and the aborted visit to Halsey, Keefer 
began to squirm in his seat. Commenting that the log showed 
Queeg to be unpleasant and severe, it in no way implicated 
insanity in his opinion. "'But to jump from them to a 
conclusion that the captain was a maniac—I was compelled 
in all honesty to warn Maryk against doing that'" (393 T). 
Maryk began to sink in his chair as other Caine officers and 
sailors responded much like Keefer in testimony after testi­
mony. Queeg had not done anything insane before, during, or 
after the typhoon. Even when Willie testified that Queeg 
was not in possession of his faculties, frozen in terror 
during the typhoon, Challee discredited his observations 
due to Willie's lack of sufficient experience at sea to judge 
a superior officer's ability at seamanship. Deep down, 
Willie had never believed the Captain insane. "Stupid, 
mean, vicious, cowardly, incompetent, yes—but sane" (404 T). 
234 
Greenwald began his attack using Keith to discredit 
Queeg on grounds of cowardice. As he started to question 
Willy about the "yellowstain" incident and the Stanfield 
fiasco, Challee objected but was overruled. For the first 
time the Board began to stare at Queeg in a frowning manner. 
Captain Blakely warned Greenwald that he was on extremely 
sensitive ground since naval regulations (Article 4, sections 
13 and 14) specified a maximum punishment of death to any 
naval officer in time of battle who "displays cowardice, 
negligence, or disaffection, or withdraws from or keeps out 
of danger to which he should expose himself" (405 T). Then, 
as Willie explained Queeg's extortion of money from him in 
the liquor incident, Captain Blakely began to grimace 
horribly. 
After Willie's testimony, Challee called his "expert" 
on shiphandling, Captain Southard,who had held many commands 
on destroyers and was now commander of a destroyer squadron. 
Southard was quick to condemn Maryk's course of action as 
improper. When Greenwald asked Southard if he had ever 
conned a DMS, the reply was negative. Then Greenwald asked 
him if he had ever been in a typhoon and the answer was also 
negative. Dismissing Southard's remarks as hypothetical, 
Greenwald asked Southard what he would do in the circumstances 
described by Maryk. '"In the last extremity I'd head into 
the wind if I could. Only in the last extremity'" (408 T). 
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Challee leaped to his feet and asked Southard who was 
the best judge as to whether a ship was in its last extremity. 
"'There is only one judge. The commanding officer'" (408 M). 
Noting that it is common for more junior officers to panic 
when a ship goes through bad weather, Captain Southard 
added that the Navy designates a commanding officer because 
"his knowledge of the sea and of ships is better than anyone 
else's on the ship." When Challee interjected that possibly 
a skipper should listen to his subordinates when all agree 
that a ship is going down, Southard replied, "'Negative! 
Panic is a common hazard at sea. The highest function of 
command is to override it and to listen to nothing but the 
voice of his own judgment'" (40 8 B). 
On the second day of trial, Challee called forth Dr. 
Forrest Lundeen, a Navy commander who was chief of psychiatry 
at the local naval hospital. He had headed the medical board 
which included two civilian psychiatrists (Drs. Bird and 
Manella) who had examined Queeg. Asserting that behavioral 
normality is relative, Dr. Lundeen stated that no adult was 
without psychological problems to some degree except a 
"happy imbecile." When asked about the board's findings with 
regard to Queeg's mental condition, Dr. Lundeen made the 
following statement: "'The commander is sane now and has 
always been sane. A psychotic collapse leaves trauma that 
can always be detected'" (409 M). 
Since Dr. Manella had been detached, Dr. Bird was 
called to testify in backing up Dr. Lundeen's remarks. 
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Greenwald asked him about the nature and origins of Queeg's 
"adult problems" relevant to his mental competence as a naval 
officer. Dr. Bird stated that Queeg's ill temper and harsh­
ness were generated in part from an "unfavorable childhood." 
Some factors included the following: "Disturbed background. 
Divorced parents, financial trouble, schooling problems" 
(All T). In adult life, Dr. Bird testified that Queeg's 
early experiences as a child were aggravated somewhat by his 
short stature, low standing in his class at the Academy 
citing that the "hazing" for Queeg was a "scarring experience." 
The doctor further explained that Queeg's harshness was a 
compensating factor for his feelings of inferiority. '"His 
identity as a naval officer is the essential balancing factor. 
It's the key to his personal security and therefore he's 
excessively zealous to protect his standing'" (411 M). 
Dr. Bird contended that Queeg's anxiety to protect his stand­
ing caused him to deny admitting mistakes, hound subordinates 
about details, and engendered a pride in meticulous perfec­
tion. '"Any mistake of a subordinate is intolerable because 
it might endanger him'" (Mil M). Ironically, the doctor 
added that Queeg was incapable of admitting mistakes of his 
own which might be interpreted as lying by someone else. "'He— 
you might say he revises reality in his own mind so that he 
comes out blameless'" (411 M). 
Under further questioning by Greenwald, Dr. Bird 
continued to project a profile of Queeg. He indicated that a 
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man like Queeg naturally perceived that subordinates were 
"against him" and would be "constantly on the alert to defend 
his self-esteem." This would inevitably arouse questions of 
competence and loyalty in Queeg1's mind regarding subordinates. 
Queeg's stubbornness could be attributed to a "rigidity of 
personality" in his striving to be perfect. '"The inner 
insecurity checks him from admitting that those who differ 
with him might be right1" (412 T). 
At last, Greenwald got Dr. Lundeen to admit in cross-
examination that Queeg had the symptoms of a paranoid per­
sonality but without a "disabling affliction" which would 
affect his ability to command. However, Dr. Lundeen indicated 
that circumstances could cause a paranoid personality to 
withdraw from reality in the form of torpor, frenzy, or 
nervous collapse. 
In a cross-examination of Dr. Bird, Greenwald asked him 
to distinguish between "compensated" and "adjusted" with 
respect to paranoia. Dr. Bird stated that such a personality 
could compensate for say, early childhood trauma, but could 
never wholly adjust except through psychoanalysis. "'Captain 
Queeg subconsciously feels that he is disliked because he is 
wicked, stupid, and personally insignificant. This guilt 
and hostility trace back to infancy'" (4l6 M). .When asked 
how Queeg compensated for such feelings, Dr. Bird offered 
the following explanation: "'In two ways mainly. The 
paranoid pattern, which is useless and not desirable, and his 
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naval career which is extremely useful and desirable'" 
(4l6 M). Greenwald asked clarification of this last point. 
'"You say his military career is a result of his disturbance?1" 
(416 M). To this question. Dr. Bird replied, "'Most military 
careers are.'" Explaining further, Dr. Bird said, "'I 
simply mean that it represents an escape, a chance to return 
to the wonb and be reborn with a synthetic blameless self'" 
(4l6 B). At the end of his cross-examination, Greenwald 
got Dr. Bird to admit Queeg's disturbances were symptoms of 
a sickness and he repudiated Bird's conclusion that Queeg 
could handle the extreme stress of naval command since 
Bird had only five months in the service and had never been 
to sea. "'I suggest that since evidently you don't know 
much about the requirements of command you may be wrong in 
your conclusion'" (*Jl8 B). 
Mext, Greenwald called Maryk to the stand. After all 
the incidents in his log were restated in Maryk's words, 
Greenwald asked him what happened the day after he relieved 
Queeg. Maryk explained that Queeg privately told him that 
both of their careers would be ruined despite who was 
cleared. Queeg promised him that he would forget the whole 
incident, written off as a bad case of nerves during a 
typhoon. Maryk related that he was astonished, at the proposal 
and reminded Queeg that the entire ship knew about the 
incident, not to mention the notations in the official deck 
log. Queeg replied that he would take care of the necessary 
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erasures in the rough deck log. Maryk reminded Queeg about 
the rule forbidding erasures in an official log but Queeg 
had laughed saying that "there were rules and rules, including 
the rule of self-preservation." When Challee cross-examined 
Maryk, he discredited his ability to oppose the views of 
three highly trained psychiatrists as to Queeg's mental 
condition and discounted his seamanship ability noting that 
the Navy always presumes the captain of a ship to possess 
the best judgment in shiphandling. Furthermore, Challee 
challenged Maryk's story about Queeg's attempted "cover up" 
since no witnesses or erasures were brought in as evidence. 
Greenwald refused cross-examination until after Queeg took 
the stand the next morning. 
Again, Queeg looked like "a poster picture of a 
commanding officer of the Navy" as he ascended the stand. 
Greenwald lost no time in his attack after distributing 
copies of Maryk's fitness reports signed by Queeg. As 
Greenwald reviewed each incident beginning with the cutting 
of the towline through the day after the typhoon, he 
caught Queeg in self-incriminating situations which Queeg 
tried to evade by saying, "I don't recall." Then, as Green­
wald dwelled on the Stanfield incident, Queeg became increas­
ingly agitated and Challee tried to call for a recess but 
Queeg protested saying he wanted to set the record straight. 
"'I did not make a single mistake in fifteen months aboard 
the Caine and I can prove it and my record has been spotless 
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until now and I don't want it smirched by a whole lot of lies 
and distortions by disloyal officers" (4 36 M). Queeg con­
cluded that he didn't fire at the Japanese shore battery on 
Saipan because the USS Stanfield remained in his line of fire. 
As Greenwald proceeded to the relieving process during 
the typhoon, Queeg plunged his hand into his pocket and 
brought out the steel balls, rolling them between his fingers. 
On questions about Maryk's log, Queeg began to relate his 
side of each incident, hardly pausing between incidents. 
"He talked on and on, rolling the balls, his face glowing 
with satisfaction as he scored all these successive points in 
his vindication" (4 38 B). Captain Blakely looked at the 
clock, Challee bit his nails, and Greenwald calmly sat down 
as Queeg continued to rattle on, his sentences becoming 
longer and more meandering. 
After eight or nine minutes of Queeg's rambling, 
Greenwald approached him with copies of Maryk's fitness 
reports at six-month intervals. Queeg read the first one 
and quickly added that Maryk had put on a good act but had 
"cooled off in time." When Greenwald presented the second and 
last fitness report, Queeg began to hunch over and mumble as 
he read the following: 
This officer has if anything improved in his performance 
of duty since the last fitness report. He is consistently 
loyal, unflagging, thorough, courageous, and efficient. 
He is considered at present fully qualified for command 
of a 1200-ton DMS. His professional zeal and integrity 
set him apart as an outstanding example for other 
officers, reserve and regular alike. He cannot be too 
highly commended. He is recommended for transfer to the 
regular Navy. (459 M) 
Greenwald walked back to his desk, Challee rose like 
an old man and declared "no cross-examination," and Queeg 
was dismissed by Blakely. Queeg left the room as Maryk had 
seen him on many previous occasions—"shoulders hunched, 
head down, feet scurrying, the balls rolling in his fingers" 
(439 B). 
Final arguments were delayed until after lunch. 
Challee arose and lambasted Greenwald*s attempt to defame 
Queeg which was not the issue of the specification. He 
contended that Greenwald only proved that Queeg was a poor 
administrator, certainly not the basis for a summary relief 
from command. "'Such a precedent is nothing but a blank 
check for mutiny. It is the absolute destruction of the 
chain of command'" (440 B). 
No proof of insanity had been established by the defense 
according to Challee which would be the only legal basis 
upon which Maryk could have relieved Queeg under Articles 
184, 185, and 186. Looking at the officers in the court, 
Challee asserted that all of them had served with skippers 
who made errors in judgment and possessed individual 
eccentricities. Citing that no captain had been relieved 
under these articles in over thirty years, Challee offered 
the following proof that the Navy did know what it was doing 
when assigning Queeg to the Caine. 
Naval command is the greatest strain that can be brought 
to bear on a person. The captain is a god—in theory. 
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Some lapse more, some less, from that ideal. But the 
procurement policies of the Navy are rigid. That is why 
the presumption is always overwhelmingly on the side 
of the commanding officer in any dispute. lie's a man 
who's been tried in the fire. Whatever his weaknesses— 
and they may even be grave weaknesses—he's a man who 
can command a combatant ship. (441 T) 
Challee added that all complaints evidenced about Queeg 
were from subordinates, not superiors. He doubted that the 
Navy could have put a coward on board a combatant as captain 
and not detected an element of cowardice in over fifteen 
months in a war zone. Queeg's battle record had been very 
satisfactory despite his emotional problems and a disloyal 
ship. 
Greenwald's style was soft, almost apologetic as he 
gave the final argument for the defense, fie maintained 
that the defense had not set out to prove the issue of 
cowardice but quite the opposite: "that no man who rises to 
command of a United States Naval Ship can possibly be a 
coward" (442 M). If a captain commits questionable acts 
under stress, the fault must lie with the Navy's procurement 
procedure. Emphasizing that both doctors admitted in 
different terminology that Queeg was sick, Greenwald asserted 
that only the court members who had experience at sea could 
judge whether Queeg's sickness was serious enough to 
incapacitate him under severe strain. He referred only 
briefly to Queeg's symptomatic performance in court, noting 
his "evasiveness, incoherence, changing stories, and 
inability to stop speaking." Almost all of Greenwald's 
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remarks centered on Queeg as he hardly mentioned Maryk. 
"The court debated for an hour and ten minutes. Maryk 
was acquitted" (443 T). 
Queeg as Hero 
That evening, there was a double celebration, Maryk's 
acquittal and Keefer's advance on his new novel. Greenwald 
had been invited as the guest of honor but showed up late, 
very drunk. Referring to Keefer's war novel, Greenwald said 
he would make "Old Yellowstain" the hero of the novel 
because his own "little gray-headed, fat mother" was 
Jewish like himself. The officers, including Keefer, began 
to look sombre as Greenwald wavered in his slurred speech. 
"'See, the Germans aren't kidding about Jews. They're 
cooking us down to soap over there'" (446 M). Greenwald 
stated that while he was studying law, and Keefer was 
writing, and Willie was playing at Princeton, "'these stuffy, 
stupid Prussians, in the Navy and the Army—were manning 
guns'" (446 13). However, Greenwald said it was all for 
"dough" like everything else in life and not to keep Jewish 
mothers out of Nazi soap dishes. But going into service 
was still considered foolish by intellectuals. "'Bad pay, 
no millionaire future, and you can't call your mind or body 
your own. Not for sensitive intellectuals'" (446 B). 
Saying that "'You can't stop a Nazi with a law book,'" 
Greenwald related that it took the Navy eighteen months to 
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train him as a fighter pilot. "'Meantime, and it took a 
year and a half before I was any good, who was keeping 
Mama out of the soap dish? Captain Queeg'" (44? T). 
Greenwald added that some of the best men he had ever seen 
were in the military and that you couldn't be really good 
in the Army or Navy "unless you're goddamn good," despite 
the fact that some of the officers would not be up on 
"Proust fn' Finnegans Wake and all." 
Then, looking at Maryk and Keefer, Greenwald said 
Keefer had run out on everyone and that Maryk would have to 
go back to his fishing boats since his career was finished. 
"'I defended Steve because I found out the wrong guy was 
on trial. Only way I could defend him was to sink Queeg 
for you'" (448 T). Just before he threw yellow wine in 
Keefer's face, Greenwald shouted that he was drunk because 
Queeg deserved better. "'I owed him a favor, don't you see? 
He stopped Hermann Goering from washing his fat behind with 
my mother'" (44 8 T). 
As stated in the beginning summary, Keefer became the 
new skipper of the Caine but was largely inept, often display­
ing the erratic symptoms of Queeg's sickness. Instead of 
working jigsaw puzzles, however, he would frequently with­
draw to write. Willie, as executive officer, did most of 
the conning. During a kamikaze attack the Caine received a 
direct hit and Keefer went into a panic ordering abandon 
ship. Willie stayed aboard with some of the remaining men 
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and kept the Caine afloat rescuing Keefer and the rest of 
the crew. 
Eventually, Keefer left the Navy and Willie became the 
new skipper of the Caine with orders to take her to the yards 
to be scrapped. In a long letter to Kay Wynn, Willie 
expressed his inner feelings about "becoming a man" and 
even admitted that Queeg was not guilty, expressing remorse 
for not having been more loyal. "'We transferred to Queeg 
the hatred we should have felt for Hitler and the Japs who 
tore us off the beach and imprisoned us on a wallowing old 
ship for years'" (46 8 T). In a final comment on his 
present and more mature perspective on past experiences 
aboard the Caine, Willie wrote the following: 
The idea is, once you get an incompetent ass of a 
skipper—and it's a chance of war—there's nothing to do 
but serve him as though he were the wisest and the 
best, cover his mistakes, keep the ship going, and 
bear up. (468 M) 
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CHAPTER XI 
THE CAINE LEADERSHIP AND FIEDLER'S CONTINGENCY MODEL: 
AN INFERENTIAL ANALYSIS 
The evidence presented in Chapter X has portrayed a 
profile of several leadership types in The Caine Mutiny 
relative to Fielder's Contingency Model. It should be 
reiterated that the situational variables aboard the Caine 
when Queeg assumed command are reflected by Octants I 
and III as discussed in Chapter IX. Soon after Queeg 
becomes the new commanding officer, the shift of situational 
variables moves quickly into Octant V as leader-member 
relations become poor due to Queeg's relentless absurdity. 
The tasks continue to remain structured and leader position 
power remains strong because of general adherence to 
regulations until the typhoon. The typhoon produces an 
unstructured task which calls for the utmost in command 
judgment. When Queeg freezes, his leader position power 
greatly weakens which reflects a combination of variables 
in Octant VIII. 
After Maryk relieves Queeg, situational variables 
revert to Octant I with Maryk as the new leader. Leader-
member relations are good and leader position power is 
strong as indicated by the unanimous support Maryk received 
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from both officers and crew. The typhoon subsides and 
confidence in Maryk's competence returns the Caine to a more 
routine, structured task situation. 
The dialogues, actions, and descriptions noted in 
Chapter X are crucial in understanding the psychological 
motivation of each leader which has a direct bearing on 
actions taken during the various situations aboard the Caine. 
The basic premise of the inferential analysis which follows 
is that all of the key leaders (Queeg, Maryk, Keefer, 
Keith) acted predictably with respect to Fiedler's Contin­
gency Model. 
Willie Keith 
"The story begins with Willie Keith because the event 
turned on his personality as the massive door of a vault 
turns on a small jewel bearing" (Preface to The Caine 
Mutiny). The critics generally agree that Willie provides 
the central perspective from which the story is told. 
According to W. S. Hudson (1969), Willie furnishes a kind 
of "commentary on Captain Queeg, on the mutiny, and on 
the military system in general" (p. 210). Hudson asserts that 
the realistic portrayal of Willie Keith lends credibility 
to his function as the "moralizer" of the events in the 
story. 
It was always Wouk's intention to use Keith as a mirror 
against which the civilian-military conflict of the 
novel could be reflected, and through whom his own 
thoughts about the conflict could be passed on to the 
2 H  
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reader, as they are also done through Barney Greenwald. 
(Hudson, 1969, p. 205) 
Hudson goes on to note that the sequence of events 
in the novel also reflects various developmental stages 
in Willie's maturity. With respect to the subplot in the no 
el (Vlillie's personal life), Edward Weeks states that 
"in the process of his self-possession, Willie frees him­
self from his mother's domination and comes to value his 
affection for May Wynn, an Italian nightclub singer" (1951, 
p. 79). Since the Caine is the crucible through which 
Willie matures, W. S. Hudson observes that "Queeg is a part 
of the discomfort he experiences as he learns to adjust to 
a world unlike the one he had known, and Keefer is the 
embodiment of his immature reaction to that discomfort" 
(1969, p. 229). As Willie matures, his opinion of De 
Vriess changes. He takes increasing pride in his naval 
duties to the point that he even becomes irritated at the 
awkwardness of new officers such as Jorgensen and Ducely. 
The culmination of Willie's maturity is evidenced by 
his final acceptance of military authority in time of war 
indicated in his last letter to May Wynn (see last page of 
Chapter X). W. S. Hudson notes that this realization is 
actually symbolized by Greenwald's eloquence at the end of 
the novel- as a kind of spokesman for mature and responsible 
manhood. "Keith now has the maturity, but he needs Green-
wald's power of expression to demonstrate his final stage 
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of development" (19d9» p. 229). Frederic I. Carpenter 
succinctly sums up the progression of Willie Keith's 
maturity as follows: 
Moreover, it gains realistic conviction by describing 
the problem through the eyes of Willie Keith, who first 
appears as an irresponsible young romantic, grows 
gradually into a more responsible officer, but is 
seduced by Tom Keefer into "maturity," then enjoys a 
kind of conversion through the agency of Barney Green-
wald, and ends as a responsible adult fit to become 
"the last captain of the Caine." (1956-, p. 214) 
E. L. Acken (1951) adds another dimension to Carpenter's 
observations about Willie's maturation. He asserts 
that the novel is about much more than the thousands of 
"Willie Keiths" who first found out about the real world 
through military service in World War II. Acken believes 
that the novel is really about the eternal conflict between 
the civilian and military man with regard to ethics and 
standards. Willie is merely a symbol of the civilian side 
of the conflict. "Willie is a very real person, but essen­
tially, he is a symbol of the citizen of a democratic 
country coming into contact for the first time with the 
single-minded service officer and all that officer stands 
for" (1951, p. 6). 
The maturity factor in Willie is critically tested 
during the typhoon when Queeg is relieved by Maryk, 
particularly with regard to the reasons why Willie supported 
Maryk. Robert Bierstedt (1956) makes the following observa­
tion: "It is apparent that if Willie, at this tense moment, 
had supported the captain instead of the executive officer, 
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the latter's attempt to relieve his skipper would have 
failed" (p. 3). Had Willie been less mature in matters of 
shiphandling and experience at sea, he might have supported 
Queeg strio.tly from a legal "chain of command" standard, which 
was assuredly well indoctrinated in all officers fresh out 
of midshipman schools. However, Willie decides to support 
Maryk out of a moral self-preservation for both himself and 
the crew based on the hazardous situation of the Caine in the 
typhoon. W. R. Williams (195*0 tends to substantiate this 
view of Keith's moral decision as he notes that "the morale 
officer acquiesced in the relief of the captain only when 
he considered his physical existence threatened, not on the 
ground that the captain's cowardice, authoritarianism, and 
incompetence were destroying the ship's integrity" (p. 26l). 
In terms of maturity, then, Willie represents a crucial 
factor of leadership as it pertains to the Fiedler Con­
tingency Model. The evidence presented in Chapter X 
reveals Willie's changing perceptions of leadership roles 
(Queeg vs. De Vriess) which in turn define his own 
self-perceptions as a leader. His decision to support Maryk 
in approving Stillwell's seventy-two hour pass as well as to 
back Maryk in relieving Queeg were the moral decisions of 
a relationship-motivated leader. Had Willie gone strictly 
"by the book" as is typical of a task-motivated leader, he 
would have backed Queeg in his decision to maintain fleet 
course ordered by the tactical commander. 
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Finally, Willie's desire to leave the Navy after his 
obligated tour of duty is predictable in terms of the 
situation he desires as a relationship-motivated leader. 
His ambition is to become a professor of literature in a 
university setting where high LPC leaders perform best. 
While there are still policies and regulations governing 
goals and objectives of a university, there is more latitude 
for creativity and development as an individual not only for 
a professor but those whom he instructs. 
Tom Keefer 
"Lieutenant Keefer, in civilian life an imaginative 
writer, was responsible for the rumors of Queeg's insanity 
that led to the mutiny—and an impressive trial scene" 
(Booklist, 1951, p. 29^). W. S. Hudson (1969) supports 
this statement as he asserts that Wouk intended Keefer to 
be the true villain of The Caine Mutiny. "In May, 19^9, 
referring to him by the name of Wood, Wouk described him 
as a would-be novelist, intellectual snob, and great fool" 
(p. 195). These noted, negative characteristics combine 
to make Keefer insidious in his intentions to undermine 
Queeg. Hudson aptly observes that Keefer's intent was 
relatively unassertive at first as he becomes the persuasive 
leader of subordinates in the "universal military man's 
ceremony of maligning superior officers." But Keefer's 
opposition to Queeg becomes increasingly serious as he 
252 
begins to play psychiatrist in his attempt to influence 
Maryk that the Caine must be rid of such a "colossal 
ignoramus" as LCDR Queeg. "The leader of this opposition 
to the captain and the epitome of the uncooperative, dis­
gruntled civilian, is the ship's communication officer, 
Tom Keefer" (Hudson, 1969, p. 19*0. 
Edmund Fuller (1957) agrees with Hudson in that Tom 
Keefer misdirects his intelligence to the point that Wouk 
portrays him as essentially "phony" in his pretenses. "Keefer 
is more, by the way, than a phony intellectual, he is also 
the phony liberal, another familiar person of our time" 
(p. 145). The phoniness to which Fuller alludes stems 
primarily from Keefer's inability to accept responsibility 
for his accusations and follow through at crucial points 
in the novel. Harvey Swados (1953) refers to the first 
crucial test of Keefer's convictions as the time when Maryk 
and Keefer go to Admiral Halsey's office to plead for Queeg's 
replacement. However, as the men entered the flag quarters, 
"Keefer begs off at the last possible moment with the 
explanation that their proof is insufficient and subject 
to misinterpretation" (p. 2^9). It seems that part of 
Keefer's true character is that he fails at crucial times. 
Edward Weeks (1951) concurs with this view as he states 
that "Keefer, as events prove, is neither a fair judge nor 
a reliable officer when the crisis comes" (p. 79). 
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The second crisis, the relieving of Queeg during the 
typhoon, occurs without the presence of Keefer until after 
the fact. Wouk does not allow him to have a part in the 
crucial decision-making process when Maryk takes command. 
This is somewhat ironic in that Maryk's decision is the 
culmination of Keefer's vindictive persuasive ability to 
convince others of Queeg's insanity and to take the risk 
of action. "He plants in the mind of Lieutenant Maryk, 
a stolid and competent peacetime fisherman, the seed that 
grows into a conviction of Queeg's insanity" (Swados, 1953, 
p. 249). Even though Keefer congratulated Willie Keith 
as he relieves the 00D watch, it is doubtful that Keefer 
would have backed Maryk at such a crucial moment, finding 
it easier to do so after all other officers became unanimous 
in support of Maryk. 
The third crisis occurs during the court-martial when 
Keefer evades his responsibility on the witness stand. 
"Keefer protects his own career by equivocating and refusing 
to swear to Queeg's madness" (Swados, 1953, p. 250). 
In a very real sense, Keefer's cowardly testimony simply 
compounded his guilt for incitement of the doubts surround­
ing Queeg's sanity. This guilt based on Keefer's lack of 
resolve to take responsibility for acting on his convictions 
is summarized by W. S. Hudson as follows: 
On his shoulders must be placed the blame for ending 
Maryk's career; if not for him, Maryk would not have had 
to relieve Queeg, as Willie says; and what Greenwald 
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meant ultimately when he said that Maryk was guilty 
was that Keefer was responsible for Maryk's guilt, which 
is the same as saying that Keefer was guilty. If not 
for him, the officers of the Caine probably would have 
given Queeg the support he needed which was their duty. 
Queeg's confidence in himself would have been bolstered, 
and he very likely would have taken the ship through 
the storm. Although Maryk was acquitted, mutiny was a 
wrong act and one for which Keefer must be held 
responsible. (1969, pp. 198-199) 
William II. Whyte (1956) adds to Hudson's analysis by 
asserting that it was Keefer's constant "needling of authority" 
that led the "ordinary people" of the Caine astray. "The 
'smart' people who question things, who upset people— 
they are the wrong ones" (p. 246). To some extent Whyte 
puts Greenwald in this category with a different sense of 
guilt for lending his legal services to acquit Maryk while 
incriminating Queeg. "Barney Greenwald was too smart for 
his own good too, and to redeem himself, he had to throw 
a glass of champagne in Keefer's dirty intellectual face" 
(p. 246). Greenwald had defended Maryk and the others 
only because Keefer should have been the one on trial. 
"Greenwald had defended them, but only because he found out 
that 'the wrong man was on trial'" (Carpenter, 1956, p. 215). 
In fact, W. S. Hudson concludes that "despite his brains, 
Keefer is a hypocrite and a coward, even more so than the man 
he maligns" (1969, p. 196). 
Thus, Keefer is denounced by Greenwald (and Wouk) 
not because he had been so outspoken but because Keefer had 
failed to carry his accusations through to their conclusion. 
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Keefer's mocking cynicism only worsened Queeg's condition 
and made the mutiny inevitable. V/. A. Williams observes 
that the key point in The Calne Mutiny is not that authority 
is sacred but that "the intellectual abdicated his responsi­
bility—and consequently lost not only his opportunity but 
also his self-respect" (195*1, p. 261). Keefer's crime was 
not so much the questioning of authority but the failure 
to take necessary countermeasures to remedy the situation. 
W. J. Stuckey (1966) states that Wouk focuses on Keefer's 
guilt of irresponsibility at the end of the novel to ensure 
that there is no mistake of his literary intention in 
portraying Keefer as a bigger coward than Queeg. Noting 
Keefer's denial of Queeg's insanity in sworn testimony, 
Stuckey discusses the obvious symbolism of Greenwald's 
hurling a glass of yellow champagne in Keefer's face at the 
banquet. The quotation below summarizes Stuckey's views 
of Wouk's intentions and lends further insight to the irony 
of Keefer's character: 
Then, to make absolutely certain that the reader 
gets the point, Wouk puts the Caine under Keefer's 
command and lets us see how Keefer behaves. And, of 
course, novelist Keefer does very badly. When a mine 
bobs up under the ship's prow, Wouk tells us that 
Keefer squeaked with excitement. His eyeballs even take 
on an "opaque yellowish look and are rimmed with red." 
Whenever Keefer gets the opportunity, he retires 
"into an isolation like Queeg's—except that he [works] 
on his novel instead of solving jigsaw puzzles." 
Finally, Keefer surpasses even Queeg in cowardice by 
committing the most heinous of all naval crimes: he 
abandons the ship before it sinks. To make Keefer's 
cowardice even more obvious, itfouk arranges matters so 
that the ship does not sink and Captain Keefer is made 
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to seen ridiculous as well as contemptible. (1966, 
pp. 162-163) 
Having presented the evidence in Chapter X portraying 
Keefer as the epitome of the "disgruntled civilian" and 
having looked at the character analysis of several critics, 
it is very difficult to place Keefer in a leadership cate­
gory at all with respect to Fiedler's Contingency Model. 
The primary reason is the reluctance or inability of Keefer 
to act on his perceptions toward a meaningful conclusion. 
From the beginning of the novel through the court-martial, 
Keefer merely incites others to view Queeg in a negative 
perception of mental incompetence while protecting himself 
from blame with an evasive verbal dexterity. 
The most logical placement of Keefer as a leadership 
type in Fiedler's Contingency Model would be to consider 
his overall character as reflective of the relationship-
motivated leader. However, the acid test of the effective­
ness of Keefer's performance comes after the court-martial 
when he is put in a position which forces him to act as 
skipper of the Caine. The residual effects of the court-
martial and Keefer's part in it have tended to vary the 
strength of leader-member relations in the minds of the 
officers and crew aboard the Caine. While leader position 
power remains strong relative to what had occurred in 
Queeg's case, the leader-member relations vary between 
"good" in Octant III and "poor" in Octant VII. These two 
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octants reflect an unstructured task structure since these 
are the crucial tests of Keefer's ability as a leader to 
perform effectively. The mine incident as well as the 
kamikaze attacks are unstructured situations and Keefer acts 
predictably incompetently as an inept relationship-motivated 
leader within the criteria in Octants III and VII where a 
competent task-motivated leader would have performed best. 
In essence, it is Willie Keith who takes effective action, 
recognizing the situation, deviating from his normal 
relationship-motivated role and becoming effective as a 
task-motivated leader in crucial situations. It is for this 
reason that he becomes the competent final captain of the 
Caine whereas Tom Keefer fails miserably and predictably. 
Steve Maryk 
Even though Keefer is portrayed as the real villain 
of The Caine Mutiny, it is Maryk who is forced to act in 
the critical circumstance of the typhoon. Maryk becomes 
the "scapegoat" for the Navy system which allows him a 
superficial acquittal since both his and yueeg's professional 
military careers are ultimately ruined. Edmund Fuller 
offers a succinct analysis in this regard: 
It is an oversimplification to say that Maryk is 
permitted to defy authority and is then slapped over the 
wrist for the defiance. . . . The court-martial does 
not convict Maryk, but neither does it move to lighten 
or mitigate the seriousness of such an action on the 
part of a subordinate toward his superior. . . . Maryk 
is justified as far as we could possibly expect within 
the military system. (1957, page 139) 
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The justification which puller mentions is a moral one 
of self-preservation not only for Maryk but the safety of 
the crew as well. Had not Queeg incriminated himself under 
Greenwald's relentless questioning, the Navy system might 
well have convicted Maryk on legal interpretation of Articles 
184, 185 and 186 of Navy Regulations. Maryk's decision to 
relieve Queeg was for much the same reasons as those within 
Willie when he backed Maryk. W. A. Williams comments on 
Maryk's decision to relieve Queeg as follows: 
The executive officer, asked why he had not acted 
earlier, asserted that he "wasn't sure of [his] ground." 
As with the morale officer, he acted only when the 
captain's tyranny and incompetence touched him in terms 
of physical survival. None of these considerations 
detract from his courage in relieving the skipper at 
the height of the storm. But to concentrate on this 
courage and seamanship is to miss the point. More 
accurate was the defending lawyer's charge that the 
intellectual, not the executive officer, should have 
been tried. (1954, p. 26l) 
Williams' observation reveals an important facet of 
Maryk's character in terms of leadership. While Steve was 
extremely competent in the functional aspects of shipboard 
operations, he was not astute in the political dimension 
of the Navy system. Maryk does not really understand Reefer's 
exhortations concerning the inner circle of fraternity in 
the Navy as well as the "father-son" tradition of its 
politics. To compound the problem, Maryk manifests an 
inferiority complex in his ability to lend verbal expression 
to his inner convictions which causes his tragic dependence 
on Keefer in this regard. Had Maryk had the confidence to 
verbalize his findings to Halsey without Keefer, it is 
possible that something night have been done about Queeg's 
removal before the typhoon. The irony is that the most 
competent officer aboard the Caine, Maryk, is just as 
"washed up" as the incompetent Queeg while latently incom­
petent Keefer assumes command as the new skipper. 
Keefer was probably right in telling Maryk that he 
would become a twenty-year "time server," unable to break 
into the political inner circle of the Navy system. The 
system does not always reward operational competence 
which must often be reinforced by "connections" in the right 
places along the chain of command. Maryk's relatively low 
socioeconomic background as the son of a "dumb immigrant 
fisherman" would have excluded him from the fraternity of 
Academy men and the elite of the"ivy league." For Maryk, 
the Navy was the best alternative to breaking his back 
hauling in fish for a living. 
All of the aforementioned factors of Maryk*s character 
as well as the evidence presented in Chapter X provide a 
unique leader profile with respect to Fiedler's Contingency 
Model. Maryk's performance reflects a blend of both the 
task- and relationship-motivated leader types within 
operational/functional criteria. Few critics would dispute 
the fact that Maryk was the most competent shiphandler 
aboard the Caine. He understood the engineering plant, 
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standard operating procedures of the fleet, and the best 
ways to deploy sweep gear in order to accomplish the Caine1s 
wartime mission. 
Most importantly, Maryk's functional understanding of 
naval operations was coupled with his natural understanding 
of the crew. Maryk's socioeconomic background enhanced his 
insight concerning the crew's motivations and aspirations. 
In this regard, Maryk is an example of the relationship-
motivated leader in Fiedler's Model. Like De Vriess, Maryk 
knew when to tighten and relax regulation in order to derive 
maximum performance from the crew in important situations. 
It was Maryk who pleaded for relief for the crew during 
Queeg's water restriction but it was also Maryk who was not 
beyond taking his shirt off and pushing the minesweeping 
detail to outperform all other fleet units in launching and 
recovering sweep gear. 
In view of Maryk's dual motivation as a leader, he 
acts predictably with respect to the situational variables 
in Fiedler's Contingency Model as discussed in Chapters 
IX and X. In Chapter IX, the variables in octants I and III 
comprised the setting aboard the Caine under Captain De Vriess. 
Had Maryk relieved De Vriess, the Caine probably would have 
realized little significant change in leadership effective­
ness and would have continued to outperform other fleet 
DMS's. However, Queeg's arrival causes the situational 
variables to gradually shift to the right side of Fiedler's 
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Model culminating in octant VIII at the time of the typhoon 
when Maryk relieved Queeg. 
Despite the fact that Maryk performed predictably in 
a strictly operational sense, it was his lack of effective­
ness politically which was his undoing and caused hira to 
become the proverbial "man in the middle" between a wary 
crew, an incompetent skipper, and a disgruntled wardroom of 
officers. Had he been more politically astute in terms of 
verbalizing his convictions effectively, Maryk might have 
gotten action from Halsey or possibly he could have ameliorated 
conditions between Queeg and the men as a kind of "buffer." 
It is not uncommon for a very sharp executive officer to be 
the real power behind a not-so-sharp captain of a ship in 
terms of ensuring smooth-running efficiency and high morale. 
However, Maryk's commanding officer might have been incompetent 
to such a degree that no executive officer in the Navy could 
have performed effectively under such a man as Queeg. 
Philip Francis Queeg 
"The essence of sea command is the proper handling of a 
ship under battle, emergency, and routine conditions" 
(Browne, 1956, p. 217). This statement reflects the real 
issue which is on trial in the Caine court-martial—the 
competence of LCDR Philip F. Queeg as a commanding officer 
of a naval warship. The factor of competence is also 
crucial to any type of leadership whether it be task- or 
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relationship-motivated within any of the octants in Fiedler's 
Contingency Model. Prior to an inferential analysis of 
Queeg in relation to the Contingency Model, it is necessary 
to review some criticism of Queeg1s competence. 
According to an article appearing in Time (April 9, 
1951), Queeg is labeled as a "phony and misfit skipper." 
He is further referred to as "a pallid little man turning 
to fat" who graduated near the bottom of his class at 
Annapolis and was incapable of handling either his ship or 
men. "He was a martinet, a liar, a petty tyrant, and when 
the chips were down in combat, a coward" (Time, 1951, p. 
110). Robert Bierstedt agrees with this last descriptive 
statement as he observes that Queeg is a classic example 
of a man who possesses those qualities which usually insure 
"success in any bureaucracy and failure everywhere else." 
However, Queeg fails miserably due to his incompetence and 
misapplication of Navy Regulations which he considers "his 
only Bible and his only Law." Bierstect notes that Queeg 
is far more than a disciplinarian, he is a martinet. 
"While martinets and myrmidons may be conspicuous in military 
organizations, they can be found, of course, in all the 
organizations of society" (1956, p. 3). 
Even the general public was somewhat dismayed by 
Queeg's portrayal when the book and play came out in the 
early 1950s. According to W. J. Stuckey, "readers who 
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had been nourished for many years on official wartime pro­
paganda must have been shocked and amused to find that 
Captain Queeg had none of the dignity or competence tradi­
tionally associated with his position as ship's commander" 
(1966, p. 159). Riley Hughes agrees with Stuckey's assess­
ment and offers the following segment of Queeg's less-than-
dignified character: "There is a growing dramatic situation 
as the schizoid skipper of the minesweeper Caine, with his 
maddening affirmation 'Kay, kay' and his assurance 'I kid 
you not,' exercises his petty tyranny over officers and 
men" (1951» p. ^73). W. K. Harrison (1951) adds that 
"Queeg, the captain, was brutal (within regulation limits), 
cowardly, and incompetent" (p. 51*0. Referring to Queeg's 
seamanship, W. S. Hudson (1969) reiterates the following 
fiascos: (a) the first time Queeg gets under way, he damages 
another ship and gets stuck in a mud bank, (b) in heavy 
fog, Queeg nearly has a collision with a tanker and a 
battleship; the latter because he was on the wrong side 
of the channel, (c) on an approach in San Francisco Queeg 
backs down too late and crashes into a pier laden with 
civilians, (d) while chewing out a sailor for having his 
shirttail out, Queeg cuts his own towline, and (e) as he 
refuses to listen to reason, Queeg shows his inability to 
handle the Caine during the typhoon. Hudson concludes that 
"Queeg's shiphandling ability is just as far below par as his 
ability to handle men" (p. 190). 
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An example of this last statement is Queeg's constant 
demand for strict compliance with the most minute of naval 
regulations which had been relaxed under De Vriess. On 
the premise that he is a "book man," Queeg forbids shirttails 
hanging out, reading on watch, and no sleeping during the 
day. Harry Gilroy (1951) reiterates Queeg's callous use 
of regulation with yet another observation: "At any breach 
of discipline, however slight, he imposes stern penalties— 
such things as taking away the leave of men who have not 
had a visit with their families in years and may well be 
blown to bits before the next chance" (p. 5). Finally, 
Hudson summarizes several minor incidents that invoke 
disproportionate penalty from Queeg, adding to almost a 
complete devastation of morale aboard the Caine. 
Queeg cuts off the ship's movies for six months because 
someone forgets to invite him to a particular showing. 
He cuts off the water at the equator because one of his 
officers is detached against his will. Because the 
steward's mates eat some leftover strawberries, Queeg 
conducts a massive search for a key he is sure someone 
has made to the icebox. . . . The slightest irregularity 
means a midnight conference of department heads who are 
alternating deck watch and have no chance to make up 
the lost sleep during the day" (1969, p. 190). 
It is ironic that while Queeg inflicts unreasonable 
punishment on his men for the slightest deviation from "the 
book," he often abuses regulation for his benefit. Robert 
Bierstedt summarizes some pertinent examples of Queeg's 
misuse of authority. 
.But Queeg is not, in other circumstances, a "book 
officer" at all. He illegally transports back to the 
states a consignment of liquor for his own personal use 
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and then extorts the cost of it from Willie, when, 
because of his own mistakes, it is lost overboard. On 
several occasions, he submits to his superiors reports 
which stray rather considerably from the truth in the 
direction of self-justification, and he offers, in the 
instance of the "mutiny" itself, to erase and rewrite 
the rough log of the ship. This last, for obvious 
reasons, is an exceedingly serious offense against 
naval regulations. (1956, p. 4) 
In addition, Queeg often threatens his officers with unsatis­
factory fitness reports as a means of punishment. Navy 
directives specify that fitness reports are to be used only 
to evaluate actual performance of subordinates rather than 
as a means of punishment. In another observation of 
Queeg1s "double standard" of interpreting regulations, Harry 
Gilroy states that "while the ship's company is held to 
rigid standards, he makes clownish mistakes of ship-
handling and finally—-in the concluding pages—shows 
cowardice in action" (1951, p. 5). 
It is Queeg's cowardice that raises the eyebrows of 
the court members as testimony is given about the incidents 
at Kwajalein and Saipan. W. S. Hudson (1969) notes that"during 
combat, he continuously changes his position so as to 
remain on the sheltered side of the bridge. Several times, 
he runs from combat." Robert Bierstedt reiterates Hudson's 
observation by commenting on the Kwajalein assault when Queeg 
dropped th: yellow dye marker well behind the line of 
departure. "This last incident wins him the name, 'Old 
Yellowstain' among his subordinate officers, and the 
'Yellow,' of course, stands for more than the color of the 
dye" (1956, p. 4). Queeg's worst display of cowardice 
occurred during the assault on Saipan when the destroyer 
Stanfield was straddled by fire from a Japanese shore 
battery. Queeg never stays on the side of the bridge 
exposed to enemy fire. Furthermore, Bierstedt notes, Queeg 
"fails to return enemy fire when he has an opportunity to do 
so, and instead moves the Caine out of range as rapidly 
as possible" (1956, p. 4). 
Queeg's cowardice is certainly an indication of his 
incompetence for command at sea and his inability to make 
reasonable decisions, especially in crucial situations, 
compounds his incompetence. The best example of Queeg's 
ineptness occurs during the typhoon which very nearly 
destroys the Caine and her crew. Virtually frozen in panic 
to the engine order telegraph, Queeg is incapable of giving 
coherent, reasonable orders despite prudent recommendations 
from subordinates. "His refusal to come into the wind, to 
ballast his tanks, and to turn the depth charges on 'safe' 
all increase the hazards to his ship" (Bierstedt, 1956, 
p. 3). Clinging to the tenet that the standing orders of 
fleet course must be obeyed, Queeg exercises no initiative 
in departing from those orders even under the extenuating 
circumstances of a typhoon. "When the Caine is caught in 
a violent storm and seems doomed, Queeg freezes on the 
bridge, unable to issue orders that would save the ship" 
(Swados, 1953, P. 250). 
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Even before Maryk feels compelled to relieve Queeg 
during the typhoon, Harvey Swados believes that the officers 
^e Caine must have concluded that Queeg was "a coward, 
an unbalanced disciplinarian, and finally a madman" (1953, 
p. 249). Lydia McClean (1953) agrees with this conclusion 
as she notes that the Caine "is commanded by a Regular Navy 
officer named Queeg, a tyrant, an incompetent seaman, a 
coward, and a sort of package of all the neuroses" (p. 195). 
W. S. Hudson (1969) essentially agrees with Keefer's, 
and Greenwald's and the court psychiatrists' analysis 
of Queeg's neurotic paranoia. The combination of an 
unfavorable childhood (divorced parents), school problems, 
and a lack of money coupled with Queeg's low standing at 
the Naval Academy contributed to his later psychotic condi­
tion. "All this, together with his small physical stature, 
had created in him a strong feeling of inferiority, a sense 
of being persecuted, and a lack of confidence in his 
ability" (Hudson, 1969, p. 191). 
Hudson further explains that Queeg compensated for his 
feelings of inferiority in several ways. "In the first 
place, he had chosen military service for a career because 
it offered him security" (1969, p. 192). Then, Queeg 
became a perfectionist, expecting everyone to follow 
regulations by the letter which negated the necessity for 
making judgmental decisions. By making the little things 
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that he could do seem important, Queeg compensated for his 
cowardice. An example of such a situation in which Queeg 
felt completely in control was the infamous "strawberry 
affair." Additionally, Queeg1s refusal to act until given 
orders and forgetting his mistakes enabled him to displace 
blame on others. This characteristic is explained as follows: 
But Queeg's most distinguishing trait is an uncommon 
talent for covering up his mistakes. He can always 
rationalize an error of judgment or twist a situation 
so that someone else appears at fault. It is Willie 
Keith's fault, as morale officer, that Urban's shirttail 
is out; the two target-towing lines separate because they 
are of poor quality. . . . This suggests that, unlike 
Captain Bligh and Vere, Captain Queeg suffers from an 
emotional condition that accounts, at least in part, 
for his behavior. (Hudson, 1969, p. 191) 
An outward manifestation of Queeg's neurosis was the 
habit of rubbing two steel balls together which he drew 
out of his pocket during times of emotional stress. Another 
mannerism which reflected Queeg's lack of self-confidence 
and inner tenseness was generally exhibited by certain word 
selections. He often used cliches, military jargon to 
express irritation and spoke in proverbs to illustrate 
the intent of his orders. "He had convinced himself that 
he was a good officer, and he operated with the help of the 
book, the steel balls, and the jargon, under the assumption 
that when things went wrong it was the fault of someone 
else" (Hudson, 1969, p. 193). 
However, Queeg's "crutches" used to compensate for his 
feelings of inferiority and inadequacy are not enough 
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to mask his true psychotic condition during the court-martial. 
Walcott Gibbs (195^) provides an interesting analysis of 
Queeg's gradual unravelling on the witness stand as he 
responds to Greenwald's questions. 
It begins with trivialities—the investigation of semi-
comic mishaps in the course of the voyage, petty tyran­
nies, charges of minor misconduct—but presently the 
trivialities evolve into something else. As Queeg 
explains away absurdities, he begins to be involved in 
tiny contradictions; his irritation grows, and so does 
his confusion; one story merges into another; irritation 
turns to fury and then to incoherent ranting and then, 
ultimately, to total collapse. It is a shocking pic­
ture of the absolute disintegration of a personality, 
and at the end of it Greenwald has unmistakably made 
his point. It is quite evident that under sufficient 
stress, Queeg could not conceivably be helu responsible 
for his behavior. (pp. 60-61) 
Eupnemia Wyatt (195^), a theater critic, refers to Queeg's 
psychological disintegration as "a painful stripping of human 
decencies" and a "spectacle of naval shame." Wyatt states 
that she, like the court members on stage, felt the 
necessity to bow her head so as to avert her eyes as Queeg 
destroys himself. "When he cracks under Greenwald's 
relentless questions, his burst of recrimination suddenly 
lays bare all his 'maladjustments' and 'non-compensated 
complexes'" (p. 466). 
Noting that the members of the court-martial board are 
better qualified than medical examiners to evaluate the 
stresses of command at sea, Greenwald points out that Queeg's 
behavior aboard the Caine, especially cowardice, must be 
attributed to a mental condition. Obviously, Greenwald 
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appeals to the naval officers of the board and their pride 
in the naval system. "The defense attorney, Greenwald, 
denies that Queeg is guilty of cowardice on the ground that 
no man certified by the Navy as qualified for command could 
possibly be guilty of so heinous a charge" (Bierstedt, 
1956, p. 4). 
In the aftermath of the trial, Gibbs comments on Wouk's 
attempt to make Queeg a heroic symbol. "To Greenwald, 
Queeg, no matter how incompetent, or even unbalanced 
he may be, is a hero in that he represents the Regular Navy, 
which stood as the country's only defense when we went to 
war" (195^, p. 61). Since Greenwald is Jewish, he feels 
strongly about Hitler's intentions of "melting his old mother 
down into a bar of soap." Queeg is described as a "martyr," 
Maryk a "scapegoat," and Keefer as the "cold-blooded 
opportunist" who used Maryk for vengeance and then betrayed 
him at the trial. J. D. Scott (1951) suggests 
that even though conventional heroes are recognizable as 
possessing certain positive characteristics, Wouk's supposed 
villain "is really a hero after all—the unstable, pathetic 
bully, Captain Queeg, U.S.N., of doubtful competence and 
doubtful courage" (p. 56 8). 
However, James R. Browne (1956) does not agree with 
either Gibbs or Scott in perceiving Queeg as any type of 
hero. Browne asserts that just because Queeg was a member 
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of the armed services, he was such an ineffectual part of 
the opposition to "Hitlerian barbarisn" that "he could not, 
under any circumstances, justifiably be considered the 
hero of anything" (p. 216). Brown goes on to back his 
criticism with the following analysis: 
Queeg was lost before the story began, not because of 
command pressures, but because of being the kind of 
person he was. And no matter how much some readers may 
be inclined to sympathize with him as a pitiable object, 
his plight cannot justifiably be called a breakdown under 
the rigors of command. Command is not something that 
can merely be held passively, or visited upon people 
like some kind of disease. It is a form of activity 
that has to be practiced, and if it is not successful, it 
does not exist. Queeg in The Caine Mutiny was never 
displayed in the act of properly exercising command, 
(p. 218) 
Lee Rogow (1951) emphatically agrees with Browne's 
assessment as noted above. Rogow sees Queeg as the type of 
officer encountered by many civilians who served during 
the War. In peacetime, the Queegs of the professional 
military may be the "watchdogs" of America's security while 
civilians are "blissfully doping off" but there is no 
excuse for the incompetence displayed by the inept skipper 
of the Caine. "It is true, of course, that the professional 
sailors and soldiers ivere necessary to America's triumph 
by arms, but I do not see that this could ever be made a 
justification for cruelty, stupidity, and downright insanity 
in the officer class" (p. 17). In agreement with Rogow's 
assertion, Harry Gilroy (1951) offers the following succinct 
summation of Queeg's leadership ability portrayed in The 
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Caine Mutiny: "It is a dreadfully impressive portrait of a 
small-natured man put in a position that calls for the best 
in any man, that of command of a IJavy ship at sea in wartime" 
(p. 5). 
Gilroy's assessment of Queeg in this last statement, as 
well as the evidence of the criticism presented, reveals 
that LCDR Philip F. Queeg acted predictably relative to 
Fiedler's Contingency Model of effective leadership. 
Queeg is a classic, though extreme example, of the task-
motivated leadership type. He regards personal relationships 
as secondary to accomplishing what he desires whether it be 
a military mission or more often, his own petty tasks. Of 
course, many task-motivated leaders are quite effective 
in circumstances with situational variables delineated 
in Octants I, III, VII, and VIII of the Contingency Model 
but only if the essential quality of competence is present 
in their knowledge or character. This quality, especially 
in a mental sense, is what was really on trial in The Caine 
Mutiny. 
Competence may be defined in mental, physical, or 
spiritual realms as the ability, fitness, or capacity to 
achieve an acceptable level of performance whether the 
results are concrete or abstract. Militarily, Queeg 
had the exposure to become a competent commanding officer 
(Annapolis, tours of duty at sea) but his mental condition 
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precluded his effectiveness, whatever the psychological 
causes. The paranoia, his persecution complex, low self-
esteem, and neuroses in general negated his ability to become 
an effective task-motivated leader regardless of the octant 
of situational variables. Therefore, Queeg's incompetent 
performance based on psychological abnormalities, made his 
performance quite predictable in relation to Fiedler's 
Contingency Model. In essence, Queeg's actions and inac­
tions hardly constituted leadership by any standard as he 
was totally ineffective in any positive direction. 
Of course, Queeg was effective in achieving adherence 
to his petty demands but the effect was in a negative 
direction toward conditions "unfavorable for a leader" as 
portrayed on the right side of the Fiedler Contingency Model. 
Queeg's mental incompetence prevented him from perceiving 
the positive aspects of De Vriess' leadership characterized 
by the variables in Octant I of the Contingency Model when 
Queeg came aboard. As Queeg relentlessly pushed both 
officers and crew to meet his absurd demands, the situational 
variables shifted the circumstances aboard the Caine from 
Octant I to Octant VII during the events leading up to the 
typhoon. When Maryk made the decision to relieve Queeg, 
even "leader position power" had become weak in a highly 
"unstructured" task situation and leader-member relations 
had been "poor" for some time. 
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Another key factor in the Fiedler Contingency Model 
is the perception of co-workers by the leader under evalua­
tion. As noted in Chapter II, task-motivated leaders rate 
character traits in their co-workers as low and therefore 
have low LPC (least preferred co-worker) scores in contrast 
to high LPC of relationship-motivated leaders who tend to 
rate the traits of their least preferred co-workers somewhat 
higher. However, this rating system can only be valid on 
the assumption that the leader's perception of his co-workers 
is derived from mental competence. Obviously, Queeg's 
psychotic condition greatly distorts his perception of 
people as well as situationsj hence his actions are necessarily 
incompetent. Another illustration of this distortion of 
perception was the disparity between Queeg's verbal testi­
mony concerning Maryk's fitness as an officer and the written 
reports presented as evidence to discredit Queeg's testimony. 
In a last analysis, Queeg might well have performed 
well in the situational variables of Octants I and III 
of Fiedler's Contingency Model as did De Vriess had it 
not been for his mental incapacity. He possessed the charac­
ter traits of a task-motivated leader but he lacked the 
judgment to apply those traits effectively as commanding 
officer of the Caine. Predictably, as J. R. Browne noted 
earlier, "Queeg, in The Caine Mutiny, was never displayed 
in the act of properly exercising command" (1956, p. 218). 
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Admiral Halsey*s View 
In an exclusive interview with Admiral Halsey, Lydia 
McClean (1953) posed hypothetical questions regarding the 
course of action the Admiral would have taken had the Caine 
really existed as part of the Pacific fleet. First, Halsey 
stated that "he had enjoyed every bit of The Caine Mutiny, 
especially as he had spent twenty-five years in destroyers 
himself" (p. 223). When asked what he would have done if 
Keefer and Maryk had actually submitted their report on 
Queeg, Admiral Halsey indicated that he would not have had 
time to review the report personally "since the Fleet was 
leaving to support the landing on Mindoro." However, Halsey 
stated that he would have sent a senior member of his staff, 
"a man of experience and mature judgment," over to the Caine 
to investigate conditions. "Whatever action he took would 
have been determined by the report of this officer." 
Another question McClean asked Halsey was his opinion 
with respect to Maryk1s decision to relieve Queeg during 
the typhoon. Halsey prefaced his answer by saying that an 
opinion in such an extenuating circumstance would be most 
difficult since, of course, the Caine never existed as part 
of his fleet. However, Halsey did offer the following 
general remarks which reveal the complexity of variables 
surrounding the nature of Maryk's action: 
If the ship is in serious trouble, he may be liable to 
punishment if he doesn't take over. It's the most 
difficult situation a naval officer can find himself in. 
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He can't act a minute too soon, or a minute too late. 
And it's something he has to decide for himself. Nobody 
can undertake to advise him. If he guesses right, 
that's fine—if he guesses wrong, God help him. 




The major characters in Melville's Billy Budd and 
Wouk's The Caine Mutiny have been inferentially analyzed in 
terms of predictable behavior with respect to Fiedler's 
Contingency Model. The motivations and actions portrayed in 
both formal and informal leaders within these selected 
novels have provided insight into leadership effectiveness 
contingent upon situational variables. Even though naval 
military settings were used exclusively, the organizational 
and decision-making concepts involved apply to any bureau­
cratic setting whether it be civilian or military. In this 
chapter the Fiedler Contingency Model will be applied to 
major figures in the two models. A brief discussion of key 
situations will illustrate situations in which major figures 
made decisions. 
The Situational Contingency Aboard the Bellipotent 
The situation aboard the Bellipotent was highly 
favorable for leaders as indicated by the variables of 
Octant I in the Fiedler Contingency Model (see Figure 4 
at the end of Chapter II). The graph further reveals that 
task-motivated leaders should perform best contingent upon 
the situational variables of Octant I. The inferences of 
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contingency substantiated by the analysis in Chapter IV 
can be summarized as follows using the three categories of 
variables on the left-hand side of the Contingency Model: 
(a) the leader-member relations were quite "good" primarily 
due to the general respect for Captain Vere by both officers 
and crew, (b) the task or mission was highly "structured" 
since the Bellipotent was governed by Admiralty directives as 
well as the Articles of War, and (c) leader position power 
was very "strong" resulting from a combination of both (a) 
and (c). Collectively, these three variables in Octant I 
of Fiedler's Contingency Model depict a very strong case 
for a positive situational favorableness for leaders in 
general and especially favorable for task-motivated (low 
LPC) leaders such as Captain Vere. 
Captain Vere 
Since Vere was portrayed and analyzed (Chapter VII) as 
a very task-motivated (low LPC) leader with respect to the 
Fiedler Contingency Model. the predictability of his effec­
tiveness was quite favorable for him in an Octant I situa­
tion. Though there was a compassionate side to Vere's 
character, an important attribute of a relationship-motivated 
(high LPC) leader, his primary allegiance was to temporal 
law and martial duty in the accomplishment of his wartime 
mission. Briefly, Vere's natural and considerate, inclina­
tions toward Billy became secondary to his unwavering sense 
of duty. 
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It should be noted, however, that the uniqueness of 
Billy's action within existing circumstances caused a 
relatively "unstructured" task situation for Vere within 
the highly structured warship environment of the Bellipotent. 
Coupled with a momentary straining of "leader member 
relations" during the pronouncement of verdict and subse­
quent execution scenes, evidence showed that Octant I 
variables had shifted to the right of Fiedler's Model to an 
Octant VII situation which is depicted as "unfavorable" for 
leaders. Nevertheless, task-motivated leaders are predicted 
to perform well in such a contingency and Vere succeeded 
in maintaining order at this crucial juncture of circum­
stances. Whether or not Vere was morally correct is not the 
question in terms of his leadership effectiveness. Through 
Vere's efforts to maintain the order of the martial system 
above human considerations, the Bellipotent is restored to 
its original, efficient equilibrium which had existed prior 
to Billy's impressment. 
Claggart 
Claggart was an example of the classic task-motivated 
(low LPC) leader with respect to Fiedler's Contingency 
Model and performed predictably in the contingent situational 
favorableness delineated in Chapter IV. His effectiveness 
was morally negative as his monomania to destroy Billy 
became masked by his subtlety and cunning deceit. Even the 
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onerousness of the master-at-arms' position aboard ship did 
not deter Claggart from accomplishing his personal mission 
amidst the general negative feeling toward him from the 
crew. However, as a task-motivated (low LPC) leader, 
Claggart did not consider positive personal relationships 
among co-workers as necessary to the achievement of a task. 
Organizationally, Claggart functioned effectively within 
the highly disciplined environment of the Bellipotent. 
Positional authority was well delineated and demanded little 
personal motivation of others to comply with the achievement 
of prescribed tasks. Claggart's paranoiac mistrust of others 
enhanced his carrying out his "police" function through a 
covert network of "understrappers." Thus, it is easy to see 
why a character such as Billy, so free of guile and deceit, 
must have confounded Claggart, the task-motivated, driving, 
organizational opportunist. Perceiving Billy as nothing 
more than innocent was too much for Claggart to bear and in 
his destruction of Billy Budd, he himself was destroyed. 
Billy Budd 
The evidence presented in Chapter V revealed that Billy 
Budd was an ideally charismatic, informal leader. His 
charisma was not used to influence others toward some 
economic or political goal in the Weberian sense. Rather, 
his presence seemed to make those around him more aware of 
their intrinsic, natural inclinations of humanism and 
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brotherhood. As an informal leader, Billy did not influence 
by power or positional authority but through personal 
example. The aura of his presence transcended "measured 
forms" of legal law and military regulation and was exhibited 
by a contagious, sincere concern for his fellow man. 
Inferential analysis, therefore, showed that Billy Budd 
was an ideal example of the relationship-motivated (high 
LPC) leader with respect to Fiedler's Contingency Model. 
Personal relationships were extremely important to Billy 
even to the detriment of task accomplishment or physical 
survival. He possessed great trust for others, often inter­
preted as his tragic flaw of naivet£ and innocence. Billy's 
natural goodness endeared him to his mates and superiors in 
formal leadership positions. Had he been tainted with the 
intelligent deceit of Claggart, the dutiful pragmatism of 
Vere, or the wise cynicism of the Dansker, Billy would have 
acted more as the worldly organization man and survived. 
Predictably, Billy did not survive and could not have 
been effective in retaliation to Claggart's design. Unlike 
the contingency factors aboard the Rights-of-Man (Chapter IV) 
which reflected a combination of variables of Octants IV 
and V of Fiedler's Model, the situational contingencies 
aboard the Bellipotent heavily reflect leader favorableness 
in Octant I where task-motivated (low LPC) leaders are most 
effective. Almost from the beginning of his impressment 
when Billy was harshly commanded to sit down in the whale 
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boat taking him from his symbolic Rights, his charismatic 
naturalness was in conflict with the unnaturalness of military 
law and regulation. Though effective as a relationship-
motivated leader in his duties and in his relations with 
all save Claggart, Billy can not and did not survive this 
man-of-war world but transcended to another. 
The Situational Contingency Aboard the Caine 
When Queeg reported aboard the Caine to relieve De 
Vriess, the contingency of situational variables is reflected 
by Octant I in Fiedler's Contingency Model. The obvious 
rapport between De Vriess and his men suggested "good" 
leader-member relations. The Caine's task was highly 
"structured" since her wartime mission of rninesweeping and 
escort duty was well delineated by naval directives. 
Occasionally the "slackness" of the crew in port might imply 
an apparent unstructured situation aboard the "hooligan Navy" 
of the decrepit Caine which would suggest a shift to Octant 
III in Fiedler's Model. However, the performance of the 
Caine consistently exceeded that of other DMS's in accomplish­
ment of prescribed tasks. This, coupled with the "strong" 
leader position power of DeVriess revealed an Octant I 
situation when Queeg reported aboard. 
During the months following Queeg's assumption of 
command, the combination of situational variables produces 
contingencies toward the right-hand spectrum of Fiedler's 
Model. Queeg's negative influence on the officers and 
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crew produced a deterioration in leader-member relations. 
Incessant and absurd directives from Queeg caused a "circle 
of compliance" around the skipper with many tasks becoming 
relatively unstructured as compared to the situation under 
De Vriess when morale was much higher. Leader position power, 
however, remained "strong" due to Queeg's positional authority. 
In effect, Queeg caused a shift of variables to the combina­
tion depicted in Octant VII. 
The critical event of the typhoon caused one more shift 
to the right from Octant VII to Octant VIII of Fiedler's 
Contingency Model. The variable of leader position power 
changed from "strong" to "weak" as Maryk assumed command 
under Article 184 despite protest from Queeg. Eventually 
Maryk's influence reinstated the situational variables 
aboard the Caine back to the original contingency of Octant I. 
All of the octants of contingency just described (I, 
III, VII, and VIII) are conducive to effective performance 
by task-motivated leaders according to the parameters of 
Fiedler's Contingency Model. Even though Octants I and III 
are considered to be situations "favorable" for leaders and 
Octants VII and VIII "unfavorable" for leaders, task-
motivated leadership should still be effective in all these 
octants. However, the premise of leader competence must be 
assumed if Fiedler's theory is to have validity and this 
quality was sorely lacking in Queeg. 
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Phillip Francis Queeg 
Competence may be defined as the ability, fitness, or 
capacity to achieve an acceptable level of performance 
whether the results are concrete or abstract. Militarily, 
Queeg had the training to become a competent commanding 
officer (Annapolis, excellent sea duty), but his mental 
condition precluded effectiveness in a positive direction. 
Depicted as an extreme and somewhat absurd example of 
Fiedler's task-motivated leader, Queeg's paranoia, persecu­
tion complex, low self-esteem, and general neuroses negated 
his ability to be effective by acceptable standards regard­
less of the contingency octant in Fiedler's Contingency 
Model. 
Of course, Queeg was effective in achieving adherence 
to his petty demands but the result was in a negative 
direction toward contingency octants VII and VIII which are 
"unfavorable" for leaders in general. Queeg regarded 
personal relationships as secondary (disdain for reserves 
and enlisted men) to accomplishing what he desired whether 
it was a military mission or his own petty tasks. Queeg's 
mental incompetence prevented him from perceiving the 
positive aspects of De Vriess' leadership characterized as 
effective in Octant I of Fiedler's Contingency Model. The 
negative aspects of Queeg's effectiveness in terms of leader 




In stark contrast to Queeg, Maryk was an ideal blend 
of both the task-motivated and relationship-motivated leader 
in Fiedler's Model. The most competent shiphandler aboard 
the Caine, Maryk also understood the engineering plant, 
standard operating procedures of the fleet, and the most 
efficient ways to deploy sweep gear in order to accomplish 
the Caine1s wartime mission. Maryk's functional/operational 
competence made him an effective leader not only in Octant 
I under De Vriess but also in Octants VII and VIII when he 
finally relieved the incompetent Queeg. 
Just as important, Maryk's functional understanding of 
naval operations was coupled with his natural understanding 
of the crew. Maryk's socioeconomic background enhanced his 
insight concerning the crew's motivations and aspirations. 
Like De Vriess, he knew when to tighten and relax regulation 
in order to derive maximum performance from the crew in 
important situations. 
In view of Maryk's dual motivation as a leader, he 
acted predictably with respect to the situational variables 
in Fiedler's Contingency Model as discussed in Chapters IX 
and X. Despite the fact that Maryk performed effectively 
in an operational sense, it was his lack of effectiveness 
politically which was his undoing and caused him to become 
the proverbial "man in the middle" between a wary crew, an 
incompetent skipper, and a disgruntled wardroom of officers. 
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Had he been more politically astute in terms of verbalizing 
his convictions effectively, Maryk might have gotten 
action from Halsey in having Queeg relieved. 
Tom Keefer 
The catalyst of the events which led to Queeg's relief 
was LT. Tom Keefer. The evidence presented in Chapter X 
portrayed Keefer as the epitome of the "disgruntled civilian." 
He is difficult to place in a leadership category within 
Fiedler's Contingency Model due to his reluctance or ina­
bility to act on his perceptions toward a meaningful con­
clusion. From the beginning of the novel through the 
court-martial, Keefer incited others to view Queeg in 
terms of mental incompetence, while protecting himself from 
blame with an evasive verbal dexterity. 
Probably the most logical placement of Keefer in 
Fiedler's Contingency Model would be to consider his overall 
character as reflective of the relationship-motivated 
(high LPC) leader. He tended to value his rapport with his 
fellow officers as their informal leader against the tyranni­
cal Queeg and even seemed sympathetic toward the crew's 
plight as victims of the navy system. Through devious 
design, Keefer was effective as an informal, relationship-
motivated leader who instigated the events which ultimately 
led to the relief of Queeg. 
Predictably, however, Keefer failed miserably when he 
was made skipper of the Caine. Ironically, he gradually 
2 
became like Queeg as he showed ineffectiveness in both 
Octants I and VII since task-motivated leaders normally 
perform best in these octants. Willie Keith had to take 
effective action during, the kamikaze attack which produced 
the variables of an Octant VII situation. 
Willie Keith 
Willie represented leadership maturation with respect 
to Fiedler's Contingency Model. The evidence presented in 
Chapter X revealed Willie's changing perceptions of leader­
ship roles (Queeg vs. De Vriess) which in turn defined his 
own self-perceptions as a leader. His decision to support 
Maryk in approving Stillwell's seventy-two-hour pass as 
well as to back Maryk in relieving Queeg were the moral 
decisions of a (high LPC) relationship-motivated leader. 
Had 'Willie gone strictly "by the book" as is typical of a 
task-motivated leader, he would have backed Queeg in his 
decision to maintain fleet course ordered by the tactical 
commander. 
However, his competence as the last skipper of the 
Caine reflected the characteristics of a task-motivated 
(low LPC) leader. He was not only effective in the prevail 
ing Octant I situation aboard the Caine but reacted pre­
dictably well during the Octant VII situation of the kami­
kaze attack. Briefly, Keith reflected much of the dual 
leadership motivation of Maryk but he was also a mature 
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intellectual version of the immature Keefer. This unique 
blend of leadership qualities enabled him to become effec­
tive in situational contingencies both favorable and 
unfavorable for leaders and he, therefore, survives Queeg, 
Maryk, and Kee fe r. 
Comparison and Contrast of Leadership Types Portrayed 
in Billy Budd and The Caine Mutiny 
The conflicts portrayed in Melville's Billy Budd and 
Wouk's The Caine Mutiny provide some interesting parallels 
with respect to characters analyzed within the variables of 
Fiedler's Contingency Model. For example, both Captain Vere 
and Captain Queeg profess to be "by the book" men yet 
deviate from prescribed regulations when personal goals 
are at stake. Also, both characters are portrayed as 
task-motivated leaders who are effective in Octant I 
contingencies: Vere in a competent manner and Queeg in an 
absurd manner. 
Another interesting parallel might be drawn between 
Claggart and Keefer. Each of these men acts as the catalyst 
in the progressive events aboard his respective ship. The 
key difference in character lies in the intensity of 
motivation and manner of taking action. Claggart is a 
task-motivated leader who becomes obsessed with a monomania 
to destroy Billy even at the cost of his own destruction. 
Keefer, a relationship-motivated leader, lacks fortitude 
2 6 9 
and commitment to follow through with his accusations 
even through Maryk's court-martial. 
A final comparison and contrast of key leaders in the 
novels selected might include the characters of Billy Budd 
and Steve Maryk. Though symbolically different, they both 
become unfortunate victims of powerful systems. Obviously, 
Billy Budd is an idealistic portrayal of the more reaiisticV, 
mundane Maryk. Billy is a highly charismatic informal 
leader, while Maryk is rather stolid and occupies a posi­
tion of formal leadership. Ironically, their sincerity and 
natural inclinations are betrayed due to an inability to 
verbalize adequately their true feelings to higher authority. 
Billy reacts violently as a result of this inadequacy, 
anc MarykTs situation could have been avoided entirely had 
he felt the confidence to approach Halsey without Keefer's 
aid. 
Finally, it can be said that both Billy and Maryk 
are task-motivated in the expert performance of routine 
duty which only enhances respect for their competence. 
However, each character is also relationship-motivated as 
evidenced through admiration from their shipmates. Tragi­
cally, both Budd and Maryk become the ironic figures of 
destruction since both men are ideal in comparison to the 
system of regulated authority which ultimately destroys 
them. 
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Conclusion and Implications 
The legal and moral issues depicted both in Melville's 
Billy Budd and Wouk's The Caine Mutiny provide a crucial 
dimension in the study of leadership. This dimension 
transcends statistical analysis, graphs, and models of 
theory, although analytical inferences can be made using 
a valid leadership instrument as has been done with Fied­
ler's Contingency Model. Actions can be documented as mani­
festations of leadership effectiveness, but they remain 
only one facet of the highly complex issue of leadership. 
This is the reason why an attempt was made here to present 
comprehensively both the psychological and moral influences 
on leader decision and action. While only two settings 
highly governed by traditional military regulation have been 
presented, inferences of a universal nature can be applied 
to most other organizations, especially if they are rela­
tively large bureaucracies. 
In terms of leadership effectiveness within virtually 
all organizations, it is crucial to match an individual 
to a situation with contingency variables favorable to his 
leadership style and psychological motivation. The 
underlying premise of Fiedler's Contingency Model is that 
it is far more feasible to change an individual's situa­
tion than to change the individual in order to enhance 
leader effectiveness. A highly task-motivated leader 
(low LPC) might be very effective in a production-oriented 
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job such as supervisor of an assembly line but would be 
relatively ineffective in a "think tank" situation or a 
research laboratory. In contrast, a highly relationship-
motivated leader (high LPC) might be an excellent sales 
manager but would find it intrinsically difficult to initiate 
harsh measures on the assembly line to increase production 
quotas. 
With regard to educational organizations, the implica­
tions of this study are enormous. Most school systems are 
bureaucratic in nature and necessarily subordinate individual 
responsibility to authoritative regulation with rare 
exception. Nevertheless, schools are institutions of 
socialization where human potential must simultaneously 
"self actualize" while becoming integrated into the greater 
society. Too often, personal, self-actualization is 
suppressed for the preservation of the school system, the 
socialization instrument of societal concerns. If teachers 
and administrators merely accept this fact as "what 
is" and are not conscious of what morally "should be," 
then schools will continue to mirror inhumane mindlessness 
rather than promote guidance for constructive progress in 
the human condition. 
Bureaucracies have their Queegs, Veres, Keefers, 
Keiths, Maryks, Claggarts, and even an occasional Billy 
Budd. Each of these characters contains traits which we 
292 
might perceive in ourselves as leaders and most certainly 
traits which we might see in leaders above us either from 
a detached or subordinate point of view. Just as impor­
tantly, some of the characters may personify traits which 
we possess as leaders but do not perceive in ourselves 
even though they may be blatantly manifest to others, 
especially subordinates-. 
Hopefully this study has enabled the reader to recog­
nize strengths and weaknesses with respect to leader­
ship, not only within himself but also in superiors and 
subordinates. The personal inferences drawn from analysis 
of these pages might spark a realization about oneself or 
others which could be the beginning of one's becoirdng more 
effective through adaptation to leadership styles of 
superiors, or, in personally becoming a more effective 
leader. 
In addition to a personal analysis relative to 
leadership effectiveness, equal attention must be given to 
changing situational variables in which leadership is 
exercised. Whether leaders affect the variables (possibly 
even mould them) or whether situations create leaders is a 
timeless and insolvable question. The interaction of 
leader and situation is usually a gray area which requires 
competent judgment. Black and white situations merely 
require the administration of appropriate regulationss while 
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considerations of moral, ethical, and psychological dimen­
sions are difficult to depict in a model and play a key 
role in leadership. These dimensions, coupled with 
timing and utilizing the most appropriate leadership style 
contingent upon situational variables, continue to make 
leadership effectiveness a perpetual dilemma which evades 
quantitative or universal definition. 
It is even possible for one man in an organization to 
have that vision and ability to do the right thing 
at the right moment that is necessary to cause the 
organization to develop to its highest. The right 
thing at the right moment is a key . The problem with 
allowing minimal participation in decision-making by 
the followers is that it is often used at times when 
it should not be used and then neglected at times when, 
perhaps, it would be the better approach. It may 
be better, as a general rule, to work towards allowing 
followers as much participation in decision-making 
as possible. Nevertheless, such an approach should 
not hamper or prevent a manager from acting unilaterally 
to provide, if he is able to do so, the best decision 
that is available for the moment. (Suttles, 1977* 
P. 124) 
Questions for Further Study 
Even though the Fiedler Contingency Model is a valid 
theory of leadership effectiveness, the fluid nature of 
variables among uniquely different organizations prevents 
universal acceptance of the graph line depicted in the Model. 
However, if one desires to evaluate leaders within his 
organization, the LPC Questionnaire (Chapter II, Table 1) 
used in conjunction with the Contingency Model would provide 
valuable input to overall generalizations and conclusions. 
The results might be utilized in making decisions concerning 
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personnel shifts or transfers in an attempt to change 
workers' situations in order to enhance leader effective­
ness, productivity, and general morale. 
With regard to the Contingency Model itself, one might 
wish to study the effect of time on situational favorable-
ness. For example, many leaders who are transferred into 
an organization tend to be task-motivated initially, 
especially when radical change is expected by those in 
higher authority. However, as formal association gradually 
gives way to more personal, informal relationships, a 
leader might tend to rely more on his influence as an 
individual than on the dictates of his positional authority. 
What is the average time factor in transitional leader types 
and in which types of organizations? 
In terms of actual design, which organizations lend 
themselves to one specific leadership type and how con­
stantly does this type remain effective? This question 
could be studied with categories of organizations as points 
of reference (e.g., manufacturing, research, educational, 
service, medical, clerical, etc.). Also, what effect does 
design of the facilities in which people work, together 
with the number of people with whom they work, have on 
leadership effectiveness? Is leadership less effective 
in large, governmental, bureaucratic organizations than in 
smaller, privately-owned organizations? Which variables 
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may call for good management but not necessarily effective 
leadership 2 
Possibly, all good managers are not necessarily good 
leaders but effective leaders must also be efficient managers 
except in extreme cases of charismatic leaders. One 
point is very clear, however, and that is, most situa­
tions requiring good leadership today are complex and 
fluid in nature. While stagnant or relatively constant 
situations might call for either task- or relationship-
motivated leaders depicted by the favorableness of the 
individual octants in Fiedler's Contingency Model, fluid 
situations call for a flexible style of leadership. In 
essence, this means that today's leaders must possess 
the judgment not only to recognize the key variables 
of a particular situation but also to exercise the appro­
priate leadership style necessary to effectively deal with 
the situation in order to accomplish organizational goals. 
Thus, flexibility of leadership style is crucial to 
becoming an effective leader today. The ability to 
take necessary action in the most effective manner and 
at the right time requires both a task- and relationship-
motivated leader. The Fiedler Contingency Model provides 
an illustration of key considerations in any situation and 
some insight into the traits of leadership tendency for 
effectiveness contingent upon situations, but the intangible 
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in organizational design can be altered to enhance situa­
tional favorableness for leaders. 
Another study which might be researched is the distinc­
tion and overlap between concepts of management and 
leadership. Are the same situational variables of leader 
effectiveness also conducive to manager effectiveness? 
Is a good leader necessarily a good manager or vice versa? 
Within the field of education, numerous studies could 
be conducted to determine those variables crucial to 
effectiveness in the classroom. Do teachers have to be 
good leaders or only efficient managers, or both? If the 
answer to this question is in the affirmative, what tangible 
and intangible traits are required for a teacher to be an 
effective leader with respect to varying age groups and 
nature of subject matter? If these traits and variables 
can be identified, how can performance be fairly and 
accurately measured? Would methods of evaluation include 
a written instrument and would the evaluator be an administra' 
tor or professional colleague? 
If classrooms can be assumed to be fluid situations, 
how important would it be for teachers to be both task-
motivated (must cover the material at all costs) and 
relationship-motivated (a student is regarded as an 
individual with unique needs)? Realistically, effective 
teachers are probably a blend of both leadership types but 
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why are they the exception rather than the rule? Can 
teachers really be trained to become more effective over 
time? 
This last question raises the point of whether or not 
leaders can be trained. Host executive-training programs 
are based on the premise that this can be achieved by 
compressing experience (real or vicarious) into shortened 
time frames so as to enhance effectiveness of the personnel 
undergoing the training. However, all executives or 
trainees who undergo identical leadership training do not 
necessarily become more effective leaders regardless of 
leadership style. In short, to what degree can leadership 
be taught and learned and how can this be measured over 
time in various organizations? 
One area of leadership which must be pursued further 
is the concept of perception. How an individual perceives 
himself as a leader and how he is perceived as a leader 
by others has a great deal to do with effectiveness within 
organizations. This factor of perception is crucial to 
charismatic leaders to the point that image (religious, 
political, organizational) virtually becomes more important 
than reality in the influencing of great numbers of people. 
A study of various types of media and their influence on 
the making and breaking of leaders through public percep­
tions would be invaluable to campaign managers of political 
candidates. 
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Media studies also might raise the question of 
"followership" perceptions in a changing world. In general, 
people today tend to distrust authoritative roles of 
leaders which were accepted in the past. To what extent 
did the advent of "self-awareness," civil rights, affluency, 
"me generation" thinking, rising expectations, and higher 
educational opportunities affect the public's willingness 
to accept leaders with positional authority? 
Lastly, the Fiedler Contingency Model might be altered 
to reflect a greater flexibility required of today's 
organizational leaders. The depicted graph is linear as 
are the respective octants of situational variables. The 
predictability of effectiveness of a leadership type can 
be determined by the appropriate octants of situation 
favorableness. A study might be done to redraw the 
Contingency Model so that the octants of situational 
variables form a circle with the word leader at the center. 
This would continue to be useful for evaluating leadership 
in organizations where variables are relatively constant 
and leader style is also constant for maximum effectiveness. 
A circular construction of Fiedler's Contingency Model 
might be validated with highly diversified, ever changing 
organisations to make key organizational personnel aware 
of how to become more effective leaders. 
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